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From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <keescook@chromium.org>,
	<brauner@kernel.org>, <lennart@poettering.net>,
	<kernel-team@meta.com>, <sargun@sargun.me>
Subject: [PATCH v7 bpf-next 01/18] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 15:27:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231012222810.4120312-2-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231012222810.4120312-1-andrii@kernel.org>

Within BPF syscall handling code CAP_NET_ADMIN checks stand out a bit
compared to CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON checks. For the latter, CAP_BPF or
CAP_PERFMON are checked first, but if they are not set, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
takes over and grants whatever part of BPF syscall is required.

Similar kind of checks that involve CAP_NET_ADMIN are not so consistent.
One out of four uses does follow CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON model: during
BPF_PROG_LOAD, if the type of BPF program is "network-related" either
CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to proceed.

But in three other cases CAP_NET_ADMIN is required even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is set:
  - when creating DEVMAP/XDKMAP/CPU_MAP maps;
  - when attaching CGROUP_SKB programs;
  - when handling BPF_PROG_QUERY command.

This patch is changing the latter three cases to follow BPF_PROG_LOAD
model, that is allowing to proceed under either CAP_NET_ADMIN or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

This also makes it cleaner in subsequent BPF token patches to switch
wholesomely to a generic bpf_token_capable(int cap) check, that always
falls back to CAP_SYS_ADMIN if requested capability is missing.

Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 8677837f3deb..d5cf8f4a548b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1097,6 +1097,11 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool bpf_net_capable(void)
+{
+	return capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
 #define BPF_MAP_CREATE_LAST_FIELD map_extra
 /* called via syscall */
 static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
@@ -1200,7 +1205,7 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP_HASH:
 	case BPF_MAP_TYPE_XSKMAP:
-		if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		if (!bpf_net_capable())
 			return -EPERM;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -2600,7 +2605,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	    !bpf_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (is_net_admin_prog_type(type) && !bpf_net_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (is_perfmon_prog_type(type) && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
@@ -3750,7 +3755,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_LOOKUP:
 		return attach_type == prog->expected_attach_type ? 0 : -EINVAL;
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
-		if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		if (!bpf_net_capable())
 			/* cg-skb progs can be loaded by unpriv user.
 			 * check permissions at attach time.
 			 */
@@ -3934,7 +3939,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_detach(const union bpf_attr *attr)
 static int bpf_prog_query(const union bpf_attr *attr,
 			  union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 {
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+	if (!bpf_net_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_QUERY))
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.34.1


  reply	other threads:[~2023-10-12 22:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-12 22:27 [PATCH v7 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token and BPF FS-based delegation Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 02/18] bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 03/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 04/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 05/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 06/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-13 21:15   ` [PATCH v7 6/18] " Paul Moore
2023-10-13 21:55     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 07/18] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 08/18] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 09/18] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 10/18] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 11/18] bpf,lsm: add bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-13 21:15   ` [PATCH v7 " Paul Moore
2023-10-13 21:55     ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 12/18] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 13/18] selftests/bpf: fix test_maps' use of bpf_map_create_opts Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 14/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 15/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 16/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 17/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-10-12 22:28 ` [PATCH v7 bpf-next 18/18] bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token Andrii Nakryiko

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