From: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com> To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com>, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 25/29] ubifs: move ubifs_xattr_handlers to .rodata Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2023 02:00:29 -0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20230930050033.41174-26-wedsonaf@gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230930050033.41174-1-wedsonaf@gmail.com> From: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> This makes it harder for accidental or malicious changes to ubifs_xattr_handlers at runtime. Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> --- fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 2 +- fs/ubifs/xattr.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h b/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h index 4c36044140e7..8a9a66255e7e 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h +++ b/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h @@ -2043,7 +2043,7 @@ ssize_t ubifs_xattr_get(struct inode *host, const char *name, void *buf, size_t size); #ifdef CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_XATTR -extern const struct xattr_handler *ubifs_xattr_handlers[]; +extern const struct xattr_handler * const ubifs_xattr_handlers[]; ssize_t ubifs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size); void ubifs_evict_xattr_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, ino_t xattr_inum); int ubifs_purge_xattrs(struct inode *host); diff --git a/fs/ubifs/xattr.c b/fs/ubifs/xattr.c index 349228dd1191..5e17e9591e6e 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/xattr.c @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler ubifs_security_xattr_handler = { }; #endif -const struct xattr_handler *ubifs_xattr_handlers[] = { +const struct xattr_handler * const ubifs_xattr_handlers[] = { &ubifs_user_xattr_handler, &ubifs_trusted_xattr_handler, #ifdef CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_SECURITY -- 2.34.1 ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com> To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com>, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Subject: [PATCH 25/29] ubifs: move ubifs_xattr_handlers to .rodata Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2023 02:00:29 -0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20230930050033.41174-26-wedsonaf@gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20230930050033.41174-1-wedsonaf@gmail.com> From: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> This makes it harder for accidental or malicious changes to ubifs_xattr_handlers at runtime. Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com> --- fs/ubifs/ubifs.h | 2 +- fs/ubifs/xattr.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h b/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h index 4c36044140e7..8a9a66255e7e 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h +++ b/fs/ubifs/ubifs.h @@ -2043,7 +2043,7 @@ ssize_t ubifs_xattr_get(struct inode *host, const char *name, void *buf, size_t size); #ifdef CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_XATTR -extern const struct xattr_handler *ubifs_xattr_handlers[]; +extern const struct xattr_handler * const ubifs_xattr_handlers[]; ssize_t ubifs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size); void ubifs_evict_xattr_inode(struct ubifs_info *c, ino_t xattr_inum); int ubifs_purge_xattrs(struct inode *host); diff --git a/fs/ubifs/xattr.c b/fs/ubifs/xattr.c index 349228dd1191..5e17e9591e6e 100644 --- a/fs/ubifs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ubifs/xattr.c @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler ubifs_security_xattr_handler = { }; #endif -const struct xattr_handler *ubifs_xattr_handlers[] = { +const struct xattr_handler * const ubifs_xattr_handlers[] = { &ubifs_user_xattr_handler, &ubifs_trusted_xattr_handler, #ifdef CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_SECURITY -- 2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-30 5:02 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2023-09-30 5:00 [PATCH 00/29] const xattr tables Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 01/29] xattr: make the xattr array itself const Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 6:54 ` kernel test robot 2023-10-02 9:58 ` Thomas Weißschuh 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 02/29] ext4: move ext4_xattr_handlers to .rodata Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 03/29] 9p: move xattr-related structs " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 8:12 ` Christian Schoenebeck 2023-09-30 9:03 ` Dominique Martinet 2023-10-03 13:55 ` Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-03 21:57 ` Dominique Martinet 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 04/29] afs: move afs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 05/29] btrfs: move btrfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-02 11:28 ` David Sterba 2023-10-02 11:37 ` David Sterba 2023-10-03 13:48 ` Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 06/29] ceph: move ceph_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-03 14:30 ` Ilya Dryomov 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 07/29] ecryptfs: move ecryptfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 08/29] erofs: move erofs_xattr_handlers and xattr_handler_map " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-07 5:50 ` Gao Xiang 2023-10-07 5:50 ` Gao Xiang 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 09/29] ext2: move ext2_xattr_handlers and ext2_xattr_handler_map " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-02 9:49 ` Jan Kara 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 10/29] f2fs: move f2fs_xattr_handlers and f2fs_xattr_handler_map " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-07 6:37 ` Chao Yu 2023-10-07 6:37 ` [f2fs-dev] " Chao Yu 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 11/29] fuse: move fuse_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 12/29] gfs2: move gfs2_xattr_handlers_max " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [Cluster-devel] " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 13/29] hfs: move hfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 14/29] hfsplus: move hfsplus_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 15/29] jffs2: move jffs2_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-07 1:39 ` Zhihao Cheng 2023-10-07 1:39 ` Zhihao Cheng 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 16/29] jfs: move jfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-03 14:54 ` Dave Kleikamp 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 17/29] kernfs: move kernfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-05 10:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 18/29] nfs: move nfs4_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 19/29] ntfs3: move ntfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 20/29] ocfs2: move ocfs2_xattr_handlers and ocfs2_xattr_handler_map " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 21/29] orangefs: move orangefs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 22/29] reiserfs: move reiserfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 23/29] smb: move cifs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-01 19:59 ` Steve French 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 24/29] squashfs: move squashfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` Wedson Almeida Filho [this message] 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 25/29] ubifs: move ubifs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-07 1:39 ` Zhihao Cheng 2023-10-07 1:39 ` Zhihao Cheng 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 26/29] xfs: move xfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-01 16:18 ` Darrick J. Wong 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 27/29] overlayfs: move xattr tables " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-03 16:41 ` Amir Goldstein 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 28/29] shmem: move shmem_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-09-30 5:00 ` [PATCH 29/29] net: move sockfs_xattr_handlers " Wedson Almeida Filho 2023-10-04 21:24 ` Jakub Kicinski 2023-10-03 13:28 ` [PATCH 00/29] const xattr tables Christian Brauner 2023-10-09 14:43 ` Christian Brauner
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20230930050033.41174-26-wedsonaf@gmail.com \ --to=wedsonaf@gmail.com \ --cc=brauner@kernel.org \ --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org \ --cc=richard@nod.at \ --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \ --cc=walmeida@microsoft.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.