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From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules
Date: Sun,  1 Nov 2020 14:26:25 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201101222626.6111-7-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>

The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely
ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy
is loaded. For example, SELinux calls ima_measure_critical_data() to
measure its state and policy when they are initialized. This occurs
before a custom IMA policy is loaded, and hence IMA hook will not
measure the data. A built-in policy is therefore needed to measure
critical data provided by callers before a custom IMA policy is loaded.

Add CRITICAL_DATA to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line
contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Set the IMA template for this rule
to "ima-buf" since ima_measure_critical_data() measures a buffer.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index ec99e0bb6c6f..dc8fe969d3fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
 };
 
+static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
 /* An array of architecture specific rules */
 static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init;
 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0)
+			ima_use_critical_data = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
 			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
 		else
@@ -813,6 +820,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
 	int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
 	if (ima_policy)
@@ -875,6 +884,29 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 			  ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
 			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
 
+	if (ima_use_critical_data) {
+		template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf");
+		if (!template) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+						&(template->fields),
+						&(template->num_fields));
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		critical_data_rules[0].template = template;
+		add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("%s failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+
 	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
	gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com
Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [dm-devel] [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules
Date: Sun,  1 Nov 2020 14:26:25 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201101222626.6111-7-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201101222626.6111-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>

From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>

The IMA hook to measure kernel critical data, namely
ima_measure_critical_data(), could be called before a custom IMA policy
is loaded. For example, SELinux calls ima_measure_critical_data() to
measure its state and policy when they are initialized. This occurs
before a custom IMA policy is loaded, and hence IMA hook will not
measure the data. A built-in policy is therefore needed to measure
critical data provided by callers before a custom IMA policy is loaded.

Add CRITICAL_DATA to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line
contains "ima_policy=critical_data". Set the IMA template for this rule
to "ima-buf" since ima_measure_critical_data() measures a buffer.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index ec99e0bb6c6f..dc8fe969d3fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
 };
 
+static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = CRITICAL_DATA, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
 /* An array of architecture specific rules */
 static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
 
 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata;
+static bool ima_use_critical_data __ro_after_init;
 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;
 static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
+		else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0)
+			ima_use_critical_data = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
 			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
 		else
@@ -813,6 +820,8 @@ static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void)
 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 {
 	int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries;
+	struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
 	if (ima_policy)
@@ -875,6 +884,29 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 			  ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules),
 			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
 
+	if (ima_use_critical_data) {
+		template = lookup_template_desc("ima-buf");
+		if (!template) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ret = template_desc_init_fields(template->fmt,
+						&(template->fields),
+						&(template->num_fields));
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+
+		critical_data_rules[0].template = template;
+		add_rules(critical_data_rules,
+			  ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules),
+			  IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("%s failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+
 	ima_update_policy_flag();
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1

--
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dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-01 22:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-01 22:26 [PATCH v5 0/7] IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] IMA: update process_buffer_measurement to measure buffer hash Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-05 14:30   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-05 14:30     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 21:47     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 21:47       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 22:19       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 22:19         ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 23:16         ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 23:16           ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 12:11   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 12:11     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 21:48     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 21:48       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 3/7] IMA: add hook to measure critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 13:24   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 13:24     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 21:57     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 21:57       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 23:56       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 23:56         ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-13 17:23         ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-13 17:23           ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 4/7] IMA: add policy " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 13:43   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 13:43     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 22:02     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 22:02       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 5/7] IMA: validate supported kernel data sources before measurement Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 14:01   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 14:01     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 22:09     ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 22:09       ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-13  0:06       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-13  0:06         ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-01 22:26 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message]
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] [PATCH v5 6/7] IMA: add critical_data to the built-in policy rules Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 15:24   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 15:24     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 15:37     ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-06 15:37       ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-06 23:51       ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-06 23:51         ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-08 15:46         ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-08 15:46           ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-09 17:24           ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-01 22:26 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-01 22:26   ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-06 15:47   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-06 15:47     ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-05  0:31 ` [PATCH v5 0/7] IMA: Infrastructure for measurement of critical kernel data Mimi Zohar
2020-11-05  0:31   ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-12 22:18   ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-12 22:18     ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi

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