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From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	Mrunal Patel <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	Geoffrey Thomas <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 31/39] audit: handle idmapped mounts
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 11:37:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201115103718.298186-32-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201115103718.298186-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Audit will sometimes log the inode's i_uid and i_gid. Enable audit to log the
mapped inode when it is accessed from an idmapped mount.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
unchanged
---
 fs/namei.c            | 14 +++++++-------
 include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++----
 ipc/mqueue.c          |  8 ++++----
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1d6a0da8bf81..976ee05c5027 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
 		return -ECHILD;
 
-	audit_inode(nd->name, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
 	audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "follow_link");
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@ int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
 		retval = path_lookupat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
 
 	if (likely(!retval))
-		audit_inode(name, path->dentry,
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(path->mnt), path->dentry,
 			    flags & LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT ? AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL : 0);
 	restore_nameidata();
 	putname(name);
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ static struct filename *filename_parentat(int dfd, struct filename *name,
 	if (likely(!retval)) {
 		*last = nd.last;
 		*type = nd.last_type;
-		audit_inode(name, parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(parent->mnt), parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 	} else {
 		putname(name);
 		name = ERR_PTR(retval);
@@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
 			if (unlikely(error))
 				return ERR_PTR(error);
 		}
-		audit_inode(nd->name, dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 		/* trailing slashes? */
 		if (unlikely(nd->last.name[nd->last.len]))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EISDIR);
@@ -3260,7 +3260,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
 			return error;
 	}
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
-		audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), nd->path.dentry, 0);
 	if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
 		if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
 			return -EEXIST;
@@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
 		goto out2;
 	dput(path.dentry);
 	path.dentry = child;
-	audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, child, 0);
 	/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
 	error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
 	if (error)
@@ -3381,7 +3381,7 @@ static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
 	struct path path;
 	int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
 	if (!error) {
-		audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, 0);
 		error = vfs_open(&path, file);
 		path_put(&path);
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b3d859831a31..217d2b0c273e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
 extern struct filename *__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr);
 extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
 extern void __audit_getcwd(void);
-extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-				unsigned int flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			  const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags);
 extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
 extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 		__audit_getcwd();
 }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags) {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
+		__audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, aflags);
 }
 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
 						const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry,
+		__audit_inode(name, &init_user_ns, dentry,
 				AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
 }
 static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 { }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags)
 { }
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 5008e87b026d..f3943b2cc003 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -849,8 +849,8 @@ static void remove_notification(struct mqueue_inode_info *info)
 	info->notify_user_ns = NULL;
 }
 
-static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
-			umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
+static int prepare_open(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *dentry,
+			int oflag, int ro, umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
 			struct mq_attr *attr)
 {
 	static const int oflag2acc[O_ACCMODE] = { MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE,
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
 				  mqueue_create_attr, attr);
 	}
 	/* it already existed */
-	audit_inode(name, dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, 0);
 	if ((oflag & (O_CREAT|O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT|O_EXCL))
 		return -EEXIST;
 	if ((oflag & O_ACCMODE) == (O_RDWR | O_WRONLY))
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static int do_mq_open(const char __user *u_name, int oflag, umode_t mode,
 		goto out_putfd;
 	}
 	path.mnt = mntget(mnt);
-	error = prepare_open(path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
+	error = prepare_open(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
 	if (!error) {
 		struct file *file = dentry_open(&path, oflag, current_cred());
 		if (!IS_ERR(file))
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ddb9213a3e81..348e6048f1b7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1936,6 +1936,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 }
 
 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+				   struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				   const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
@@ -1944,7 +1945,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 	if (!dentry)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(user_ns, dentry, &caps);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1960,21 +1961,22 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
-			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+			     struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			     const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			     unsigned int flags)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->uid   = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
+	name->gid   = i_gid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
 	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
 	}
-	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, user_ns, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1983,8 +1985,8 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
  * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
  */
-void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		   unsigned int flags)
+void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+		   const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -2078,12 +2080,12 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
 	}
 	handle_path(dentry);
-	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
+	audit_copy_inode(n, user_ns, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
 }
 
 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
 {
-	__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
+	__audit_inode(NULL, mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt), file->f_path.dentry, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2175,7 +2177,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
 		if (!n)
 			return;
-		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(n, &init_user_ns, NULL, parent, 0);
 	}
 
 	if (!found_child) {
@@ -2194,7 +2196,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 	}
 
 	if (inode)
-		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(found_child, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, 0);
 	else
 		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
 }
-- 
2.29.2

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	"OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	"Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 31/39] audit: handle idmapped mounts
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 11:37:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201115103718.298186-32-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201115103718.298186-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Audit will sometimes log the inode's i_uid and i_gid. Enable audit to log the
mapped inode when it is accessed from an idmapped mount.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
unchanged
---
 fs/namei.c            | 14 +++++++-------
 include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++----
 ipc/mqueue.c          |  8 ++++----
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1d6a0da8bf81..976ee05c5027 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
 		return -ECHILD;
 
-	audit_inode(nd->name, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
 	audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "follow_link");
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@ int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
 		retval = path_lookupat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
 
 	if (likely(!retval))
-		audit_inode(name, path->dentry,
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(path->mnt), path->dentry,
 			    flags & LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT ? AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL : 0);
 	restore_nameidata();
 	putname(name);
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ static struct filename *filename_parentat(int dfd, struct filename *name,
 	if (likely(!retval)) {
 		*last = nd.last;
 		*type = nd.last_type;
-		audit_inode(name, parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(parent->mnt), parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 	} else {
 		putname(name);
 		name = ERR_PTR(retval);
@@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
 			if (unlikely(error))
 				return ERR_PTR(error);
 		}
-		audit_inode(nd->name, dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 		/* trailing slashes? */
 		if (unlikely(nd->last.name[nd->last.len]))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EISDIR);
@@ -3260,7 +3260,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
 			return error;
 	}
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
-		audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), nd->path.dentry, 0);
 	if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
 		if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
 			return -EEXIST;
@@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
 		goto out2;
 	dput(path.dentry);
 	path.dentry = child;
-	audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, child, 0);
 	/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
 	error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
 	if (error)
@@ -3381,7 +3381,7 @@ static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
 	struct path path;
 	int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
 	if (!error) {
-		audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, 0);
 		error = vfs_open(&path, file);
 		path_put(&path);
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b3d859831a31..217d2b0c273e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
 extern struct filename *__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr);
 extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
 extern void __audit_getcwd(void);
-extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-				unsigned int flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			  const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags);
 extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
 extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 		__audit_getcwd();
 }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags) {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
+		__audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, aflags);
 }
 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
 						const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry,
+		__audit_inode(name, &init_user_ns, dentry,
 				AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
 }
 static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 { }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags)
 { }
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 5008e87b026d..f3943b2cc003 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -849,8 +849,8 @@ static void remove_notification(struct mqueue_inode_info *info)
 	info->notify_user_ns = NULL;
 }
 
-static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
-			umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
+static int prepare_open(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *dentry,
+			int oflag, int ro, umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
 			struct mq_attr *attr)
 {
 	static const int oflag2acc[O_ACCMODE] = { MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE,
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
 				  mqueue_create_attr, attr);
 	}
 	/* it already existed */
-	audit_inode(name, dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, 0);
 	if ((oflag & (O_CREAT|O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT|O_EXCL))
 		return -EEXIST;
 	if ((oflag & O_ACCMODE) == (O_RDWR | O_WRONLY))
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static int do_mq_open(const char __user *u_name, int oflag, umode_t mode,
 		goto out_putfd;
 	}
 	path.mnt = mntget(mnt);
-	error = prepare_open(path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
+	error = prepare_open(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
 	if (!error) {
 		struct file *file = dentry_open(&path, oflag, current_cred());
 		if (!IS_ERR(file))
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ddb9213a3e81..348e6048f1b7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1936,6 +1936,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 }
 
 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+				   struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				   const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
@@ -1944,7 +1945,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 	if (!dentry)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(user_ns, dentry, &caps);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1960,21 +1961,22 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
-			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+			     struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			     const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			     unsigned int flags)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->uid   = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
+	name->gid   = i_gid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
 	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
 	}
-	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, user_ns, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1983,8 +1985,8 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
  * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
  */
-void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		   unsigned int flags)
+void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+		   const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -2078,12 +2080,12 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
 	}
 	handle_path(dentry);
-	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
+	audit_copy_inode(n, user_ns, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
 }
 
 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
 {
-	__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
+	__audit_inode(NULL, mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt), file->f_path.dentry, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2175,7 +2177,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
 		if (!n)
 			return;
-		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(n, &init_user_ns, NULL, parent, 0);
 	}
 
 	if (!found_child) {
@@ -2194,7 +2196,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 	}
 
 	if (inode)
-		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(found_child, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, 0);
 	else
 		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
 }
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Phil Estes" <estesp@gmail.com>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Andreas Dilger" <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	"Tycho Andersen" <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	smbarber@chromium.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mrunal Patel" <mpatel@redhat.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, "Josh Triplett" <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
	"Seth Forshee" <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"OGAWA Hirofumi" <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>,
	"Geoffrey Thomas" <geofft@ldpreload.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	"Theodore Tso" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	"Dmitry Kasatkin" <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, "Alban Crequy" <alban@kinvolk.io>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	"Stéphane Graber" <stgraber@ubuntu.com>,
	"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 31/39] audit: handle idmapped mounts
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2020 11:37:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201115103718.298186-32-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201115103718.298186-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>

Audit will sometimes log the inode's i_uid and i_gid. Enable audit to log the
mapped inode when it is accessed from an idmapped mount.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
---
/* v2 */
unchanged
---
 fs/namei.c            | 14 +++++++-------
 include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++----
 ipc/mqueue.c          |  8 ++++----
 kernel/auditsc.c      | 26 ++++++++++++++------------
 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1d6a0da8bf81..976ee05c5027 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
 		return -ECHILD;
 
-	audit_inode(nd->name, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, nd->stack[0].link.dentry, 0);
 	audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "follow_link");
 	return -EACCES;
 }
@@ -2398,7 +2398,7 @@ int filename_lookup(int dfd, struct filename *name, unsigned flags,
 		retval = path_lookupat(&nd, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL, path);
 
 	if (likely(!retval))
-		audit_inode(name, path->dentry,
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(path->mnt), path->dentry,
 			    flags & LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT ? AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL : 0);
 	restore_nameidata();
 	putname(name);
@@ -2440,7 +2440,7 @@ static struct filename *filename_parentat(int dfd, struct filename *name,
 	if (likely(!retval)) {
 		*last = nd.last;
 		*type = nd.last_type;
-		audit_inode(name, parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(name, mnt_user_ns(parent->mnt), parent->dentry, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 	} else {
 		putname(name);
 		name = ERR_PTR(retval);
@@ -3194,7 +3194,7 @@ static const char *open_last_lookups(struct nameidata *nd,
 			if (unlikely(error))
 				return ERR_PTR(error);
 		}
-		audit_inode(nd->name, dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), dir, AUDIT_INODE_PARENT);
 		/* trailing slashes? */
 		if (unlikely(nd->last.name[nd->last.len]))
 			return ERR_PTR(-EISDIR);
@@ -3260,7 +3260,7 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
 			return error;
 	}
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
-		audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt), nd->path.dentry, 0);
 	if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
 		if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
 			return -EEXIST;
@@ -3362,7 +3362,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
 		goto out2;
 	dput(path.dentry);
 	path.dentry = child;
-	audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
+	audit_inode(nd->name, user_ns, child, 0);
 	/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
 	error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
 	if (error)
@@ -3381,7 +3381,7 @@ static int do_o_path(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags, struct file *file)
 	struct path path;
 	int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags, &path);
 	if (!error) {
-		audit_inode(nd->name, path.dentry, 0);
+		audit_inode(nd->name, mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, 0);
 		error = vfs_open(&path, file);
 		path_put(&path);
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index b3d859831a31..217d2b0c273e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -293,8 +293,8 @@ extern void __audit_syscall_exit(int ret_success, long ret_value);
 extern struct filename *__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr);
 extern void __audit_getname(struct filename *name);
 extern void __audit_getcwd(void);
-extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-				unsigned int flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			  const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags);
 extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
 extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -357,10 +357,11 @@ static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 		__audit_getcwd();
 }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags) {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry, aflags);
+		__audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, aflags);
 }
 static inline void audit_file(struct file *file)
 {
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
 						const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
-		__audit_inode(name, dentry,
+		__audit_inode(name, &init_user_ns, dentry,
 				AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
 }
 static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
@@ -587,6 +588,7 @@ static inline void audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 static inline void audit_getcwd(void)
 { }
 static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
+				struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				const struct dentry *dentry,
 				unsigned int aflags)
 { }
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 5008e87b026d..f3943b2cc003 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -849,8 +849,8 @@ static void remove_notification(struct mqueue_inode_info *info)
 	info->notify_user_ns = NULL;
 }
 
-static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
-			umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
+static int prepare_open(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *dentry,
+			int oflag, int ro, umode_t mode, struct filename *name,
 			struct mq_attr *attr)
 {
 	static const int oflag2acc[O_ACCMODE] = { MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE,
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ static int prepare_open(struct dentry *dentry, int oflag, int ro,
 				  mqueue_create_attr, attr);
 	}
 	/* it already existed */
-	audit_inode(name, dentry, 0);
+	audit_inode(name, user_ns, dentry, 0);
 	if ((oflag & (O_CREAT|O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT|O_EXCL))
 		return -EEXIST;
 	if ((oflag & O_ACCMODE) == (O_RDWR | O_WRONLY))
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ static int do_mq_open(const char __user *u_name, int oflag, umode_t mode,
 		goto out_putfd;
 	}
 	path.mnt = mntget(mnt);
-	error = prepare_open(path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
+	error = prepare_open(mnt_user_ns(path.mnt), path.dentry, oflag, ro, mode, name, attr);
 	if (!error) {
 		struct file *file = dentry_open(&path, oflag, current_cred());
 		if (!IS_ERR(file))
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index ddb9213a3e81..348e6048f1b7 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1936,6 +1936,7 @@ void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
 }
 
 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
+				   struct user_namespace *user_ns,
 				   const struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
@@ -1944,7 +1945,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 	if (!dentry)
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
+	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(user_ns, dentry, &caps);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1960,21 +1961,22 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
-			     const struct dentry *dentry,
-			     struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
+			     struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			     const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			     unsigned int flags)
 {
 	name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
 	name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
 	name->mode  = inode->i_mode;
-	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
-	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
+	name->uid   = i_uid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
+	name->gid   = i_gid_into_mnt(user_ns, inode);
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
 	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
 	}
-	audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
+	audit_copy_fcaps(name, user_ns, dentry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1983,8 +1985,8 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
  * @dentry: dentry being audited
  * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
  */
-void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-		   unsigned int flags)
+void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+		   const struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
 	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
@@ -2078,12 +2080,12 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
 		n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
 	}
 	handle_path(dentry);
-	audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
+	audit_copy_inode(n, user_ns, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
 }
 
 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
 {
-	__audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
+	__audit_inode(NULL, mnt_user_ns(file->f_path.mnt), file->f_path.dentry, 0);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2175,7 +2177,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 		n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
 		if (!n)
 			return;
-		audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(n, &init_user_ns, NULL, parent, 0);
 	}
 
 	if (!found_child) {
@@ -2194,7 +2196,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
 	}
 
 	if (inode)
-		audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
+		audit_copy_inode(found_child, &init_user_ns, dentry, inode, 0);
 	else
 		found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
 }
-- 
2.29.2

--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-11-15 10:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 189+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-15 10:36 [PATCH v2 00/39] fs: idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/39] namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 02/39] mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 03/39] namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt() Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 04/39] fs: add mount_setattr() Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 16:18   ` kernel test robot
2020-11-16  2:00   ` kernel test robot
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 05/39] tests: add mount_setattr() selftests Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 06/39] fs: add id translation helpers Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 07/39] mount: attach mappings to mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23 15:47   ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-23 15:47     ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-23 15:47     ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-23 16:24     ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-23 16:24       ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-23 16:24       ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 12:30       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 12:30         ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 12:30         ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:37         ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:37           ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:37           ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:40           ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:40             ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:40             ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:44             ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:44               ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:44               ` Tycho Andersen
2020-11-24 13:59               ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:59                 ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-24 13:59                 ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 08/39] capability: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 09/39] namei: add idmapped mount aware permission helpers Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 10/39] inode: add idmapped mount aware init and " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-28 18:12   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-11-28 18:12     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-11-28 18:12     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 11/39] attr: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-16  0:34   ` kernel test robot
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 12/39] acl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 13/39] xattr: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 14/39] commoncap: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-22 21:18   ` Paul Moore
2020-11-22 21:18     ` Paul Moore
2020-11-22 21:18     ` Paul Moore
2020-11-23  7:45     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23  7:45       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23  7:45       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 15/39] stat: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 16/39] namei: handle idmapped mounts in may_*() helpers Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 17/39] namei: introduce struct renamedata Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 18/39] namei: prepare for idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 19/39] open: handle idmapped mounts in do_truncate() Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36 ` [PATCH v2 20/39] open: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:36   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 21/39] af_unix: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 22/39] utimes: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 23/39] fcntl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 24/39] notify: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 25/39] init: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 26/39] ioctl: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 27/39] would_dump: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 28/39] exec: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 29/39] fs: add helpers for idmap mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-16  2:24   ` kernel test robot
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 30/39] apparmor: handle idmapped mounts Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2020-11-15 10:37   ` [PATCH v2 31/39] audit: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-22 22:17   ` Paul Moore
2020-11-22 22:17     ` Paul Moore
2020-11-22 22:17     ` Paul Moore
2020-11-23  7:41     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23  7:41       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23  7:41       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-23 22:06       ` Paul Moore
2020-11-23 22:06         ` Paul Moore
2020-11-23 22:06         ` Paul Moore
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 32/39] ima: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 33/39] fat: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 34/39] ext4: support " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 35/39] ecryptfs: do not mount on top of " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 36/39] overlayfs: " Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 12:31   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-11-18 10:26     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 37/39] fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 38/39] selftests: add idmapped mounts xattr selftest Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37 ` [PATCH v2 39/39] tests: add vfs/idmapped mounts test suite Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-15 10:37   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20 21:15   ` Kees Cook
2020-11-20 21:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-11-20 21:15     ` Kees Cook
2020-11-17 23:54 ` [PATCH v2 00/39] fs: idmapped mounts Jonathan Corbet
2020-11-17 23:54   ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-11-17 23:54   ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-11-18  9:45   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-18  9:45     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-18  9:45     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-18  3:51 ` Stephen Barber
2020-11-18  3:51   ` Stephen Barber
2020-11-18  3:51   ` Stephen Barber
2020-11-20  2:33 ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-11-20  2:33   ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-11-20  2:33   ` Darrick J. Wong
2020-11-20  9:10   ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20  9:10     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20  9:10     ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20  9:12     ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-20  9:12       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-20  9:12       ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-11-20 11:58       ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20 11:58         ` Christian Brauner
2020-11-20 11:58         ` Christian Brauner

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