From: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>, honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com, Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Raphael Gault <raphael.gault@arm.com>, Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@gmail.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 5/9] arm64: perf: Add userspace counter access disable switch Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 22:15:07 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210420031511.2348977-6-robh@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210420031511.2348977-1-robh@kernel.org> Like x86, some users may want to disable userspace PMU counter altogether. Add a sysfs 'rdpmc' file to control userspace counter access. The default is '1' which is enabled. Writing '0' disables access. In the case of multiple PMUs (i.e. big.LITTLE), the control is per PMU and userspace must disable access on each PMU. Note that x86 also supports writing '2' to globally enable user access. As there's not existing userspace support to worry about, this shouldn't be necessary for Arm. It could be added later if the need arises. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 4 ++- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c index bfbb7f449aca..1ab6308ca89c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -336,6 +336,54 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_caps_attrs, }; +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void *mm); + +static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmu *pmu = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = container_of(pmu, struct arm_pmu, pmu); + + return snprintf(buf, 40, "%d\n", cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc); +} + +static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + struct pmu *pmu = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = container_of(pmu, struct arm_pmu, pmu); + unsigned long val; + ssize_t ret; + + ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (val > 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (val != cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc) { + cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc = !!val; + if (!val) + on_each_cpu_mask(&cpu_pmu->supported_cpus, armv8pmu_disable_user_access, NULL, 1); + } + + return count; +} + +static DEVICE_ATTR(rdpmc, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, get_attr_rdpmc, set_attr_rdpmc); + +static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_rdpmc.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attr_group = { + .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attrs, +}; + /* * Perf Events' indices */ @@ -950,7 +998,8 @@ static void armv8pmu_sched_task(struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool sched_in) * If a new task has user access enabled, clear the dirty counters * to prevent the potential leak. */ - if (ctx && current->mm && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { + if (ctx && to_arm_pmu(ctx->pmu)->attr_rdpmc && + current->mm && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { armv8pmu_enable_user_access(); armv8pmu_clear_dirty_counters(to_arm_pmu(ctx->pmu)); } else { @@ -1093,7 +1142,8 @@ static int __armv8_pmuv3_map_event(struct perf_event *event, &armv8_pmuv3_perf_cache_map, ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_EVENT); - if (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) || !armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event)) + if (armpmu->attr_rdpmc && + (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) || !armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event))) event->hw.flags |= ARMPMU_EL0_RD_CNTR; /* @@ -1218,7 +1268,9 @@ static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) static int armv8pmu_undef_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 insn) { - if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { + struct arm_pmu *armpmu = *this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_armpmu); + + if (armpmu->attr_rdpmc && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { armv8pmu_enable_user_access(); return 0; } @@ -1277,6 +1329,9 @@ static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_CAPS] = caps ? caps : &armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group; + cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_RDPMC] = &armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attr_group; + cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc = true; + return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h b/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h index 1daad3b2cce5..9303cd07ac57 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h +++ b/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ enum armpmu_attr_groups { ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_EVENTS, ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_FORMATS, ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_CAPS, + ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_RDPMC, ARMPMU_NR_ATTR_GROUPS }; @@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ struct arm_pmu { int (*map_event)(struct perf_event *event); int (*filter_match)(struct perf_event *event); int num_events; - bool secure_access; /* 32-bit ARM only */ + bool secure_access:1; /* 32-bit ARM only */ + bool attr_rdpmc:1; #define ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS 0x40 DECLARE_BITMAP(pmceid_bitmap, ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS); #define ARMV8_PMUV3_EXT_COMMON_EVENT_BASE 0x4000 -- 2.27.0
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>, honnappa.nagarahalli@arm.com, Zachary.Leaf@arm.com, Raphael Gault <raphael.gault@arm.com>, Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, Itaru Kitayama <itaru.kitayama@gmail.com>, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v7 5/9] arm64: perf: Add userspace counter access disable switch Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 22:15:07 -0500 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210420031511.2348977-6-robh@kernel.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210420031511.2348977-1-robh@kernel.org> Like x86, some users may want to disable userspace PMU counter altogether. Add a sysfs 'rdpmc' file to control userspace counter access. The default is '1' which is enabled. Writing '0' disables access. In the case of multiple PMUs (i.e. big.LITTLE), the control is per PMU and userspace must disable access on each PMU. Note that x86 also supports writing '2' to globally enable user access. As there's not existing userspace support to worry about, this shouldn't be necessary for Arm. It could be added later if the need arises. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> --- arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h | 4 ++- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c index bfbb7f449aca..1ab6308ca89c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/perf_event.c @@ -336,6 +336,54 @@ static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group = { .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_caps_attrs, }; +static void armv8pmu_disable_user_access(void *mm); + +static ssize_t get_attr_rdpmc(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct pmu *pmu = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = container_of(pmu, struct arm_pmu, pmu); + + return snprintf(buf, 40, "%d\n", cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc); +} + +static ssize_t set_attr_rdpmc(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + struct pmu *pmu = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu = container_of(pmu, struct arm_pmu, pmu); + unsigned long val; + ssize_t ret; + + ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (val > 1) + return -EINVAL; + + if (val != cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc) { + cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc = !!val; + if (!val) + on_each_cpu_mask(&cpu_pmu->supported_cpus, armv8pmu_disable_user_access, NULL, 1); + } + + return count; +} + +static DEVICE_ATTR(rdpmc, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, get_attr_rdpmc, set_attr_rdpmc); + +static struct attribute *armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_rdpmc.attr, + NULL, +}; + +static const struct attribute_group armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attr_group = { + .attrs = armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attrs, +}; + /* * Perf Events' indices */ @@ -950,7 +998,8 @@ static void armv8pmu_sched_task(struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool sched_in) * If a new task has user access enabled, clear the dirty counters * to prevent the potential leak. */ - if (ctx && current->mm && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { + if (ctx && to_arm_pmu(ctx->pmu)->attr_rdpmc && + current->mm && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { armv8pmu_enable_user_access(); armv8pmu_clear_dirty_counters(to_arm_pmu(ctx->pmu)); } else { @@ -1093,7 +1142,8 @@ static int __armv8_pmuv3_map_event(struct perf_event *event, &armv8_pmuv3_perf_cache_map, ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_EVENT); - if (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) || !armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event)) + if (armpmu->attr_rdpmc && + (armv8pmu_event_want_user_access(event) || !armv8pmu_event_is_64bit(event))) event->hw.flags |= ARMPMU_EL0_RD_CNTR; /* @@ -1218,7 +1268,9 @@ static int armv8pmu_probe_pmu(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu) static int armv8pmu_undef_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 insn) { - if (atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { + struct arm_pmu *armpmu = *this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_armpmu); + + if (armpmu->attr_rdpmc && atomic_read(¤t->mm->context.pmu_direct_access)) { armv8pmu_enable_user_access(); return 0; } @@ -1277,6 +1329,9 @@ static int armv8_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *cpu_pmu, char *name, cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_CAPS] = caps ? caps : &armv8_pmuv3_caps_attr_group; + cpu_pmu->attr_groups[ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_RDPMC] = &armv8_pmuv3_rdpmc_attr_group; + cpu_pmu->attr_rdpmc = true; + return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h b/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h index 1daad3b2cce5..9303cd07ac57 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h +++ b/include/linux/perf/arm_pmu.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ enum armpmu_attr_groups { ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_EVENTS, ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_FORMATS, ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_CAPS, + ARMPMU_ATTR_GROUP_RDPMC, ARMPMU_NR_ATTR_GROUPS }; @@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ struct arm_pmu { int (*map_event)(struct perf_event *event); int (*filter_match)(struct perf_event *event); int num_events; - bool secure_access; /* 32-bit ARM only */ + bool secure_access:1; /* 32-bit ARM only */ + bool attr_rdpmc:1; #define ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS 0x40 DECLARE_BITMAP(pmceid_bitmap, ARMV8_PMUV3_MAX_COMMON_EVENTS); #define ARMV8_PMUV3_EXT_COMMON_EVENT_BASE 0x4000 -- 2.27.0 _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-20 3:15 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-04-20 3:15 [PATCH v7 0/9] arm64 userspace counter access support Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 1/9] arm64: Restrict undef hook for cpufeature registers Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 2/9] arm64: pmu: Add function implementation to update event index in userpage Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 3/9] arm64: perf: Enable PMU counter direct access for perf event Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 4/9] drivers/perf: arm_pmu: Export the per_cpu cpu_armpmu Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring [this message] 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 5/9] arm64: perf: Add userspace counter access disable switch Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 6/9] libperf: Add arm64 support to perf_mmap__read_self() Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 7/9] perf: arm64: Add test for userspace counter access on heterogeneous systems Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 16:46 ` Masayoshi Mizuma 2021-04-30 16:46 ` Masayoshi Mizuma 2021-04-30 18:17 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 18:17 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 18:20 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 18:20 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 20:16 ` Masayoshi Mizuma 2021-04-30 20:16 ` Masayoshi Mizuma 2021-05-13 9:05 ` nakamura.shun 2021-05-13 9:05 ` nakamura.shun 2021-05-13 12:37 ` Rob Herring 2021-05-13 12:37 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 8/9] perf: arm64: Add tests for 32-bit and 64-bit counter size userspace access Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` [PATCH v7 9/9] Documentation: arm64: Document PMU counters access from userspace Rob Herring 2021-04-20 3:15 ` Rob Herring 2021-04-30 18:59 ` [PATCH v7 0/9] arm64 userspace counter access support Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2021-04-30 18:59 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 2021-05-03 14:56 ` Rob Herring 2021-05-03 14:56 ` Rob Herring
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