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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v24 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2021 18:12:24 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210409151224.4tlklypbjpxcztpt@box.shutemov.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210401221104.31584-15-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

On Thu, Apr 01, 2021 at 03:10:48PM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Shadow stack accesses are those that are performed by the CPU where it
> expects to encounter a shadow stack mapping.  These accesses are performed
> implicitly by CALL/RET at the site of the shadow stack pointer.  These
> accesses are made explicitly by shadow stack management instructions like
> WRUSSQ.
> 
> Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mapping can see faults in normal,
> valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.  Shadow
> stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and
> copy-on-write.
> 
> Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow
> stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack
> mapping.
> 
> In handling a shadow stack page fault, verify it occurs within a shadow
> stack mapping.  It is always an error otherwise.  For valid shadow stack
> accesses, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write.  Because clearing
> _PAGE_DIRTY (vs. _PAGE_RW) is used to trigger the fault, shadow stack read
> fault and shadow stack write fault are not differentiated and both are
> handled as a write access.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov

  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-09 15:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-01 22:10 [PATCH v24 00/30] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 01/30] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 02/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 03/30] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 04/30] x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_CET and setup functions Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 10:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-09 15:52     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-09 17:14       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-09 23:14         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-10  9:29           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 05/30] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 06/30] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 07/30] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 08/30] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 09/30] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 10/30] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 11/30] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 12/30] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:07   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 13/30] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:10   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 14/30] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:12   ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 15/30] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:16   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 16/30] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:20   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 17/30] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:22   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 18/30] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:25   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 19/30] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:31   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 20/30] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:34   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 21/30] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-09 15:57   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-04-09 23:47     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 23/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 24/30] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce shadow stack token setup/verify routines Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-06 22:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-06 22:49     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-01 22:10 ` [PATCH v24 25/30] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-06 22:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-06 22:50     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-04-07 19:36     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2021-04-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v24 26/30] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v24 27/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v24 28/30] mm: Move arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() to arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v24 29/30] mm: Update arch_validate_flags() to include vma anonymous Yu-cheng Yu
2021-04-01 22:11 ` [PATCH v24 30/30] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu

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