From: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> To: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>, Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>, Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Subject: [PATCH 3/4] sh: Add SECCOMP_FILTER Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 23:13:21 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200722231322.419642-3-kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200722231322.419642-1-kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Port sh to use the new SECCOMP_FILTER code. Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> --- arch/sh/Kconfig | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S | 2 ++ arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 5 +++-- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig index 32d959849df9..10b510c16841 100644 --- a/arch/sh/Kconfig +++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ config SUPERH select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD select GUP_GET_PTE_LOW_HIGH if X2TLB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S index c4d88d61890d..ad963104d22d 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S @@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ syscall_trace_entry: mov.l 7f, r11 ! Call do_syscall_trace_enter which notifies jsr @r11 ! superior (will chomp R[0-7]) nop + cmp/eq #-1, r0 + bt syscall_exit mov.l r0, @(OFF_R0,r15) ! Save return value ! Reload R0-R4 from kernel stack, where the ! parent may have modified them using diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c index 64bfb714943e..25ccfbd02bfa 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c @@ -485,8 +485,6 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { long ret = 0; - secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[0]); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) /* @@ -496,6 +494,9 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) */ ret = -1L; + if (secure_computing() = -1) + return -1; + if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[0]); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 252140a52553..6eb21685c88f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ struct seccomp_data { # define __NR_seccomp 358 # elif defined(__s390__) # define __NR_seccomp 348 +# elif defined(__sh__) +# define __NR_seccomp 372 # else # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture" # define __NR_seccomp 0xffff @@ -1622,6 +1624,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally) # define SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM regs[4] # define SYSCALL_RET regs[2] # define SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG +#elif defined(__sh__) +# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs +# define SYSCALL_NUM gpr[3] +# define SYSCALL_RET gpr[0] #else # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls" #endif @@ -1693,7 +1699,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {} #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \ - defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv) + defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv) || defined(__sh__) { regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall; } -- 2.28.0.rc1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> To: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>, Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>, Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>, Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Subject: [PATCH 3/4] sh: Add SECCOMP_FILTER Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 01:13:21 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20200722231322.419642-3-kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20200722231322.419642-1-kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> Port sh to use the new SECCOMP_FILTER code. Signed-off-by: Michael Karcher <kernel@mkarcher.dialup.fu-berlin.de> --- arch/sh/Kconfig | 1 + arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S | 2 ++ arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c | 5 +++-- tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sh/Kconfig b/arch/sh/Kconfig index 32d959849df9..10b510c16841 100644 --- a/arch/sh/Kconfig +++ b/arch/sh/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ config SUPERH select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD select GUP_GET_PTE_LOW_HIGH if X2TLB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S index c4d88d61890d..ad963104d22d 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/entry-common.S @@ -368,6 +368,8 @@ syscall_trace_entry: mov.l 7f, r11 ! Call do_syscall_trace_enter which notifies jsr @r11 ! superior (will chomp R[0-7]) nop + cmp/eq #-1, r0 + bt syscall_exit mov.l r0, @(OFF_R0,r15) ! Save return value ! Reload R0-R4 from kernel stack, where the ! parent may have modified them using diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c index 64bfb714943e..25ccfbd02bfa 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c @@ -485,8 +485,6 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { long ret = 0; - secure_computing_strict(regs->regs[0]); - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) /* @@ -496,6 +494,9 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) */ ret = -1L; + if (secure_computing() == -1) + return -1; + if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[0]); diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c index 252140a52553..6eb21685c88f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c @@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ struct seccomp_data { # define __NR_seccomp 358 # elif defined(__s390__) # define __NR_seccomp 348 +# elif defined(__sh__) +# define __NR_seccomp 372 # else # warning "seccomp syscall number unknown for this architecture" # define __NR_seccomp 0xffff @@ -1622,6 +1624,10 @@ TEST_F(TRACE_poke, getpid_runs_normally) # define SYSCALL_SYSCALL_NUM regs[4] # define SYSCALL_RET regs[2] # define SYSCALL_NUM_RET_SHARE_REG +#elif defined(__sh__) +# define ARCH_REGS struct pt_regs +# define SYSCALL_NUM gpr[3] +# define SYSCALL_RET gpr[0] #else # error "Do not know how to find your architecture's registers and syscalls" #endif @@ -1693,7 +1699,7 @@ void change_syscall(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, EXPECT_EQ(0, ret) {} #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc__) || \ - defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv) + defined(__s390__) || defined(__hppa__) || defined(__riscv) || defined(__sh__) { regs.SYSCALL_NUM = syscall; } -- 2.28.0.rc1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-22 23:13 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-07-22 23:13 [PATCH 1/4] sh: Fix validation of system call number Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:13 ` Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 2/4] sh: Rearrange blocks in entry-common.S Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:13 ` Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:13 ` Michael Karcher [this message] 2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 3/4] sh: Add SECCOMP_FILTER Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-28 15:50 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-28 15:50 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-28 16:21 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-28 16:21 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-28 16:30 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-28 16:30 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-28 16:38 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-28 16:38 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-28 17:03 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-28 17:03 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-29 0:49 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-29 0:49 ` Rich Felker 2020-08-29 11:09 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-08-29 11:09 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-09-03 3:56 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 3:56 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 5:46 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 5:46 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 6:04 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-09-03 6:04 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-09-03 6:17 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 6:17 ` Rich Felker 2020-09-03 6:03 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-09-03 6:03 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:13 ` [PATCH 4/4] sh: bring syscall_set_return_value in line with other architectures Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:13 ` Michael Karcher 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:20 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/4] sh: Fix validation of system call number John Paul Adrian Glaubitz 2020-07-22 23:19 ` John Paul Adrian Glaubitz
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