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From: Li Zhengyu <lizhengyu3@huawei.com>
To: <palmer@dabbelt.com>, <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Cc: <alex@ghiti.fr>, <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, <bjorn.topel@gmail.com>,
	<ebiederm@xmission.com>, <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>,
	<jszhang@kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	<mick@ics.forth.gr>, <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	<penberg@kernel.org>, <sunnanyong@huawei.com>,
	<wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 -next 2/6] RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:09:10 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220408100914.150110-3-lizhengyu3@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220408100914.150110-1-lizhengyu3@huawei.com>

From: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>

The pointer to buffer loading kernel binaries is in kernel space for
kexec_fil mode, When copy_from_user copies data from pointer to a block
of memory, it checkes that the pointer is in the user space range, on
RISCV-V that is:

static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
{
	return size <= TASK_SIZE && addr <= TASK_SIZE - size;
}

and TASK_SIZE is 0x4000000000 for 64-bits, which now causes
copy_from_user to reject the access of the field 'buf' of struct
kexec_segment that is in range [CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE,
CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET), is invalid user space pointer.

This patch fixes this issue by skipping access_ok(), use mempcy() instead.

Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index cbef0fc73afa..df8e24559035 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
 		if (image->segment[i].memsz <= sizeof(fdt))
 			continue;
 
-		if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
+		if (image->file_mode)
+			memcpy(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt));
+		else if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
 			continue;
 
 		if (fdt_check_header(&fdt))
-- 
2.17.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Li Zhengyu <lizhengyu3@huawei.com>
To: <palmer@dabbelt.com>, <liaochang1@huawei.com>
Cc: <alex@ghiti.fr>, <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>, <bjorn.topel@gmail.com>,
	<ebiederm@xmission.com>, <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>,
	<jszhang@kernel.org>, <kexec@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>,
	<mick@ics.forth.gr>, <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	<penberg@kernel.org>, <sunnanyong@huawei.com>,
	<wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 -next 2/6] RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:09:10 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220408100914.150110-3-lizhengyu3@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220408100914.150110-1-lizhengyu3@huawei.com>

From: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>

The pointer to buffer loading kernel binaries is in kernel space for
kexec_fil mode, When copy_from_user copies data from pointer to a block
of memory, it checkes that the pointer is in the user space range, on
RISCV-V that is:

static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
{
	return size <= TASK_SIZE && addr <= TASK_SIZE - size;
}

and TASK_SIZE is 0x4000000000 for 64-bits, which now causes
copy_from_user to reject the access of the field 'buf' of struct
kexec_segment that is in range [CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE,
CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET), is invalid user space pointer.

This patch fixes this issue by skipping access_ok(), use mempcy() instead.

Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index cbef0fc73afa..df8e24559035 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
 		if (image->segment[i].memsz <= sizeof(fdt))
 			continue;
 
-		if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
+		if (image->file_mode)
+			memcpy(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt));
+		else if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
 			continue;
 
 		if (fdt_check_header(&fdt))
-- 
2.17.1


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Li Zhengyu <lizhengyu3@huawei.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 -next 2/6] RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 18:09:10 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220408100914.150110-3-lizhengyu3@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220408100914.150110-1-lizhengyu3@huawei.com>

From: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>

The pointer to buffer loading kernel binaries is in kernel space for
kexec_fil mode, When copy_from_user copies data from pointer to a block
of memory, it checkes that the pointer is in the user space range, on
RISCV-V that is:

static inline bool __access_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size)
{
	return size <= TASK_SIZE && addr <= TASK_SIZE - size;
}

and TASK_SIZE is 0x4000000000 for 64-bits, which now causes
copy_from_user to reject the access of the field 'buf' of struct
kexec_segment that is in range [CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE,
CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET), is invalid user space pointer.

This patch fixes this issue by skipping access_ok(), use mempcy() instead.

Signed-off-by: Liao Chang <liaochang1@huawei.com>
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
index cbef0fc73afa..df8e24559035 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec.c
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
 		if (image->segment[i].memsz <= sizeof(fdt))
 			continue;
 
-		if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
+		if (image->file_mode)
+			memcpy(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt));
+		else if (copy_from_user(&fdt, image->segment[i].buf, sizeof(fdt)))
 			continue;
 
 		if (fdt_check_header(&fdt))
-- 
2.17.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-08 10:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-08 10:09 [PATCH v3 -next 0/6] riscv: kexec: add kexec_file_load() support Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` [PATCH v3 -next 1/6] kexec_file: Fix kexec_file.c build error for riscv platform Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-05-20 15:45   ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-05-20 15:45     ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-05-20 15:45     ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-05-22  3:07     ` Baoquan He
2022-05-22  3:07       ` Baoquan He
2022-05-22  3:07       ` Baoquan He
2022-04-08 10:09 ` Li Zhengyu [this message]
2022-04-08 10:09   ` [PATCH v3 -next 2/6] RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` [PATCH v3 -next 3/6] RISC-V: Add kexec_file support Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` [PATCH v3 -next 4/6] RISC-V: Support for kexec_file on panic Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` [PATCH v3 -next 5/6] RISC-V: Add purgatory Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09 ` [PATCH v3 -next 6/6] RISC-V: Load purgatory in kexec_file Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-08 10:09   ` Li Zhengyu
2022-04-21  3:15 ` [PATCH v3 -next 0/6] riscv: kexec: add kexec_file_load() support lizhengyu (E)
2022-04-21  3:15   ` lizhengyu
2022-04-21  3:15   ` lizhengyu (E)
2022-05-19  8:26 ` lizhengyu (E)
2022-05-19  8:26   ` lizhengyu
2022-05-19  8:26   ` lizhengyu (E)
2022-05-20 15:45 ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-05-20 15:45   ` Palmer Dabbelt
2022-05-20 15:45   ` Palmer Dabbelt

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