From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@lst.de>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Dominik Brodowski" <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Kentaro Takeda" <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>,
"Tetsuo Handa" <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 18:01:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210316170135.226381-1-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
Hi,
This new patch group the current task security checks in a dedicated
helper current_chroot_allowed() and extend the patch description.
The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious
procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch
allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2), which may be
complementary to the use of user namespaces.
This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
time ago:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/
This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc3 . I would really
appreciate constructive reviews.
Previous versions:
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210311105242.874506-1-mic@digikod.net
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310181857.401675-1-mic@digikod.net
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310161000.382796-1-mic@digikod.net
Regards,
Mickaël Salaün (1):
fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
fs/open.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
base-commit: 1e28eed17697bcf343c6743f0028cc3b5dd88bf0
--
2.30.2
next reply other threads:[~2021-03-16 17:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-03-16 17:01 Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2021-03-16 17:01 ` [PATCH v4 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 18:43 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 19:04 ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2021-03-16 19:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 19:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-03-16 19:31 ` Jann Horn
2021-03-16 20:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
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