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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 3/4] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure
Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:32:20 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230331123221.3273328-4-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230331123221.3273328-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

Change the evm_inode_init_security() definition to align with the LSM
infrastructure. Keep the existing behavior of including in the HMAC
calculation only the first xattr provided by LSMs.

Changing the evm_inode_init_security() definition requires passing the
xattr array allocated by security_inode_init_security(), and the number of
xattrs filled by previously invoked LSMs.

Use the newly introduced lsm_get_xattr_slot() to position EVM correctly in
the xattrs array, like a regular LSM, and to increment the number of filled
slots. For now, the LSM infrastructure allocates enough xattrs slots to
store the EVM xattr, without using the reservation mechanism.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
---
 include/linux/evm.h               | 13 +++++++------
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 security/security.c               |  6 +++---
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 7dc1ee74169..597632c71c7 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
 {
 	return evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, acl_name, NULL, 0);
 }
-extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				   const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-				   struct xattr *evm);
+extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				   const struct qstr *qstr,
+				   struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count);
 extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
 extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
 extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
@@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ static inline void evm_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return;
 }
 
-static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-					  const struct xattr *xattr_array,
-					  struct xattr *evm)
+static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+					  const struct qstr *qstr,
+					  struct xattr *xattrs,
+					  int *xattr_count)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cf24c525558..475196ce712 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
@@ -864,23 +865,26 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 /*
  * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
  */
-int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
-				 const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
-				 struct xattr *evm_xattr)
+int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			    const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
+			    int *xattr_count)
 {
 	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
+	struct xattr *evm_xattr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
-	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs ||
+	    !evm_protected_xattr(xattrs->name))
 		return 0;
 
+	evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+
 	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!xattr_data)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
-	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest);
+	rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, xattrs, xattr_data->digest);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1aeaa8ce449..ef7779ec8b2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1645,9 +1645,9 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	if (!xattr_count)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
-				      new_xattrs + xattr_count);
-	if (ret)
+	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
+				      &xattr_count);
+	if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
 out:
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-03-31 12:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-31 12:32 [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 1/4] reiserfs: Add security prefix to xattr name in reiserfs_security_write() Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:25   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-04 18:25     ` Paul Moore
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 2/4] security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-04-04 18:54   ` Paul Moore
2023-04-04 18:54     ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05  2:08     ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05  2:08       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05  9:43       ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-05  9:43         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-05 19:59         ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 20:43           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-05 20:49             ` Paul Moore
2023-04-05 21:07               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06  9:14                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-06 16:17                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-06  9:08             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11  7:53     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 16:42       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-11 17:23         ` [PATCH] Smack modifications for: " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:54           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-12  7:22             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-12 20:29               ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-13  7:11                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-17 16:41                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-18  7:05                     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-18 16:02                       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 13:46                         ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-19 19:25                           ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-04-19 19:25                             ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-04-20  8:48                             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-08 12:29                               ` Roberto Sassu
2023-05-09 23:44                                 ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-05-09 23:44                                   ` Mengchi Cheng
2023-05-09 23:56                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-19 21:00                           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-20  8:50                             ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-20 10:44                               ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-20 14:10                                 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:25         ` [PATCH v10 2/4] " Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11 17:40           ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-31 12:32 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-04-04 18:56   ` [PATCH v10 3/4] evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure Paul Moore
2023-04-04 18:56     ` Paul Moore
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-11  7:58     ` Roberto Sassu
2023-03-31 12:32 ` [PATCH v10 4/4] evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr Roberto Sassu
2023-04-11  7:22   ` Mimi Zohar
2023-04-03 10:36 ` [PATCH v10 0/4] evm: Do HMAC of multiple per LSM xattrs for new inodes Mimi Zohar

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