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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"David P . Reed" <dpreed@deepplum.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/9] x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported
Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2020 16:26:55 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201231002702.2223707-3-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201231002702.2223707-1-seanjc@google.com>

Force all CPUs to do VMXOFF (via NMI shootdown) during an emergency
reboot if VMX is _supported_, as VMX being off on the current CPU does
not prevent other CPUs from being in VMX root (post-VMXON).  This fixes
a bug where a crash/panic reboot could leave other CPUs in VMX root and
prevent them from being woken via INIT-SIPI-SIPI in the new kernel.

Fixes: d176720d34c7 ("x86: disable VMX on all CPUs on reboot")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Reed <dpreed@deepplum.com>
[sean: reworked changelog and further tweaked comment]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 30 ++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index db115943e8bd..efbaef8b4de9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -538,31 +538,21 @@ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void)
 	local_irq_disable();
 
 	/*
-	 * We need to disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise
-	 * we risk hanging up the machine, because the CPU ignores INIT
-	 * signals when VMX is enabled.
+	 * Disable VMX on all CPUs before rebooting, otherwise we risk hanging
+	 * the machine, because the CPU blocks INIT when it's in VMX root.
 	 *
-	 * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent
-	 * state, so we use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to disable
-	 * VMX and halt.
+	 * We can't take any locks and we may be on an inconsistent state, so
+	 * use NMIs as IPIs to tell the other CPUs to exit VMX root and halt.
 	 *
-	 * For safety, we will avoid running the nmi_shootdown_cpus()
-	 * stuff unnecessarily, but we don't have a way to check
-	 * if other CPUs have VMX enabled. So we will call it only if the
-	 * CPU we are running on has VMX enabled.
-	 *
-	 * We will miss cases where VMX is not enabled on all CPUs. This
-	 * shouldn't do much harm because KVM always enable VMX on all
-	 * CPUs anyway. But we can miss it on the small window where KVM
-	 * is still enabling VMX.
+	 * Do the NMI shootdown even if VMX if off on _this_ CPU, as that
+	 * doesn't prevent a different CPU from being in VMX root operation.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_has_vmx() && cpu_vmx_enabled()) {
-		/* Disable VMX on this CPU. */
-		cpu_vmxoff();
+	if (cpu_has_vmx()) {
+		/* Safely force _this_ CPU out of VMX root operation. */
+		__cpu_emergency_vmxoff();
 
-		/* Halt and disable VMX on the other CPUs */
+		/* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */
 		nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi);
-
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.29.2.729.g45daf8777d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-12-31  0:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-31  0:26 [PATCH 0/9] x86/virt: KVM: x86: Exception handling fixes/cleanups Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:26 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/virt: Eat faults on VMXOFF in reboot flows Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:26 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2020-12-31  0:26 ` [PATCH 3/9] x86/virt: Mark flags and memory as clobbered by VMXOFF Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:26 ` [PATCH 4/9] KVM/nVMX: Use __vmx_vcpu_run in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:26 ` [PATCH 5/9] KVM: VMX: Move Intel PT shenanigans out of VMXON/VMXOFF flows Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:26 ` [PATCH 6/9] KVM: VMX: Use the kernel's version of VMXOFF Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:27 ` [PATCH 7/9] KVM: SVM: Use asm goto to handle unexpected #UD on SVM instructions Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:27 ` [PATCH 8/9] KVM: x86: Kill off __ex() and __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot() Sean Christopherson
2020-12-31  0:27 ` [PATCH 9/9] KVM: x86: Move declaration of kvm_spurious_fault() to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2021-01-27 17:26 ` [PATCH 0/9] x86/virt: KVM: x86: Exception handling fixes/cleanups Paolo Bonzini

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