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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Tyler Hicks" <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/2] seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 13:38:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201030123849.770769-1-mic@digikod.net>

From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>

Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.

Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available.  Let's
use it!

Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 kernel/seccomp.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 8ad7a293255a..53a7d1512dd7 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
 	 * behavior of privileged children.
 	 */
 	if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
-	    security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
-				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+			!ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 
 	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
-- 
2.28.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-10-30 12:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-10-30 12:38 [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix misuse of security_capable() Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 12:38 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 15:47   ` Jann Horn
2020-10-30 16:06     ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 18:00       ` Jann Horn
2020-10-30 12:38 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2020-10-30 15:34   ` [PATCH v1 2/2] seccomp: " Jann Horn
2020-11-17 21:08 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix misuse of security_capable() Kees Cook

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