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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v14 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 08:38:38 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201012153850.26996-15-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201012153850.26996-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Shadow stack memory is writable, but its VMA has VM_SHSTK instead of
VM_WRITE.  Update maybe_mkwrite() to include the shadow stack.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig        |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c   | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h      |  2 ++
 include/linux/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/huge_memory.c        |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 50 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 415fcc869afc..7578327226e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1935,6 +1935,9 @@ config AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 config X86_CET
 	def_bool n
 
+config ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
+	def_bool n
+
 config ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	def_bool n
 
@@ -1945,6 +1948,7 @@ config X86_SHADOW_STACK_USER
 	depends on AS_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
 	select X86_CET
+	select ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
 	select ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK
 	help
 	  Shadow Stacks provides protection against program stack
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index dfd82f51ba66..a9666b64bc05 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -610,6 +610,24 @@ int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
+pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK))
+		pte = pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte);
+	return pte;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK))
+		pmd = pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd);
+	return pmd;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */
+
 /**
  * reserve_top_address - reserves a hole in the top of kernel address space
  * @reserve - size of hole to reserve
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 12be96b061c7..4f6305106feb 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -969,6 +969,8 @@ static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 		pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
+	else
+		pte = arch_maybe_mkwrite(pte, vma);
 	return pte;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/pgtable.h b/include/linux/pgtable.h
index 90654cb63e9e..157f5e726896 100644
--- a/include/linux/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/pgtable.h
@@ -1356,6 +1356,30 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 }
 #endif /* !_HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE
+pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */
+static inline pte_t arch_maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return pte;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+static inline pmd_t arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	return pmd;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_MAYBE_MKWRITE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
+
 /*
  * Architecture PAGE_KERNEL_* fallbacks
  *
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index da397779a6d4..01252b00cd06 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -464,6 +464,8 @@ pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 		pmd = pmd_mkwrite(pmd);
+	else
+		pmd = arch_maybe_pmd_mkwrite(pmd, vma);
 	return pmd;
 }
 
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-12 15:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-12 15:38 [PATCH v14 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-06 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 18:16     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-06 18:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 18:32         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-11-06 18:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 19:48     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-11-06 20:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-11-06 20:14         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 19:58   ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2020-10-12 20:48     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 19/26] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-12 15:38 ` [PATCH v14 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-10-09 18:32 [PATCH v14 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-09 18:32 ` [PATCH v14 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu

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