[PATCH 02/18] mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks

[Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>]

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>

Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment
cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a
unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which
key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is
now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key.

To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is
assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects.
This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will
not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of
mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
---
 net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h | 1 +
 net/mac80211/key.c         | 7 +++++++
 net/mac80211/key.h         | 2 ++
 net/mac80211/rx.c          | 6 ++++++
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index 8fcbaa1eedf3..874ffe7819e5 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
 	u8 rx_queue;
 	bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
 	u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
+	unsigned int key_color;
 };
 
 
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index 56c068cb49c4..f695fc80088b 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
 		       struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
 		       struct sta_info *sta)
 {
+	static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 	struct ieee80211_key *old_key;
 	int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
 	bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
@@ -850,6 +851,12 @@ int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
 	key->sdata = sdata;
 	key->sta = sta;
 
+	/*
+	 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
+	 * key and fragment cache attacks.
+	 */
+	key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
+
 	increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
 
 	ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.h b/net/mac80211/key.h
index 7ad72e9b4991..1e326c89d721 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.h
@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
 	} debugfs;
 #endif
 
+	unsigned int color;
+
 	/*
 	 * key config, must be last because it contains key
 	 * material as variable length member
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index 65fc674e27cc..531232b91bc4 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2255,6 +2255,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			 * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
 			 */
 			entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
+			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
 			memcpy(entry->last_pn,
 			       rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
 			       IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
@@ -2292,6 +2293,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 
 		if (!requires_sequential_pn(rx, fc))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
+		/* Prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks */
+		if (entry->key_color != rx->key->color)
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+
 		memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 		for (i = IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 			pn[i]++;
-- 
2.30.2