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From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans
Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 15:16:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210330131646.1401838-2-omosnace@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210330131646.1401838-1-omosnace@redhat.com>

Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.

To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.

The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
    # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off

On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True

While on the broken kernels, it will be different:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True

Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 90 +++++++++----------------------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 12 ++---
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 6dcb6aa4db7f..11f8f524de98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -305,86 +305,48 @@ void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
 	h->nel = 0;
 }
 
-int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+static int avtab_alloc_common(struct avtab *h, u32 nslot)
 {
-	u32 mask = 0;
-	u32 shift = 0;
-	u32 work = nrules;
-	u32 nslot = 0;
-
-	if (nrules == 0)
-		goto avtab_alloc_out;
-
-	while (work) {
-		work  = work >> 1;
-		shift++;
-	}
-	if (shift > 2)
-		shift = shift - 2;
-	nslot = 1 << shift;
-	if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
-		nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
-	mask = nslot - 1;
-
 	h->htable = kvcalloc(nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!h->htable)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
- avtab_alloc_out:
 	h->nel = 0;
 	h->nslot = nslot;
-	h->mask = mask;
-	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
-	       h->nslot, nrules);
+	h->mask = nslot - 1;
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig)
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
 {
-	int i;
-	struct avtab_node *node, *tmp, *tail;
-
-	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+	int rc;
+	u32 shift = 0;
+	u32 work = nrules;
+	u32 nslot = 0;
 
-	new->htable = kvcalloc(orig->nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!new->htable)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	new->nslot = orig->nslot;
-	new->mask = orig->mask;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < orig->nslot; i++) {
-		tail = NULL;
-		for (node = orig->htable[i]; node; node = node->next) {
-			tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
-			if (!tmp)
-				goto error;
-			tmp->key = node->key;
-			if (tmp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
-				tmp->datum.u.xperms =
-					kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep,
-							GFP_KERNEL);
-				if (!tmp->datum.u.xperms) {
-					kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, tmp);
-					goto error;
-				}
-				tmp->datum.u.xperms = node->datum.u.xperms;
-			} else
-				tmp->datum.u.data = node->datum.u.data;
-
-			if (tail)
-				tail->next = tmp;
-			else
-				new->htable[i] = tmp;
-
-			tail = tmp;
-			new->nel++;
+	if (nrules != 0) {
+		while (work) {
+			work  = work >> 1;
+			shift++;
 		}
+		if (shift > 2)
+			shift = shift - 2;
+		nslot = 1 << shift;
+		if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+			nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
 	}
 
+	rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
 	return 0;
-error:
-	avtab_destroy(new);
-	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
+{
+	return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
 }
 
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 4c4445ca9118..f2eeb36265d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct avtab {
 
 void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
-int avtab_duplicate(struct avtab *new, struct avtab *orig);
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
 struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 0b32f3ab025e..1ef74c085f2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -605,7 +605,6 @@ static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
 			struct cond_av_list *orig,
 			struct avtab *avtab)
 {
-	struct avtab_node *avnode;
 	u32 i;
 
 	memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
@@ -615,10 +614,11 @@ static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
-		avnode = avtab_search_node(avtab, &orig->nodes[i]->key);
-		if (WARN_ON(!avnode))
-			return -EINVAL;
-		new->nodes[i] = avnode;
+		new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
+						       &orig->nodes[i]->key,
+						       &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+		if (!new->nodes[i])
+			return -ENOMEM;
 		new->len++;
 	}
 
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
 {
 	int rc, i, j;
 
-	rc = avtab_duplicate(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
+	rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-- 
2.30.2


  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-30 13:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-30 13:16 [PATCH 0/3] selinux: fix changing booleans Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-30 13:16 ` Ondrej Mosnacek [this message]
2021-03-31  2:04   ` [PATCH 1/3] selinux: fix cond_list corruption when " Paul Moore
2021-03-31  9:12     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-31 23:19       ` Paul Moore
2021-04-01  7:59         ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-04-01 15:36           ` Paul Moore
2021-04-01 15:54             ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-04-01 15:56               ` Paul Moore
2021-03-30 13:16 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup() Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-05-11  1:34   ` Paul Moore
2021-03-30 13:16 ` [PATCH 3/3] selinux: constify some avtab function arguments Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-05-11  1:36   ` Paul Moore
2021-03-31  1:13 ` [PATCH 0/3] selinux: fix changing booleans Paul Moore
2021-03-31  8:23   ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2021-03-31 23:26     ` Paul Moore

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