From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2020 14:26:25 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201101222626.6111-7-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy is loaded. For example, SELinux calls ima_measure_critical_data() to measure its state and policy when they are initialized. This occurs before a custom IMA policy is loaded, and hence IMA hook will not measure the data. A built-in policy is therefore needed to measure critical data provided by callers before a custom IMA policy is loaded. Add CRITICAL_DATA to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Set the IMA template for this rule to "ima-buf" since ima_measure_critical_data() measures a buffer. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index ec99e0bb6c6f..dc8fe969d3fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -813,6 +820,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) void __init ima_init_policy(void) { int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries; + struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; + int ret = 0; /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) @@ -875,6 +884,29 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) { + template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf"); + if (!template) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt, + &(template->fields), + &(template->num_fields)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + critical_data_rules[0].template = template; + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + } + +out: + if (ret) + pr_err("%s failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret); + ima_update_policy_flag(); } -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2020 14:26:25 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201101222626.6111-7-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy is loaded. For example, SELinux calls ima_measure_critical_data() to measure its state and policy when they are initialized. This occurs before a custom IMA policy is loaded, and hence IMA hook will not measure the data. A built-in policy is therefore needed to measure critical data provided by callers before a custom IMA policy is loaded. Add CRITICAL_DATA to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Set the IMA template for this rule to "ima-buf" since ima_measure_critical_data() measures a buffer. Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index ec99e0bb6c6f..dc8fe969d3fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = { + {.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +}; + /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init; @@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; +static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { @@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else @@ -813,6 +820,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) void __init ima_init_policy(void) { int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries; + struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL; + int ret = 0; /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ if (ima_policy) @@ -875,6 +884,29 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + if (ima_use_critical_data) { + template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf"); + if (!template) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt, + &(template->fields), + &(template->num_fields)); + if (ret) + goto out; + + critical_data_rules[0].template = template; + add_rules(critical_data_rules, + ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); + } + +out: + if (ret) + pr_err("%s failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret); + ima_update_policy_flag(); } -- 2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-01 22:26 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-11-01 22:26 [PATCH v5 0/7] IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] IMA: update process_buffer_measurement to measure buffer hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-05 14:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-05 14:30 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 21:47 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 21:47 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 22:19 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 22:19 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 23:16 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 23:16 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 12:11 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 12:11 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 21:48 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 21:48 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 3/7] IMA: add hook to measure critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 13:24 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 13:24 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 21:57 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 21:57 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 23:56 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 23:56 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-13 17:23 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-13 17:23 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 4/7] IMA: add policy " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 13:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 13:43 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 22:02 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 22:02 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 5/7] IMA: validate supported kernel data sources before measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 14:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 14:01 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 22:09 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 22:09 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-13 0:06 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-13 0:06 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-01 22:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 15:24 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 15:24 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 15:37 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-06 15:37 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-06 23:51 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-06 23:51 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-08 15:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-08 15:46 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-09 17:24 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-06 15:47 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-06 15:47 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-05 0:31 ` [PATCH v5 0/7] IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data Mimi Zohar 2020-11-05 0:31 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-12 22:18 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-12 22:18 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
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