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From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:43:43 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014344.228523-4-coxu@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220414014344.228523-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".

This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.

This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
.builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys
keyring.

Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = image_probe,
 	.load = image_load,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
-- 
2.34.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>, Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>,
	Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list)
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:43:43 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014344.228523-4-coxu@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220414014344.228523-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".

This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.

This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
.builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys
keyring.

Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = image_probe,
 	.load = image_load,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
-- 
2.34.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
To: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 09:43:43 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220414014344.228523-4-coxu@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220414014344.228523-1-coxu@redhat.com>

Currently, a problem faced by arm64 is if a kernel image is signed by a
MOK key, loading it via the kexec_file_load() system call would be
rejected with the error "Lockdown: kexec: kexec of unsigned images is
restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7".

This happens because image_verify_sig uses only the primary keyring that
contains only kernel built-in keys to verify the kexec image.

This patch allows to verify arm64 kernel image signature using not only
.builtin_trusted_keys but also .platform and .secondary_trusted_keys
keyring.

Fixes: 732b7b93d849 ("arm64: kexec_file: add kernel signature verification support")
Cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org
Cc: keyrings at vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable at kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 9ec34690e255..5ed6a585f21f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/pe.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/image.h>
@@ -130,18 +129,10 @@ static void *image_load(struct kimage *image,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-static int image_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
-{
-	return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, NULL,
-				       VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
-}
-#endif
-
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_image_ops = {
 	.probe = image_probe,
 	.load = image_load,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
-	.verify_sig = image_verify_sig,
+	.verify_sig = kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig,
 #endif
 };
-- 
2.34.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-04-14  1:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-14  1:43 [PATCH v6 0/4] use more system keyrings to verify arm64 and s390 kexec kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43 ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43 ` [PATCH v6 1/4] kexec: clean up arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  3:44   ` Baoquan He
2022-04-14  3:44     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-14  3:44     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-15  9:37     ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-15  9:37       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-15  9:37       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  1:40       ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  1:40         ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  1:40         ` Baoquan He
2022-04-14  1:43 ` [PATCH v6 2/4] kexec, KEYS: make the code in bzImage64_verify_sig generic Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  1:53   ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  1:53     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  1:53     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  5:42     ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  5:42       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  5:42       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43 ` Coiby Xu [this message]
2022-04-14  1:43   ` [PATCH v6 3/4] arm64: kexec_file: use more system keyrings to verify kernel image signature Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  2:14   ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  2:14     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  2:14     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  5:46     ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  5:46       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  5:46       ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43 ` [PATCH v6 4/4] kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-14  1:43   ` Coiby Xu
2022-04-18  2:11   ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  2:11     ` Baoquan He
2022-04-18  2:11     ` Baoquan He

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