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From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>,
	"Hannes Reinecke" <hare@suse.de>, "Torsten Duwe" <duwe@suse.de>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, "Nicolai Stange" <nstange@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH v4 15/15] crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 13:11:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220221121101.1615-16-nstange@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220221121101.1615-1-nstange@suse.de>

As the ->q in struct dh_ctx gets never set anywhere, the code in
dh_is_pubkey_valid() for doing the full public key validation in accordance
to SP800-56Arev3 is effectively dead.

However, for safe-prime groups Q = (P - 1)/2 by definition and
as the safe-prime groups are the only possible groups in FIPS mode (via
those ffdheXYZ() templates), this enables dh_is_pubkey_valid() to calculate
Q on the fly for these.
Implement this.

With this change, the last code accessing struct dh_ctx's ->q is now gone.
Remove this member from struct dh_ctx.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
---
 crypto/dh.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/dh.c b/crypto/dh.c
index d0d24f615b2d..cca289477485 100644
--- a/crypto/dh.c
+++ b/crypto/dh.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
 
 struct dh_ctx {
 	MPI p;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
-	MPI q;	/* Value is optional. */
 	MPI g;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
 	MPI xa;	/* Value is guaranteed to be set. */
 };
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ struct dh_ctx {
 static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	mpi_free(ctx->p);
-	mpi_free(ctx->q);
 	mpi_free(ctx->g);
 	mpi_free(ctx->xa);
 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
@@ -99,11 +97,12 @@ static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf,
 /*
  * SP800-56A public key verification:
  *
- * * If Q is provided as part of the domain paramenters, a full validation
- *   according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
+ * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed
+ *   trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A
+ *   section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed.
  *
- * * If Q is not provided, a partial validation according to SP800-56A section
- *   5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
+ * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation
+ *   according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed.
  */
 static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
 {
@@ -114,21 +113,40 @@ static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y)
 	 * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2.
 	 *
 	 * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1
-	 * as the mpi_sub_ui function is yet missing.
+	 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that
+	 * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and
+	 * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1.
 	 */
 	if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p */
-	if (ctx->q) {
-		MPI val = mpi_alloc(0);
+	/*
+	 * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p
+	 *
+	 * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2.
+	 */
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		MPI val, q;
 		int ret;
 
+		val = mpi_alloc(0);
 		if (!val)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		ret = mpi_powm(val, y, ctx->q, ctx->p);
+		q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p));
+		if (!q) {
+			mpi_free(val);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one
+		 * from it before shifting to the right.
+		 */
+		mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1);
 
+		ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p);
+		mpi_free(q);
 		if (ret) {
 			mpi_free(val);
 			return ret;
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-02-21 12:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-21 12:10 [PATCH v4 00/15] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] crypto: kpp - provide support for KPP template instances Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 13:18   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] crypto: kpp - provide support for KPP spawns Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:11   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:12   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] crypto: dh - split out deserialization code from crypto_dh_decode() Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:13   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] crypto: dh - introduce common code for built-in safe-prime group support Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:14   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] crypto: dh - implement ffdheXYZ(dh) templates Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:15   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] crypto: testmgr - add known answer tests for " Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:16   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive for ffdheXYZ(dh) Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:17   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] crypto: testmgr - add keygen tests for ffdheXYZ(dh) templates Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:18   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] crypto: dh - allow for passing NULL to the ffdheXYZ(dh)s' ->set_secret() Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:18   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] crypto: api - allow algs only in specific constructions in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:19   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:10 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] crypto: dh - disallow plain "dh" usage " Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 14:19   ` Hannes Reinecke
2022-02-21 12:11 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] lib/mpi: export mpi_rshift Nicolai Stange
2022-02-21 12:11 ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2022-02-21 14:20   ` [PATCH v4 15/15] crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification Hannes Reinecke
2022-03-02 22:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Herbert Xu

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