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From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: ehabkost@redhat.com, mtosatti@redhat.com, mst@redhat.com,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org,
	"Marcel Apfelbaum" <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com, andi.kleen@intel.com,
	cohuck@redhat.com, "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	borntraeger@de.ibm.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, "David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	"Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
	pragyansri.pathi@intel.com
Subject: [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
Date: Mon,  8 Feb 2021 17:05:33 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210208060538.39276-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208060538.39276-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV.  Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c   | 14 --------------
 accel/kvm/sev-stub.c  |  4 ++--
 target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev.c     |  7 ++++++-
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 226e1556f9..e72a19aaf8 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
 
     kvm_state = s;
 
-    /*
-     * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
-     * encryption context.
-     */
-    if (ms->cgs) {
-        Error *local_err = NULL;
-        /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */
-        ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
-        if (ret < 0) {
-            error_report_err(local_err);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
     ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto err;
diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@
 
 int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 {
-    /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */
-    g_assert_not_reached();
+    /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */
+    return 0;
 }
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h"
 #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h"
 #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 
 #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
 #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
@@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s)
     uint64_t shadow_mem;
     int ret;
     struct utsname utsname;
+    Error *local_err = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize SEV context, if required
+     *
+     * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is
+     * a no-op.
+     *
+     * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support
+     * mechanism is selected.  SEV is the only mechanism available to
+     * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new
+     * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need
+     * their own initialization either here or elsewhere.
+     */
+    ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        error_report_err(local_err);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) {
         error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM");
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
 
 int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 {
-    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
+    SevGuestState *sev
+        = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
     char *devname;
     int ret, fw_error;
     uint32_t ebx;
     uint32_t host_cbitpos;
     struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
 
+    if (!sev) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true);
     if (ret) {
         error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
To: pasic@linux.ibm.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, pair@us.ibm.com,
	qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com
Cc: "Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
	cohuck@redhat.com, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	ehabkost@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com,
	mtosatti@redhat.com,
	"Richard Henderson" <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, "Greg Kurz" <groug@kaod.org>,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, pragyansri.pathi@intel.com,
	jun.nakajima@intel.com, andi.kleen@intel.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, "David Hildenbrand" <david@redhat.com>,
	"David Gibson" <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
Date: Mon,  8 Feb 2021 17:05:33 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210208060538.39276-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210208060538.39276-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>

While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV.  Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c   | 14 --------------
 accel/kvm/sev-stub.c  |  4 ++--
 target/i386/kvm/kvm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev.c     |  7 ++++++-
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 226e1556f9..e72a19aaf8 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -2180,20 +2180,6 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
 
     kvm_state = s;
 
-    /*
-     * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
-     * encryption context.
-     */
-    if (ms->cgs) {
-        Error *local_err = NULL;
-        /* FIXME handle mechanisms other than SEV */
-        ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
-        if (ret < 0) {
-            error_report_err(local_err);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
     ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto err;
diff --git a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
index 512e205f7f..9587d1b2a3 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/sev-stub.c
@@ -17,6 +17,6 @@
 
 int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 {
-    /* SEV can't be selected if it's not compiled */
-    g_assert_not_reached();
+    /* If we get here, cgs must be some non-SEV thing */
+    return 0;
 }
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
index 6dc1ee052d..4788139128 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm/kvm.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include "hw/i386/intel_iommu.h"
 #include "hw/i386/x86-iommu.h"
 #include "hw/i386/e820_memory_layout.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 
 #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
 #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
@@ -2135,6 +2136,25 @@ int kvm_arch_init(MachineState *ms, KVMState *s)
     uint64_t shadow_mem;
     int ret;
     struct utsname utsname;
+    Error *local_err = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize SEV context, if required
+     *
+     * If no memory encryption is requested (ms->cgs == NULL) this is
+     * a no-op.
+     *
+     * It's also a no-op if a non-SEV confidential guest support
+     * mechanism is selected.  SEV is the only mechanism available to
+     * select on x86 at present, so this doesn't arise, but if new
+     * mechanisms are supported in future (e.g. TDX), they'll need
+     * their own initialization either here or elsewhere.
+     */
+    ret = sev_kvm_init(ms->cgs, &local_err);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        error_report_err(local_err);
+        return ret;
+    }
 
     if (!kvm_check_extension(s, KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING)) {
         error_report("kvm: KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING not supported by KVM");
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index f9e9b5d8ae..11c9a3cc21 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -664,13 +664,18 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
 
 int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 {
-    SevGuestState *sev = SEV_GUEST(cgs);
+    SevGuestState *sev
+        = (SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
     char *devname;
     int ret, fw_error;
     uint32_t ebx;
     uint32_t host_cbitpos;
     struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
 
+    if (!sev) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true);
     if (ret) {
         error_report("%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
-- 
2.29.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-08  6:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-08  6:05 [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 01/13] qom: Allow optional sugar props David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 02/13] confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 03/13] sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 04/13] confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption() David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 05/13] confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 06/13] sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init() David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 07/13] confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` David Gibson [this message]
2021-02-08  6:05   ` [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 09/13] confidential guest support: Update documentation David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 10/13] spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 11/13] spapr: PEF: prevent migration David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 12/13] confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05 ` [PULL v9 13/13] s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:05   ` David Gibson
2021-02-08 13:00 ` [PULL v9 00/13] Cgs patches Peter Maydell
2021-02-08 13:00   ` Peter Maydell
2021-05-17 10:58 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-05-17 10:58   ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2021-02-08  6:07 David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:07 ` [PULL v9 08/13] confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code David Gibson
2021-02-08  6:07   ` David Gibson

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