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From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, dalias@libc.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, guoren@kernel.org,
	sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, will@kernel.org,
	ardb@kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, deller@gmx.de, x86@kernel.org,
	linux@armlinux.org.uk, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, geert@linux-m68k.org,
	linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-um@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	green.hu@gmail.com, shorne@gmail.com, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org,
	nickhu@andestech.com, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, dinguyen@kernel.org,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, richard@nod.at, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, davem@davemloft.net
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


_______________________________________________
linux-snps-arc mailing list
linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-snps-arc

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: openrisc@lists.librecores.org
Subject: [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK@0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 13:13:15 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg = KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg = KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg = KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: linux@armlinux.org.uk, will@kernel.org, guoren@kernel.org,
	bcain@codeaurora.org, geert@linux-m68k.org, monstr@monstr.eu,
	tsbogend@alpha.franken.de, nickhu@andestech.com,
	green.hu@gmail.com, dinguyen@kernel.org, shorne@gmail.com,
	deller@gmx.de, mpe@ellerman.id.au, peterz@infradead.org,
	mingo@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
	dalias@libc.org, davem@davemloft.net, richard@nod.at,
	x86@kernel.org, jcmvbkbc@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, ardb@kernel.org,
	linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org, linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org,
	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, openrisc@lists.librecores.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lis
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok()
Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 14:13:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220216131332.1489939-2-arnd@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220216131332.1489939-1-arnd@kernel.org>

From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

Three architectures check the end of a user access against the
address limit without taking a possible overflow into account.
Passing a negative length or another overflow in here returns
success when it should not.

Use the most common correct implementation here, which optimizes
for a constant 'size' argument, and turns the common case into a
single comparison.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: da551281947c ("csky: User access")
Fixes: f663b60f5215 ("microblaze: Fix uaccess_ok macro")
Fixes: 7567746e1c0d ("Hexagon: Add user access functions")
Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
---
 arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h       |  7 +++----
 arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h    | 18 +++++++++---------
 arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h | 19 ++++---------------
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c40f06ee8d3e..ac5a54f57d40 100644
--- a/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/csky/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 #define __ASM_CSKY_UACCESS_H
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(uaccess_kernel() ? KERNEL_DS.seg : get_fs().seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
 
 static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	unsigned long limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	return ((addr < limit) && ((addr + size) < limit));
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
 
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
index ef5bfef8d490..719ba3f3c45c 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -25,17 +25,17 @@
  * Returns true (nonzero) if the memory block *may* be valid, false (zero)
  * if it is definitely invalid.
  *
- * User address space in Hexagon, like x86, goes to 0xbfffffff, so the
- * simple MSB-based tests used by MIPS won't work.  Some further
- * optimization is probably possible here, but for now, keep it
- * reasonably simple and not *too* slow.  After all, we've got the
- * MMU for backup.
  */
+#define uaccess_kernel() (get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
+#define user_addr_max() (uaccess_kernel() ? ~0UL : TASK_SIZE)
 
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
-	((get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg) || \
-	(((unsigned long)addr < get_fs().seg) && \
-	  (unsigned long)size < (get_fs().seg - (unsigned long)addr)))
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long limit = TASK_SIZE;
+
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
+}
+#define __access_ok __access_ok
 
 /*
  * When a kernel-mode page fault is taken, the faulting instruction
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
index d2a8ef9f8978..5b6e0e7788f4 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/microblaze/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -39,24 +39,13 @@
 
 # define uaccess_kernel()	(get_fs().seg == KERNEL_DS.seg)
 
-static inline int access_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
+static inline int __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
 {
-	if (!size)
-		goto ok;
+	unsigned long limit = user_addr_max();
 
-	if ((get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr)) ||
-			(get_fs().seg < ((unsigned long)addr + size - 1))) {
-		pr_devel("ACCESS fail at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-		return 0;
-	}
-ok:
-	pr_devel("ACCESS OK at 0x%08x (size 0x%x), seg 0x%08x\n",
-			(__force u32)addr, (u32)size,
-			(u32)get_fs().seg);
-	return 1;
+	return (size <= limit) && (addr <= (limit - size));
 }
+#define access_ok(addr, size) __access_ok((unsigned long)addr, size)
 
 # define __FIXUP_SECTION	".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
 # define __EX_TABLE_SECTION	".section __ex_table,\"a\"\n"
-- 
2.29.2


  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-16 13:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 528+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-16 13:13 [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [PATCH v2 01/18] uaccess: fix integer overflow on access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] uaccess: fix nios2 and microblaze get_user_8() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:35   ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:35     ` David Laight
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:28   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:28     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] nds32: fix access_ok() checks in get/put_user Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:25     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get, put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [PATCH v2 04/18] sparc64: add __{get,put}_kernel_nocheck() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86: remove __range_not_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:28   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:28     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:29     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:29       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 15:45     ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 15:45       ` David Laight
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86: use more conventional access_ok() definition Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] nios2: drop access_ok() check from __put_user() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:29   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:29     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-23 23:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-23 23:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-24  7:05     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  7:05       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:30   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  8:55   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` [OpenRISC] [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get, put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` [PATCH v2 08/18] uaccess: add generic __{get,put}_kernel_nofault Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  8:55     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] mips: use simpler access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 13:24   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 13:24     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 14:31     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 14:31       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-21 15:21       ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-21 15:21         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36       ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-22 16:36         ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23 20:05     ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` [OpenRISC] " Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23 20:05       ` Linus Torvalds
2022-02-23  7:41   ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` [OpenRISC] " Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  7:41     ` Thomas Bogendoerfer
2022-02-23  9:26     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-23  9:26       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] m68k: fix access_ok for coldfire Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:30   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:30     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  9:00   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:00     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:24     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:24       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] arm64: simplify access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] uaccess: fix type mismatch warnings from access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:31     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-25  4:30   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:30     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] uaccess: generalize access_ok() Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:52     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 19:15   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-17 19:15     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  7:16     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:16       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:30     ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` [OpenRISC] " David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18  9:30       ` David Laight
2022-02-18 18:07       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` [OpenRISC] " Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18 18:07         ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-02-18  6:34   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:34     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:23     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:23       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:04   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` [OpenRISC] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-18  9:04     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2022-02-24  8:29   ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:29     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:41     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-24  8:41       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-25  4:31   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:31     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/test_lockup: fix kernel pointer check for separate address spaces Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:35   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:35     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:15     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:15       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] sparc64: remove CONFIG_SET_FS support Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:34   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:34     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:41       ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:01       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:01         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] sh: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  6:36   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:36     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] ia64: " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] uaccess: drop maining CONFIG_SET_FS users Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 13:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 18:44   ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` [OpenRISC] " Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 18:44     ` Sam Ravnborg
2022-02-16 22:02     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-16 22:02       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17 22:36   ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` [OpenRISC] " Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-17 22:36     ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-02-18  6:37   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` [OpenRISC] " Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  6:37     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-02-18  7:10     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  7:10       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18 10:18   ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` [OpenRISC] " Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-18 10:18     ` Sergey Matyukevich
2022-02-24  8:45   ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` [OpenRISC] " Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-24  8:45     ` Stafford Horne
2022-02-25  4:33   ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` [OpenRISC] " Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-25  4:33     ` Dinh Nguyen
2022-02-17  7:20 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] clean up asm/uaccess.h, kill set_fs for good Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  7:49   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  7:49     ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  2:21     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21       ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21       ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21       ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21       ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  2:21       ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  9:20       ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  9:20         ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-18  1:50   ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` [OpenRISC] " Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18  1:50     ` Al Viro
2022-02-18 10:01     ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` [OpenRISC] " Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-18 10:01       ` Christophe Leroy
2022-02-17  8:13 ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` [OpenRISC] " Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann
2022-02-17  8:13   ` Arnd Bergmann

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