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From: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
To: glider@google.com
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 15/44] mm: kmsan: call KMSAN hooks from SLUB code
Date: Mon,  5 Sep 2022 14:24:23 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220905122452.2258262-16-glider@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220905122452.2258262-1-glider@google.com>

In order to report uninitialized memory coming from heap allocations
KMSAN has to poison them unless they're created with __GFP_ZERO.

It's handy that we need KMSAN hooks in the places where
init_on_alloc/init_on_free initialization is performed.

In addition, we apply __no_kmsan_checks to get_freepointer_safe() to
suppress reports when accessing freelist pointers that reside in freed
objects.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

---
v2:
 -- move the implementation of SLUB hooks here

v4:
 -- change sizeof(type) to sizeof(*ptr)
 -- swap mm: and kmsan: in the subject
 -- get rid of kmsan_init(), replace it with __no_kmsan_checks

v5:
 -- do not export KMSAN hooks that are not called from modules
 -- drop an unnecessary whitespace change

Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/I6954b386c5c5d7f99f48bb6cbcc74b75136ce86e
---
 include/linux/kmsan.h | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/kmsan/hooks.c      | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 mm/slab.h             |  1 +
 mm/slub.c             | 17 ++++++++++
 4 files changed, 151 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan.h b/include/linux/kmsan.h
index b36bf3db835ee..5c4e0079054e6 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct page;
+struct kmem_cache;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KMSAN
 
@@ -48,6 +49,44 @@ void kmsan_free_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
  */
 void kmsan_copy_page_meta(struct page *dst, struct page *src);
 
+/**
+ * kmsan_slab_alloc() - Notify KMSAN about a slab allocation.
+ * @s:      slab cache the object belongs to.
+ * @object: object pointer.
+ * @flags:  GFP flags passed to the allocator.
+ *
+ * Depending on cache flags and GFP flags, KMSAN sets up the metadata of the
+ * newly created object, marking it as initialized or uninitialized.
+ */
+void kmsan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * kmsan_slab_free() - Notify KMSAN about a slab deallocation.
+ * @s:      slab cache the object belongs to.
+ * @object: object pointer.
+ *
+ * KMSAN marks the freed object as uninitialized.
+ */
+void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object);
+
+/**
+ * kmsan_kmalloc_large() - Notify KMSAN about a large slab allocation.
+ * @ptr:   object pointer.
+ * @size:  object size.
+ * @flags: GFP flags passed to the allocator.
+ *
+ * Similar to kmsan_slab_alloc(), but for large allocations.
+ */
+void kmsan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags);
+
+/**
+ * kmsan_kfree_large() - Notify KMSAN about a large slab deallocation.
+ * @ptr: object pointer.
+ *
+ * Similar to kmsan_slab_free(), but for large allocations.
+ */
+void kmsan_kfree_large(const void *ptr);
+
 /**
  * kmsan_map_kernel_range_noflush() - Notify KMSAN about a vmap.
  * @start:	start of vmapped range.
@@ -114,6 +153,24 @@ static inline void kmsan_copy_page_meta(struct page *dst, struct page *src)
 {
 }
 
+static inline void kmsan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+				    gfp_t flags)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kmsan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
+				       gfp_t flags)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kmsan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
+{
+}
+
 static inline void kmsan_vmap_pages_range_noflush(unsigned long start,
 						  unsigned long end,
 						  pgprot_t prot,
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 040111bb9f6a3..000703c563a4d 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -27,6 +27,82 @@
  * skipping effects of functions like memset() inside instrumented code.
  */
 
+void kmsan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(object == NULL))
+		return;
+	if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * There's a ctor or this is an RCU cache - do nothing. The memory
+	 * status hasn't changed since last use.
+	 */
+	if (s->ctor || (s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
+		return;
+
+	kmsan_enter_runtime();
+	if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+		kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(object, s->object_size,
+					       KMSAN_POISON_CHECK);
+	else
+		kmsan_internal_poison_memory(object, s->object_size, flags,
+					     KMSAN_POISON_CHECK);
+	kmsan_leave_runtime();
+}
+
+void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+{
+	if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
+		return;
+
+	/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
+	if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)))
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state
+	 * until the next allocation. We cannot save its state to detect
+	 * use-after-free bugs, instead we just keep it unpoisoned.
+	 */
+	if (s->ctor)
+		return;
+	kmsan_enter_runtime();
+	kmsan_internal_poison_memory(object, s->object_size, GFP_KERNEL,
+				     KMSAN_POISON_CHECK | KMSAN_POISON_FREE);
+	kmsan_leave_runtime();
+}
+
+void kmsan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+{
+	if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
+		return;
+	if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
+		return;
+	kmsan_enter_runtime();
+	if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+		kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory((void *)ptr, size,
+					       /*checked*/ true);
+	else
+		kmsan_internal_poison_memory((void *)ptr, size, flags,
+					     KMSAN_POISON_CHECK);
+	kmsan_leave_runtime();
+}
+
+void kmsan_kfree_large(const void *ptr)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+
+	if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
+		return;
+	kmsan_enter_runtime();
+	page = virt_to_head_page((void *)ptr);
+	KMSAN_WARN_ON(ptr != page_address(page));
+	kmsan_internal_poison_memory((void *)ptr,
+				     PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page),
+				     GFP_KERNEL,
+				     KMSAN_POISON_CHECK | KMSAN_POISON_FREE);
+	kmsan_leave_runtime();
+}
+
 static unsigned long vmalloc_shadow(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return (unsigned long)kmsan_get_metadata((void *)addr,
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 4ec82bec15ecd..9d0afd2985df7 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -729,6 +729,7 @@ static inline void slab_post_alloc_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
 			memset(p[i], 0, s->object_size);
 		kmemleak_alloc_recursive(p[i], s->object_size, 1,
 					 s->flags, flags);
+		kmsan_slab_alloc(s, p[i], flags);
 	}
 
 	memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, flags, size, p);
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 862dbd9af4f52..2c323d83d0526 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/kasan.h>
+#include <linux/kmsan.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/cpuset.h>
 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
@@ -359,6 +360,17 @@ static void prefetch_freepointer(const struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 	prefetchw(object + s->offset);
 }
 
+/*
+ * When running under KMSAN, get_freepointer_safe() may return an uninitialized
+ * pointer value in the case the current thread loses the race for the next
+ * memory chunk in the freelist. In that case this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() in
+ * slab_alloc_node() will fail, so the uninitialized value won't be used, but
+ * KMSAN will still check all arguments of cmpxchg because of imperfect
+ * handling of inline assembly.
+ * To work around this problem, we apply __no_kmsan_checks to ensure that
+ * get_freepointer_safe() returns initialized memory.
+ */
+__no_kmsan_checks
 static inline void *get_freepointer_safe(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 {
 	unsigned long freepointer_addr;
@@ -1709,6 +1721,7 @@ static inline void *kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 	ptr = kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
 	/* As ptr might get tagged, call kmemleak hook after KASAN. */
 	kmemleak_alloc(ptr, size, 1, flags);
+	kmsan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags);
 	return ptr;
 }
 
@@ -1716,12 +1729,14 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_hook(void *x)
 {
 	kmemleak_free(x);
 	kasan_kfree_large(x);
+	kmsan_kfree_large(x);
 }
 
 static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
 						void *x, bool init)
 {
 	kmemleak_free_recursive(x, s->flags);
+	kmsan_slab_free(s, x);
 
 	debug_check_no_locks_freed(x, s->object_size);
 
@@ -5915,6 +5930,7 @@ static char *create_unique_id(struct kmem_cache *s)
 	p += sprintf(p, "%07u", s->size);
 
 	BUG_ON(p > name + ID_STR_LENGTH - 1);
+	kmsan_unpoison_memory(name, p - name);
 	return name;
 }
 
@@ -6016,6 +6032,7 @@ static int sysfs_slab_alias(struct kmem_cache *s, const char *name)
 	al->name = name;
 	al->next = alias_list;
 	alias_list = al;
+	kmsan_unpoison_memory(al, sizeof(*al));
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.37.2.789.g6183377224-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-05 12:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-05 12:24 [PATCH v6 00/44] Add KernelMemorySanitizer infrastructure Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 01/44] x86: add missing include to sparsemem.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 02/44] stackdepot: reserve 5 extra bits in depot_stack_handle_t Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 03/44] instrumented.h: allow instrumenting both sides of copy_from_user() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 04/44] x86: asm: instrument usercopy in get_user() and put_user() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 05/44] asm-generic: instrument usercopy in cacheflush.h Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 06/44] kmsan: add ReST documentation Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-06  3:10   ` [PATCH v6 6/44] " Bagas Sanjaya
2022-11-07 14:24     ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 07/44] kmsan: introduce __no_sanitize_memory and __no_kmsan_checks Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 08/44] kmsan: mark noinstr as __no_sanitize_memory Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 09/44] x86: kmsan: pgtable: reduce vmalloc space Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 10/44] libnvdimm/pfn_dev: increase MAX_STRUCT_PAGE_SIZE Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 11/44] kmsan: add KMSAN runtime core Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 12/44] kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 13/44] MAINTAINERS: add entry for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 14/44] mm: kmsan: maintain KMSAN metadata for page operations Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` Alexander Potapenko [this message]
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 16/44] kmsan: handle task creation and exiting Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 17/44] init: kmsan: call KMSAN initialization routines Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 18/44] instrumented.h: add KMSAN support Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 19/44] kmsan: unpoison @tlb in arch_tlb_gather_mmu() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 20/44] kmsan: add iomap support Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 21/44] Input: libps2: mark data received in __ps2_command() as initialized Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 22/44] dma: kmsan: unpoison DMA mappings Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 23/44] virtio: kmsan: check/unpoison scatterlist in vring_map_one_sg() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 24/44] kmsan: handle memory sent to/from USB Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 25/44] kmsan: add tests for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 26/44] kmsan: disable strscpy() optimization under KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 27/44] crypto: kmsan: disable accelerated configs " Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 28/44] kmsan: disable physical page merging in biovec Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 29/44] block: kmsan: skip bio block merging logic for KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 30/44] kcov: kmsan: unpoison area->list in kcov_remote_area_put() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 31/44] security: kmsan: fix interoperability with auto-initialization Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 32/44] objtool: kmsan: list KMSAN API functions as uaccess-safe Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 33/44] x86: kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported code Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 34/44] x86: kmsan: skip shadow checks in __switch_to() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 35/44] x86: kmsan: handle open-coded assembly in lib/iomem.c Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 36/44] x86: kmsan: use __msan_ string functions where possible Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 37/44] x86: kmsan: sync metadata pages on page fault Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 38/44] x86: kasan: kmsan: support CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM on x86, enable it for KASAN/KMSAN Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 39/44] x86: fs: kmsan: disable CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 40/44] x86: kmsan: don't instrument stack walking functions Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-09  8:57   ` Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 41/44] entry: kmsan: introduce kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs() Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 42/44] bpf: kmsan: initialize BPF registers with zeroes Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 43/44] mm: fs: initialize fsdata passed to write_begin/write_end interface Alexander Potapenko
2022-09-05 12:24 ` [PATCH v6 44/44] x86: kmsan: enable KMSAN builds for x86 Alexander Potapenko

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