From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>, Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>, David Safford <safford@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, "open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>, "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Subject: [PATCH v4 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 02:51:54 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201013025156.111305-2-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201013025156.111305-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..c7b1701cdac5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, int ret; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); @@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; + return -EIO; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); @@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; + return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), @@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; goto out; } if (tpm2) -- 2.25.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org, "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>, Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>, David Safford <safford@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v4 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 05:51:54 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201013025156.111305-2-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201013025156.111305-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the return value: 1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated. 2. A negative value on error. However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read counts to the user space does not make any possible sense. Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value. Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index b9fe02e5f84f..c7b1701cdac5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -403,9 +403,12 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, int ret; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) + return -EIO; + tpm_buf_reset(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND, TPM_ORD_OSAP); tpm_buf_append_u16(tb, type); tpm_buf_append_u32(tb, handle); @@ -496,8 +499,12 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, goto out; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) - goto out; + return -EIO; + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); datsize = htonl(datalen); pcrsize = htonl(pcrinfosize); @@ -601,9 +608,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); - return ret; + return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, enonce1, nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), @@ -1013,8 +1023,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; goto out; } if (tpm2) -- 2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-13 2:51 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-10-13 2:51 [PATCH v4 0/3] KEYS, trusted: a bunch of bug fixes Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-13 2:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message] 2020-10-13 2:51 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-13 2:51 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-13 2:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-13 2:51 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-13 2:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-30 8:52 ` [PATCH v4 1/3,RESEND] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-30 8:52 ` [PATCH v4 2/3,RESEND] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-10-30 8:52 ` [PATCH v4 3/3,RESEND] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-11-04 1:18 ` [PATCH v4 1/3,RESEND 2] KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-11-04 1:18 ` [PATCH v4 2/3,RESEND 2] KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-11-04 1:19 ` [PATCH v4 3/3,RESEND 2] KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations Jarkko Sakkinen 2020-11-04 7:30 ` Sumit Garg 2020-11-04 10:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20201013025156.111305-2-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \ --to=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \ --cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \ --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \ --cc=hpa@linux.intel.com \ --cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \ --cc=jmorris@namei.org \ --cc=key@linux.vnet.ibm.com \ --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=safford@linux.vnet.ibm.com \ --cc=serge@hallyn.com \ --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.