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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 04/13] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled'
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:21:35 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210122202144.2756381-5-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210122202144.2756381-1-seanjc@google.com>

Drop the sev_enabled flag and switch its one user over to sev_active().
sev_enabled was made redundant with the introduction of sev_status in
commit b57de6cd1639 ("x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection").
sev_enabled and sev_active() are guaranteed to be equivalent, as each is
true iff 'sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED' is true, and are only ever
written in tandem (ignoring compressed boot's version of sev_status).

Removing sev_enabled avoids confusion over whether it refers to the guest
or the host, and will also allow KVM to usurp "sev_enabled" for its own
purposes.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  1 -
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 12 +++++-------
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c |  1 -
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 31c4df123aa0..9c80c68d75b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 
 extern u64 sme_me_mask;
 extern u64 sev_status;
-extern bool sev_enabled;
 
 void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
 			 unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index c79e5736ab2b..bcca8f8f27a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
 
-bool sev_enabled __section(".data");
-
 /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
 
@@ -373,16 +371,16 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
  * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
  * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
  */
-bool sme_active(void)
-{
-	return sme_me_mask && !sev_enabled;
-}
-
 bool sev_active(void)
 {
 	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
 }
 
+bool sme_active(void)
+{
+	return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
+}
+
 /* Needs to be called from non-instrumentable code */
 bool noinstr sev_es_active(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index 6c5eb6f3f14f..0c2759b7f03a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -545,7 +545,6 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 
 		/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
-		sev_enabled = true;
 		physical_mask &= ~sme_me_mask;
 		return;
 	}
-- 
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-22 20:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-22 20:21 [PATCH v3 00/13] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 21:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 07/13] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported) Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 21:11   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky

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