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From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 17/35] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 13:46:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-17-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org>

All GCS operations at EL0 must happen on a page which is marked as
having UnprivGCS access, including read operations.  If a GCS operation
attempts to access a page without this then it will generate a data
abort with the GCS bit set in ESR_EL1.ISS2.

EL0 may validly generate such faults, for example due to copy on write
which will cause the GCS data to be stored in a read only page with no
GCS permissions until the actual copy happens.  Since UnprivGCS allows
both reads and writes to the GCS (though only through GCS operations) we
need to ensure that the memory management subsystem handles GCS accesses
as writes at all times.  Do this by adding FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to any GCS
page faults, adding handling to ensure that invalid cases are identfied
as such early so the memory management core does not think they will
succeed.  The core cannot distinguish between VMAs which are generally
writeable and VMAs which are only writeable through GCS operations.

EL1 may validly write to EL0 GCS for management purposes (eg, while
initialising with cap tokens).

We also report any GCS faults in VMAs not marked as part of a GCS as
access violations, causing a fault to be delivered to userspace if it
attempts to do GCS operations outside a GCS.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 3fe516b32577..ec392207a475 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -494,13 +494,30 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note: not valid for EL1 DC IVAC, but we never use that such that it
+ * should fault. EL0 cannot issue DC IVAC (undef).
+ */
+static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
+{
+	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
+}
+
+static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr)
+{
+	if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr))
+		return false;
+
+	return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS;
+}
+
 #define VM_FAULT_BADMAP		((__force vm_fault_t)0x010000)
 #define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS	((__force vm_fault_t)0x020000)
 
 static vm_fault_t __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				  struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 				  unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
-				  struct pt_regs *regs)
+				  unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
@@ -510,6 +527,26 @@ static vm_fault_t __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	 */
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags))
 		return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) {
+		/*
+		 * Writes to a GCS must either be generated by a GCS
+		 * operation or be from EL1.
+		 */
+		if (is_write_abort(esr) &&
+		    !(is_gcs_fault(esr) || is_el1_data_abort(esr)))
+			return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * GCS faults should never happen for pages that are
+		 * not part of a GCS and the operation being attempted
+		 * can never succeed.
+		 */
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	}
+
+
 	return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, mm_flags, regs);
 }
 
@@ -518,13 +555,18 @@ static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
 	return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
 }
 
-/*
- * Note: not valid for EL1 DC IVAC, but we never use that such that it
- * should fault. EL0 cannot issue DC IVAC (undef).
- */
-static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
+static bool is_invalid_el0_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr)
 {
-	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
+	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+		return false;
+	if (likely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))) {
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+		return false;
+	return is_write_abort(esr);
 }
 
 static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
@@ -573,6 +615,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		/* If EPAN is absent then exec implies read */
 		if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN))
 			vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
+		/*
+		 * Upgrade read faults to write faults, GCS reads must
+		 * occur on a page marked as GCS so we need to trigger
+		 * copy on write always.
+		 */
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	}
 
 	if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr) && is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) {
@@ -595,6 +644,19 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	if (!vma)
 		goto lock_mmap;
 
+	/*
+	 * We get legitimate write faults for GCS pages from GCS
+	 * operations and from EL1 writes to EL0 pages but just plain
+	 * EL0 writes are invalid.  Specifically check for this since
+	 * as a result of upgrading read faults to write faults for
+	 * CoW the mm core isn't able to distinguish these invalid
+	 * writes.
+	 */
+	if (is_invalid_el0_gcs_access(vma, esr)) {
+		vma_end_read(vma);
+		goto lock_mmap;
+	}
+
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
 		vma_end_read(vma);
 		goto lock_mmap;
@@ -624,7 +686,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, vma, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, regs);
+	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, vma, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, esr, regs);
 
 	/* Quick path to respond to signals */
 	if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {

-- 
2.30.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 17/35] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2023 13:46:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-17-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230724-arm64-gcs-v2-0-dc2c1d44c2eb@kernel.org>

All GCS operations at EL0 must happen on a page which is marked as
having UnprivGCS access, including read operations.  If a GCS operation
attempts to access a page without this then it will generate a data
abort with the GCS bit set in ESR_EL1.ISS2.

EL0 may validly generate such faults, for example due to copy on write
which will cause the GCS data to be stored in a read only page with no
GCS permissions until the actual copy happens.  Since UnprivGCS allows
both reads and writes to the GCS (though only through GCS operations) we
need to ensure that the memory management subsystem handles GCS accesses
as writes at all times.  Do this by adding FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to any GCS
page faults, adding handling to ensure that invalid cases are identfied
as such early so the memory management core does not think they will
succeed.  The core cannot distinguish between VMAs which are generally
writeable and VMAs which are only writeable through GCS operations.

EL1 may validly write to EL0 GCS for management purposes (eg, while
initialising with cap tokens).

We also report any GCS faults in VMAs not marked as part of a GCS as
access violations, causing a fault to be delivered to userspace if it
attempts to do GCS operations outside a GCS.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 3fe516b32577..ec392207a475 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -494,13 +494,30 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note: not valid for EL1 DC IVAC, but we never use that such that it
+ * should fault. EL0 cannot issue DC IVAC (undef).
+ */
+static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
+{
+	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
+}
+
+static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr)
+{
+	if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr))
+		return false;
+
+	return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS;
+}
+
 #define VM_FAULT_BADMAP		((__force vm_fault_t)0x010000)
 #define VM_FAULT_BADACCESS	((__force vm_fault_t)0x020000)
 
 static vm_fault_t __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 				  struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
 				  unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
-				  struct pt_regs *regs)
+				  unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
@@ -510,6 +527,26 @@ static vm_fault_t __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	 */
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags))
 		return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) {
+		/*
+		 * Writes to a GCS must either be generated by a GCS
+		 * operation or be from EL1.
+		 */
+		if (is_write_abort(esr) &&
+		    !(is_gcs_fault(esr) || is_el1_data_abort(esr)))
+			return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * GCS faults should never happen for pages that are
+		 * not part of a GCS and the operation being attempted
+		 * can never succeed.
+		 */
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			return VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
+	}
+
+
 	return handle_mm_fault(vma, addr, mm_flags, regs);
 }
 
@@ -518,13 +555,18 @@ static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
 	return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
 }
 
-/*
- * Note: not valid for EL1 DC IVAC, but we never use that such that it
- * should fault. EL0 cannot issue DC IVAC (undef).
- */
-static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
+static bool is_invalid_el0_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr)
 {
-	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
+	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+		return false;
+	if (likely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))) {
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
+	if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+		return false;
+	return is_write_abort(esr);
 }
 
 static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
@@ -573,6 +615,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		/* If EPAN is absent then exec implies read */
 		if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_EPAN))
 			vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
+		/*
+		 * Upgrade read faults to write faults, GCS reads must
+		 * occur on a page marked as GCS so we need to trigger
+		 * copy on write always.
+		 */
+		if (is_gcs_fault(esr))
+			mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
 	}
 
 	if (is_ttbr0_addr(addr) && is_el1_permission_fault(addr, esr, regs)) {
@@ -595,6 +644,19 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	if (!vma)
 		goto lock_mmap;
 
+	/*
+	 * We get legitimate write faults for GCS pages from GCS
+	 * operations and from EL1 writes to EL0 pages but just plain
+	 * EL0 writes are invalid.  Specifically check for this since
+	 * as a result of upgrading read faults to write faults for
+	 * CoW the mm core isn't able to distinguish these invalid
+	 * writes.
+	 */
+	if (is_invalid_el0_gcs_access(vma, esr)) {
+		vma_end_read(vma);
+		goto lock_mmap;
+	}
+
 	if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
 		vma_end_read(vma);
 		goto lock_mmap;
@@ -624,7 +686,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		goto done;
 	}
 
-	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, vma, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, regs);
+	fault = __do_page_fault(mm, vma, addr, mm_flags, vm_flags, esr, regs);
 
 	/* Quick path to respond to signals */
 	if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) {

-- 
2.30.2


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
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http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-07-24 12:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-07-24 12:45 [PATCH v2 00/35] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 01/35] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 02/35] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 03/35] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 04/35] arm64/sysreg: Add new system registers for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 05/35] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 06/35] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 07/35] arm64/gcs: Provide copy_to_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 08/35] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 09/35] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 10/35] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 11/35] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45 ` [PATCH v2 12/35] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:45   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 13/35] arm64/el2_setup: Allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 14/35] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 15/35] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 16/35] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2023-07-24 12:46   ` [PATCH v2 17/35] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 18/35] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS registers for EL0 Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 19/35] arm64/gcs: Allocate a new GCS for threads with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 20/35] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 21/35] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 22/35] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 23/35] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 24/35] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 25/35] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 26/35] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 27/35] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 28/35] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 29/35] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 30/35] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 31/35] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 32/35] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 33/35] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 34/35] selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46 ` [PATCH v2 35/35] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2023-07-24 12:46   ` Mark Brown

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