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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v37 01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:39 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220628005611.13106-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new functions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/linux/security.h     | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
 security/security.c          | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7fc4e9f49f54..5260dbe9ef0d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1919,6 +1919,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+					   void **lsmrule)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+					    void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
 
 extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
 
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-				       void **lsmrule)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					void *lsmrule)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 188b8f782220..8b176769dd86 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2580,6 +2580,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 {
-- 
2.36.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: john.johansen@canonical.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v37 01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:55:39 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220628005611.13106-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220628005611.13106-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Create real functions for the ima_filter_rule interfaces.
These replace #defines that obscure the reuse of audit
interfaces. The new functions are put in security.c because
they use security module registered hooks that we don't
want exported.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
 include/linux/security.h     | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 26 --------------------------
 security/security.c          | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7fc4e9f49f54..5260dbe9ef0d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1919,6 +1919,30 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+					   void **lsmrule)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+					    void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITYFS
 
 extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..1b5d70ac2dc9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -418,32 +418,6 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG */
 
-/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-
-#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
-#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
-
-#else
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-				       void **lsmrule)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					void *lsmrule)
-{
-	return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
-
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 188b8f782220..8b176769dd86 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2580,6 +2580,27 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+/*
+ * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
+ * the audit subsystem.
+ */
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
 {
-- 
2.36.1

--
Linux-audit mailing list
Linux-audit@redhat.com
https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit


  reply	other threads:[~2022-06-28  0:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20220628005611.13106-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-06-28  0:55 ` [PATCH v37 00/33] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2022-06-28  0:55     ` [PATCH v37 01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 02/33] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 03/33] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 04/33] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 05/33] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 07/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 08/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 09/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 10/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 12/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 13/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 14/33] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 15/33] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 16/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 17/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 18/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  5:36     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28  5:36       ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28  8:44     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28  8:44       ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28 11:24     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28 11:24       ` kernel test robot
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 19/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 20/33] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55   ` [PATCH v37 21/33] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:55     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 22/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx module selection Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 23/33] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 24/33] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 25/33] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 26/33] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 27/33] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 28/33] audit: multiple subject lsm values for netlabel Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 29/33] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 30/33] netlabel: Use a struct lsmblob in audit data Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 31/33] LSM: Removed scaffolding function lsmcontext_init Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 32/33] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56   ` [PATCH v37 33/33] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2022-06-28  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-12 21:42   ` [PATCH v37 00/33] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor John Johansen
2022-07-12 21:42     ` John Johansen
2022-07-12 21:58     ` Casey Schaufler
2022-07-12 21:58       ` Casey Schaufler

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