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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations
Date: Sun, 13 Aug 2023 12:45:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230813104517.3346-1-bp@alien8.de> (raw)

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@alien8.de>

Skip the srso cmd line parsing which is not needed on Zen1/2 with SMT
disabled and with the proper microcode applied (latter should be the
case anyway) as those are not affected.

Fixes: 5a15d8348881 ("x86/srso: Tie SBPB bit setting to microcode patch detection")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d02f73c5339d..8959a1b9fb80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2418,8 +2418,10 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 		 * IBPB microcode has been applied.
 		 */
 		if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
-		    (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)))
+		    (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) {
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+			goto pred_cmd;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
@@ -2696,6 +2698,9 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
 {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
 			  srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
 			  (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));
-- 
2.42.0.rc0.25.ga82fb66fed25


             reply	other threads:[~2023-08-13 10:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-13 10:45 Borislav Petkov [this message]
2023-08-14  6:39 ` [PATCH] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-14 20:08   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-14 20:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-14 20:53       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-14 21:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15  9:57           ` [PATCH] x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15 19:58             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-15 20:17               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-15 21:27                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-16  8:30                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 16:07                     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-16 17:35                       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-16 18:29                         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-16 18:58                           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-17  9:07                             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-08-17 14:54                               ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-18 10:59     ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
2023-08-14  9:37 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)

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