[PATCH] crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, pavel@denx.de,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()
Date: Sat,  2 Jan 2021 14:59:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210102135909.5637-1-ardb@kernel.org> (raw)

Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned
accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another:
the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the
target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of
intentional tampering.

So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer
before validating the key further.

Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/ecdh.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/ecdh.c b/crypto/ecdh.c
index d56b8603dec9..96f80c8f8e30 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdh.c
@@ -39,7 +39,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
 	struct ecdh params;
 	unsigned int ndigits;
 
-	if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0)
+	if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, &params) < 0 ||
+	    params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);
-- 
2.17.1

