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From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com> (raw)

The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
the same sentence.

Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
the config that provides that.

Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index ab7d402c1677..a2b22d5640ec 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
    before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
    using the firmware.
 
-   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
+   Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
    and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
    attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
 
-- 
2.17.1


             reply	other threads:[~2021-12-30 17:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-30 17:19 Lukas Bulwahn [this message]
2022-01-03 22:57 ` [PATCH] Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization Jonathan Corbet

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