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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v18 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Wed,  8 Jul 2020 17:12:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200709001234.9719-4-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200709001234.9719-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/security.h            |  7 ++++---
 kernel/auditfilter.c                |  6 ++++--
 kernel/auditsc.c                    | 14 ++++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  4 ++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  7 +++++--
 security/security.c                 | 10 ++++++++--
 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 591dae299c6f..294410533b51 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1878,7 +1878,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void **lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -1894,8 +1895,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void **lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					    u32 op, void **lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index f9a632ae7be1..15a7fb80d6a7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
 			pid_t pid;
 			u32 sid;
+			struct lsmblob blob;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_isset) {
 					security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-						   f->type, f->op,
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+						   &blob, f->type, f->op,
 						   f->lsm_rules);
 				}
 				break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index bafa03a5c866..975c3b8c8d0d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -456,6 +456,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -654,7 +655,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
 								   f->lsm_rules);
 			}
@@ -669,15 +672,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_isset) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rules);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+						lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								n->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -689,7 +694,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rules))
 					++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df93ac258e01..64bff42f5d56 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -414,8 +414,8 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					     void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
+					     u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a442b8940e93..9a0f462e8891 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
+		struct lsmblob lsmdata;
 
 		if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
 			if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+			lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, osid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+			lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid);
+			rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata,
 							rule->lsm[i].type,
 							Audit_equal,
 							rule->lsm[i].rules);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d05090bf63c6..3bbd01e8192e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2527,11 +2527,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
+		if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+			continue;
 		hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 	}
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void **lsmrule)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
 	int rc;
@@ -2539,7 +2542,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)
 	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {
 		if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
 			continue;
-		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+		if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					       field, op,
 					       &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
-- 
2.24.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-09  0:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20200709001234.9719-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-09  0:12 ` [PATCH v18 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 16:11     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-09 16:28       ` John Johansen
2020-07-09 19:24         ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 19:54         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12     ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  1:30     ` Jann Horn
2020-07-24  1:08       ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09  0:12   ` [PATCH v18 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler

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