[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks

From: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
	andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, song@kernel.org,
	yonghong.song@linux.dev, kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@google.com,
	haoluo@google.com, jolsa@kernel.org, eddyz87@gmail.com
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Fix issue in verifying allow_ptr_leaks
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 02:07:02 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230823020703.3790-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230823020703.3790-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com>

After we converted the capabilities of our networking-bpf program from
cap_sys_admin to cap_net_admin+cap_bpf, our networking-bpf program
failed to start. Because it failed the bpf verifier, and the error log
is "R3 pointer comparison prohibited".

A simple reproducer as follows,

SEC("cls-ingress")
int ingress(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct iphdr *iph = (void *)(long)skb->data + sizeof(struct ethhdr);

	if ((long)(iph + 1) > (long)skb->data_end)
		return TC_ACT_STOLEN;
	return TC_ACT_OK;
}

Per discussion with Yonghong and Alexei [1], comparison of two packet
pointers is not a pointer leak. This patch fixes it.

Our local kernel is 6.1.y and we expect this fix to be backported to
6.1.y, so stable is CCed.

[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+Nmspr7Si+pxWn8zkE7hX-7s93ugwC+94aXSy4uQ9vBg@mail.gmail.com/

Suggested-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4ccca1f..b6b60cd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -14047,6 +14047,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* check src2 operand */
+	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
 		if (insn->imm != 0) {
 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14058,12 +14064,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
-		if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
+		if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) &&
+		    is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
 			verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
 				insn->src_reg);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
-		src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
 	} else {
 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
 			verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -14071,12 +14078,6 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		}
 	}
 
-	/* check src2 operand */
-	err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
 	is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
 
 	if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
-- 
1.8.3.1

