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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v18 18/25] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 13:25:17 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210127212524.10188-19-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210127212524.10188-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

Can_follow_write_pte() ensures a read-only page is COWed by checking the
FOLL_COW flag, and uses pte_dirty() to validate the flag is still valid.

Like a writable data page, a shadow stack page is writable, and becomes
read-only during copy-on-write, but it is always dirty.  Thus, in the
can_follow_write_pte() check, it belongs to the writable page case and
should be excluded from the read-only page pte_dirty() check.  Apply
the same changes to can_follow_write_pmd().

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 mm/gup.c         | 8 +++++---
 mm/huge_memory.c | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index e4c224cd9661..66ab67626f57 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -357,10 +357,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte) &&
+				  !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index bfec65c9308b..eb64e2b56bc9 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1337,10 +1337,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+					struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd) &&
+				  !arch_shadow_stack_mapping(vma->vm_flags));
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1353,7 +1355,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-01-27 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-27 21:24 [PATCH v18 00/25] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 01/25] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 02/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode control-flow protection Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-29 19:42   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-29 19:58     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-01-29 20:33       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-29 20:46         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-01-29 21:13           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-29 20:00     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 03/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 04/25] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 05/25] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-29 21:00   ` [NEEDS-REVIEW] " Dave Hansen
2021-01-29 22:35     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-29 22:53       ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 22:43         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-01 22:59           ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 23:05             ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-01 23:12               ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 23:14                 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 06/25] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 07/25] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 08/25] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 09/25] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 10/25] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 11/25] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 12/25] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 13/25] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 14/25] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 15/25] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 16/25] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 17/25] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 19/25] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 20/25] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 21/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-02-01 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-01 22:58     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 22/25] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 23/25] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 24/25] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2021-01-29 17:07   ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-29 18:56     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-29 19:15       ` Dave Hansen
2021-01-29 19:53         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 21:54       ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-02-03 22:11         ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-03 22:28           ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-01-27 21:25 ` [PATCH v18 25/25] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu

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