From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 12:14:51 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201120201507.11993-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201120201507.11993-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fad361bf320e..be8db737da74 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg); int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq); @@ -1228,9 +1228,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5f9bdd62f78d..35d6bd0526a2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2341,11 +2341,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 0; - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob); + /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in + * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object + * labels associated with the ipc object. */ + context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob); context->type = AUDIT_IPC; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ea927a00de18..9c1098ecea03 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1882,10 +1882,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) -- 2.24.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 12:14:51 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20201120201507.11993-8-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201120201507.11993-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com --- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index fad361bf320e..be8db737da74 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg); int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq); @@ -1228,9 +1228,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5f9bdd62f78d..35d6bd0526a2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2341,11 +2341,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm = 0; - security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob); + /* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in + * the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object + * labels associated with the ipc object. */ + context->ipc.osid = lsmblob_value(&blob); context->type = AUDIT_IPC; } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ea927a00de18..9c1098ecea03 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1882,10 +1882,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) -- 2.24.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-20 20:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 84+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top [not found] <20201120201507.11993-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com> 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v22 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 17:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 17:54 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 19:22 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 19:43 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 19:24 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 20:06 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 20:06 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 22:14 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-28 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-28 23:20 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-29 1:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-29 1:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-29 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-29 13:53 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-29 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-29 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-12-29 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-12-29 19:16 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 05/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 11/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 12/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 13/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 14/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` [PATCH v23 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 16/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 17/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 18/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 19/23] audit: add support for non-syscall auxiliary records Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 23:06 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 23:06 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 23:06 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 0:36 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 0:36 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 7:36 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 7:36 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 7:36 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 22:51 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 22:51 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 22:51 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 0:02 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 0:02 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-21 0:02 ` kernel test robot 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` [PATCH v23 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler 2020-11-20 20:15 ` Casey Schaufler
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