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From: "Mårten Lindahl" <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel@axis.com, "Mårten Lindahl" <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ubifs: Free memory for tmpfile name
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2023 15:26:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230329-memleak-fix-v1-1-7133da56ea8f@axis.com> (raw)

When opening a ubifs tmpfile on an encrypted directory, function
fscrypt_setup_filename allocates memory for the name that is to be
stored in the directory entry, but after the name has been copied to the
directory entry inode, the memory is not freed.

When running kmemleak on it we see that it is registered as a leak. The
report below is triggered by a simple program 'tmpfile' just opening a
tmpfile:

  unreferenced object 0xffff88810178f380 (size 32):
    comm "tmpfile", pid 509, jiffies 4294934744 (age 1524.742s)
    backtrace:
      __kmem_cache_alloc_node
      __kmalloc
      fscrypt_setup_filename
      ubifs_tmpfile
      vfs_tmpfile
      path_openat

Free this memory after it has been copied to the inode.

Signed-off-by: Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 0f29cf201136..089ca6910124 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ static int ubifs_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
 		goto out_cancel;
 	unlock_2_inodes(dir, inode);
 
+	fscrypt_free_filename(&nm);
 	ubifs_release_budget(c, &req);
 
 	return finish_open_simple(file, 0);

---
base-commit: c9c3395d5e3dcc6daee66c6908354d47bf98cb0c
change-id: 20230329-memleak-fix-87a01daf469e

Best regards,
-- 
Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Mårten Lindahl" <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel@axis.com, "Mårten Lindahl" <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
Subject: [PATCH] ubifs: Free memory for tmpfile name
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2023 15:26:53 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230329-memleak-fix-v1-1-7133da56ea8f@axis.com> (raw)

When opening a ubifs tmpfile on an encrypted directory, function
fscrypt_setup_filename allocates memory for the name that is to be
stored in the directory entry, but after the name has been copied to the
directory entry inode, the memory is not freed.

When running kmemleak on it we see that it is registered as a leak. The
report below is triggered by a simple program 'tmpfile' just opening a
tmpfile:

  unreferenced object 0xffff88810178f380 (size 32):
    comm "tmpfile", pid 509, jiffies 4294934744 (age 1524.742s)
    backtrace:
      __kmem_cache_alloc_node
      __kmalloc
      fscrypt_setup_filename
      ubifs_tmpfile
      vfs_tmpfile
      path_openat

Free this memory after it has been copied to the inode.

Signed-off-by: Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>
---
 fs/ubifs/dir.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index 0f29cf201136..089ca6910124 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ static int ubifs_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
 		goto out_cancel;
 	unlock_2_inodes(dir, inode);
 
+	fscrypt_free_filename(&nm);
 	ubifs_release_budget(c, &req);
 
 	return finish_open_simple(file, 0);

---
base-commit: c9c3395d5e3dcc6daee66c6908354d47bf98cb0c
change-id: 20230329-memleak-fix-87a01daf469e

Best regards,
-- 
Mårten Lindahl <marten.lindahl@axis.com>


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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

             reply	other threads:[~2023-03-29 13:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-29 13:26 Mårten Lindahl [this message]
2023-03-29 13:26 ` [PATCH] ubifs: Free memory for tmpfile name Mårten Lindahl
2023-03-30  2:25 ` Zhihao Cheng
2023-03-30  2:25   ` Zhihao Cheng
2023-03-30  7:54   ` Mårten Lindahl
2023-03-30  7:54     ` Mårten Lindahl
2023-03-30  8:21     ` Zhihao Cheng
2023-03-30  8:21       ` Zhihao Cheng

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