From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <paul@paul-moore.com>, <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:37:31 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210427113732.471066-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210427113732.471066-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> This patch changes the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM infrastructure, in preparation for moving IMA and EVM to that infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- include/linux/evm.h | 19 ++++++++++++------- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 8cad46bcec9d..8b1c36c19e97 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm); +extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data); extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); @@ -102,11 +103,15 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return; } -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm) +static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data) { - return 0; + if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name) + return 0; + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 84a9b7a69b1f..d647bfd0adcd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> @@ -706,23 +707,29 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ -int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, - struct xattr *evm_xattr) +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + struct xattr *evm_xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs, base_slot, + *base_slot + 1); int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name) return 0; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || + !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; - rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 91675003a5cf..f090362550fa 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1103,9 +1103,9 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, - new_xattrs + base_slot); - if (ret) + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, &base_slot, + fs_data); + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: -- 2.25.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, paul@paul-moore.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 13:37:31 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20210427113732.471066-6-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20210427113732.471066-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com> This patch changes the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM infrastructure, in preparation for moving IMA and EVM to that infrastructure. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> --- include/linux/evm.h | 19 ++++++++++++------- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ security/security.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index 8cad46bcec9d..8b1c36c19e97 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -34,9 +34,10 @@ extern int evm_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); -extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm); +extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data); extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); @@ -102,11 +103,15 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return; } -static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *xattr_array, - struct xattr *evm) +static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data) { - return 0; + if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name) + return 0; + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 84a9b7a69b1f..d647bfd0adcd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> @@ -706,23 +707,29 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ -int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, - const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, - struct xattr *evm_xattr) +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + const struct qstr *qstr, + struct xattr *xattrs, int *base_slot, + void *fs_data) { struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + struct xattr *evm_xattr = lsm_find_xattr_slot(xattrs, base_slot, + *base_slot + 1); int rc; - if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || - !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!xattrs || !xattrs->name) return 0; + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || + !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; - rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 91675003a5cf..f090362550fa 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1103,9 +1103,9 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, - new_xattrs + base_slot); - if (ret) + ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs, &base_slot, + fs_data); + if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP) goto out; ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data); out: -- 2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-27 11:39 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-04-27 11:37 [PATCH v3 0/6] evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] security: Rewrite security_old_inode_init_security() Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] security: Pass xattrs allocated by LSMs to the inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] security: Support multiple LSMs implementing " Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu [this message] 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu 2021-04-27 11:37 ` Roberto Sassu 2021-06-08 13:02 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] evm: Prepare for moving to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
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