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From: ira.weiny@intel.com
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	nvdimm@lists.linux.dev, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: [PATCH V7 15/18] kmap: Add stray access protection for devmap pages
Date: Tue,  3 Aug 2021 21:32:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210804043231.2655537-16-ira.weiny@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210804043231.2655537-1-ira.weiny@intel.com>

From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

Enable PKS protection for devmap pages.  The devmap protection facility
wants to co-opt kmap_{local_page,atomic}() to mediate access to PKS
protected pages.

kmap() allows for global mappings to be established, while the PKS
facility depends on thread-local access. For this reason kmap() is not
supported, but it leaves a policy decision for what to do when kmap()
is attempted on a protected devmap page.

Neither of the 2 current DAX-capable filesystems (ext4 and xfs) perform
such global mappings.  The bulk of device drivers that would handle
devmap pages are not using kmap().  Any future filesystems that gain DAX
support, or device drivers wanting to support devmap protected pages
will need to move to kmap_local_page().  In the meantime to handle these
kmap() users call pgmap_protection_flag_invalid() to flag and invalid
use of any potentially protected pages.  This allows better debugging of
invalided uses vs catching faults later on when the address is used.

Direct-map exposure is already mitigated by default on HIGHMEM systems
because by definition HIGHMEM systems do not have large capacities of
memory in the direct map.  Therefore, to reduce complexity HIGHMEM
systems are not supported.

Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/highmem-internal.h | 5 +++++
 mm/Kconfig                       | 1 +
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/highmem-internal.h b/include/linux/highmem-internal.h
index 7902c7d8b55f..f88bc14a643b 100644
--- a/include/linux/highmem-internal.h
+++ b/include/linux/highmem-internal.h
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static inline struct page *kmap_to_page(void *addr)
 static inline void *kmap(struct page *page)
 {
 	might_sleep();
+	pgmap_protection_flag_invalid(page);
 	return page_address(page);
 }
 
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ static inline void kunmap(struct page *page)
 
 static inline void *kmap_local_page(struct page *page)
 {
+	pgmap_mk_readwrite(page);
 	return page_address(page);
 }
 
@@ -175,12 +177,14 @@ static inline void __kunmap_local(void *addr)
 #ifdef ARCH_HAS_FLUSH_ON_KUNMAP
 	kunmap_flush_on_unmap(addr);
 #endif
+	pgmap_mk_noaccess(kmap_to_page(addr));
 }
 
 static inline void *kmap_atomic(struct page *page)
 {
 	preempt_disable();
 	pagefault_disable();
+	pgmap_mk_readwrite(page);
 	return page_address(page);
 }
 
@@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ static inline void __kunmap_atomic(void *addr)
 #ifdef ARCH_HAS_FLUSH_ON_KUNMAP
 	kunmap_flush_on_unmap(addr);
 #endif
+	pgmap_mk_noaccess(kmap_to_page(addr));
 	pagefault_enable();
 	preempt_enable();
 }
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index 201d41269a36..4184d0a7531d 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -794,6 +794,7 @@ config DEVMAP_ACCESS_PROTECTION
 	bool "Access protection for memremap_pages()"
 	depends on NVDIMM_PFN
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_SUPERVISOR_PKEYS
+	depends on !HIGHMEM
 	select GENERAL_PKS_USER
 	default y
 
-- 
2.28.0.rc0.12.gb6a658bd00c9


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-04  4:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-04  4:32 [PATCH V7 00/18] PKS/PMEM: Add Stray Write Protection ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 01/18] x86/pkeys: Create pkeys_common.h ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 02/18] x86/fpu: Refactor arch_set_user_pkey_access() ira.weiny
2021-11-25 14:23   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 03/18] x86/pks: Add additional PKEY helper macros ira.weiny
2021-11-25 14:25   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-11-25 16:58     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-12-08  0:51     ` Ira Weiny
2021-12-08 15:11       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 04/18] x86/pks: Add PKS defines and Kconfig options ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 05/18] x86/pks: Add PKS setup code ira.weiny
2021-11-25 15:15   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-11-26  3:11     ` taoyi.ty
2021-11-26  9:57       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-11-26 11:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 06/18] x86/fault: Adjust WARN_ON for PKey fault ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 07/18] x86/pks: Preserve the PKRS MSR on context switch ira.weiny
2021-11-25 15:25   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 08/18] x86/entry: Preserve PKRS MSR across exceptions ira.weiny
2021-11-13  0:50   ` Ira Weiny
2021-11-25 11:19     ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-12-03  1:13     ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-11-25 14:12   ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-12-07  1:54     ` Ira Weiny
2021-12-07  4:45       ` Ira Weiny
2021-12-08  0:21       ` Thomas Gleixner
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 09/18] x86/pks: Add PKS kernel API ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 10/18] x86/pks: Introduce pks_abandon_protections() ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 11/18] x86/pks: Add PKS Test code ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 12/18] x86/pks: Add PKS fault callbacks ira.weiny
2021-08-11 21:18   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-17  3:21     ` Ira Weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 13/18] memremap_pages: Add access protection via supervisor Protection Keys (PKS) ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 14/18] memremap_pages: Add memremap.pks_fault_mode ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:57   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-08-07 19:32     ` Ira Weiny
2021-08-11 19:01   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2021-08-17  3:12     ` Ira Weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` ira.weiny [this message]
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 16/18] dax: Stray access protection for dax_direct_access() ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 17/18] nvdimm/pmem: Enable stray access protection ira.weiny
2021-08-04  4:32 ` [PATCH V7 18/18] devdax: " ira.weiny

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