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From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value
Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 12:03:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210513100302.22027-9-jgross@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210513100302.22027-1-jgross@suse.com>

Xen frontends shouldn't BUG() in case of illegal data received from
their backends. So replace the BUG_ON()s when reading illegal data from
the ring page with negative return values.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
index 92c9a476defc..30d7ffb1e04c 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ static int __write_console(struct xencons_info *xencons,
 	cons = intf->out_cons;
 	prod = intf->out_prod;
 	mb();			/* update queue values before going on */
+
+	if (WARN_ONCE((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out),
+		      "Illegal ring page indices"))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->out));
 
 	while ((sent < len) && ((prod - cons) < sizeof(intf->out)))
@@ -114,7 +119,10 @@ static int domU_write_console(uint32_t vtermno, const char *data, int len)
 	 */
 	while (len) {
 		int sent = __write_console(cons, data, len);
-		
+
+		if (sent < 0)
+			return sent;
+
 		data += sent;
 		len -= sent;
 
@@ -138,7 +146,10 @@ static int domU_read_console(uint32_t vtermno, char *buf, int len)
 	cons = intf->in_cons;
 	prod = intf->in_prod;
 	mb();			/* get pointers before reading ring */
-	BUG_ON((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in));
+
+	if (WARN_ONCE((prod - cons) > sizeof(intf->in),
+		      "Illegal ring page indices"))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	while (cons != prod && recv < len)
 		buf[recv++] = intf->in[MASK_XENCONS_IDX(cons++, intf->in)];
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-13 10:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-13 10:02 [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 1/8] xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 2/8] xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 13:50   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 3/8] xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:01   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:11     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 4/8] xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:11   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:23     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:12       ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 15:22         ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:33           ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08  5:47             ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08  6:37               ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08  6:40                 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08  6:52                   ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08  6:56                     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 5/8] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:20   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:24     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:08   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:03 ` [PATCH 7/8] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:31   ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:03 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2021-05-13 10:16   ` [PATCH 8/8] xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value Christophe Leroy
2021-05-13 10:20     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:25   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-05-13 10:35     ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-21 10:43 ` [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2021-05-21 10:43   ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki

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