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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] x86/mm: Drop bogus cacheability logic in update_xen_mappings()
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2021 10:04:41 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211130100445.31156-5-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211130100445.31156-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

There is no circumstance under which any part of the Xen image in memory wants
to have any cacheability other than Write Back.

Furthermore, unmapping random pieces of Xen like that comes with a non-trivial
risk of a Triple Fault, or other fatal condition.  Even if it appears to work,
an NMI or interrupt as a far wider reach into Xen mappings than calling
map_pages_to_xen() thrice.

Simplfy the safety checking to a BUG_ON().  It is substantially more correct
and robust than following either of the unlikely(alias) paths.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>

I'm half tempted to drop the check entirely, but in that case it would be
better to inline the result into the two callers.
---
 xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 21 +++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index 4d799032dc82..9bd4e5cc1d2f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -785,24 +785,21 @@ bool is_iomem_page(mfn_t mfn)
 
 static int update_xen_mappings(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int cacheattr)
 {
-    int err = 0;
     bool alias = mfn >= PFN_DOWN(xen_phys_start) &&
          mfn < PFN_UP(xen_phys_start + xen_virt_end - XEN_VIRT_START);
-    unsigned long xen_va =
-        XEN_VIRT_START + ((mfn - PFN_DOWN(xen_phys_start)) << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+    /*
+     * Something is catastrophically broken if someone is trying to change the
+     * cacheability of Xen in memory...
+     */
+    BUG_ON(alias);
 
     if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SELFSNOOP) )
         return 0;
 
-    if ( unlikely(alias) && cacheattr )
-        err = map_pages_to_xen(xen_va, _mfn(mfn), 1, 0);
-    if ( !err )
-        err = map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)mfn_to_virt(mfn), _mfn(mfn), 1,
-                     PAGE_HYPERVISOR | cacheattr_to_pte_flags(cacheattr));
-    if ( unlikely(alias) && !cacheattr && !err )
-        err = map_pages_to_xen(xen_va, _mfn(mfn), 1, PAGE_HYPERVISOR);
-
-    return err;
+    return map_pages_to_xen(
+        (unsigned long)mfn_to_virt(mfn), _mfn(mfn), 1,
+        PAGE_HYPERVISOR | cacheattr_to_pte_flags(cacheattr));
 }
 
 #ifndef NDEBUG
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-11-30 10:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-30 10:04 [PATCH 0/8] x86: Support for __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/boot: Drop incorrect mapping at l2_xenmap[0] Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:33   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 11:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 11:22       ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 12:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/boot: Better describe the pagetable relocation loops Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:43   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/boot: Fix data placement around __high_start() Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:49   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2021-11-30 13:11   ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/mm: Drop bogus cacheability logic in update_xen_mappings() Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 14:56     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/boot: Drop xen_virt_end Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:56   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:07     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/boot: Adjust .text/.rodata/etc permissions in one place Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 12:15   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/boot: Support __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:10   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH RFC 8/8] x86/boot: Check that permission restrictions have taken effect Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-06 18:12     ` Andrew Cooper

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