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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 07/13] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported)
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:21:38 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210122202144.2756381-8-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210122202144.2756381-1-seanjc@google.com>

Enable the 'sev' and 'sev_es' module params by default instead of having
them conditioned on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT.  The extra
Kconfig is pointless as KVM SEV/SEV-ES support is already controlled via
CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV, and CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT has the
unfortunate side effect of enabling all the SEV-ES _guest_ code due to
it being dependent on CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y.

Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 2b8ebe2f1caf..75a83e2a8a89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -29,11 +29,11 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 /* enable/disable SEV support */
-static bool sev_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+static bool sev_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
 
 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
-static bool sev_es_enabled = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
 #else
 #define sev_enabled false
-- 
2.30.0.280.ga3ce27912f-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-22 21:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-22 20:21 [PATCH v3 00/13] KVM: SVM: Misc SEV cleanups Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 01/13] KVM: SVM: Zero out the VMCB array used to track SEV ASID association Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 02/13] KVM: SVM: Free sev_asid_bitmap during init if SEV setup fails Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 21:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 03/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV module params/variables to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 04/13] x86/sev: Drop redundant and potentially misleading 'sev_enabled' Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 05/13] KVM: SVM: Append "_enabled" to module-scoped SEV/SEV-ES control variables Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 06/13] KVM: SVM: Condition sev_enabled and sev_es_enabled on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-01-22 21:11   ` [PATCH v3 07/13] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV/SEV-ES functionality by default (when supported) Tom Lendacky
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 08/13] KVM: SVM: Unconditionally invoke sev_hardware_teardown() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 09/13] KVM: SVM: Explicitly check max SEV ASID during sev_hardware_setup() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 10/13] KVM: SVM: Move SEV VMCB tracking allocation to sev.c Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 11/13] KVM: SVM: Drop redundant svm_sev_enabled() helper Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 12/13] KVM: SVM: Remove an unnecessary prototype declaration of sev_flush_asids() Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 20:21 ` [PATCH v3 13/13] KVM: SVM: Skip SEV cache flush if no ASIDs have been used Sean Christopherson
2021-01-22 21:16   ` Tom Lendacky

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