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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, elena.reshetova@intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
	Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, decui@microsoft.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	"K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>,
	Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC 08/10] hv: Track decrypted status in vmbus_gpadl
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:25:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231017202505.340906-9-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231017202505.340906-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

On TDX it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take
care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to
the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues.

In order to make sure caller's of vmbus_establish_gpadl() and
vmbus_teardown_gpadl() don't return decrypted/shared pages to
allocators, add a field in struct vmbus_gpadl to keep track of the
decryption status of the buffer's. This will allow the callers to
know if they should free or leak the pages.

Only compile tested.

Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
---
 drivers/hv/channel.c   | 11 ++++++++---
 include/linux/hyperv.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c
index 1ad8f7fabe06..0a7dcbb48140 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/channel.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c
@@ -479,6 +479,7 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
 				   PFN_UP(size));
 	if (ret) {
+		gpadl->decrypted = false;
 		dev_warn(&channel->device_obj->device,
 			 "Failed to set host visibility for new GPADL %d.\n",
 			 ret);
@@ -551,6 +552,7 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 	gpadl->gpadl_handle = gpadlmsg->gpadl;
 	gpadl->buffer = kbuffer;
 	gpadl->size = size;
+	gpadl->decrypted = true;
 
 
 cleanup:
@@ -564,9 +566,10 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 
 	kfree(msginfo);
 
-	if (ret)
-		set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
-				     PFN_UP(size));
+	if (ret) {
+		if (set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size)))
+			gpadl->decrypted = false;
+	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -887,6 +890,8 @@ int vmbus_teardown_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, struct vmbus_gpadl *gpad
 	if (ret)
 		pr_warn("Fail to set mem host visibility in GPADL teardown %d.\n", ret);
 
+	gpadl->decrypted = ret;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmbus_teardown_gpadl);
diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h
index 2b00faf98017..5bac136c268c 100644
--- a/include/linux/hyperv.h
+++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ struct vmbus_gpadl {
 	u32 gpadl_handle;
 	u32 size;
 	void *buffer;
+	bool decrypted;
 };
 
 struct vmbus_channel {
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-10-17 20:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-17 20:24 [PATCH 00/10] Handle set_memory_XXcrypted() errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-17 20:24 ` [PATCH 01/10] mm: Add helper for freeing decrypted memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-17 20:24 ` [PATCH 02/10] x86/mm/cpa: Reject incorrect encryption change requests Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-18  8:44   ` Ingo Molnar
2023-10-18 15:53     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-17 20:24 ` [PATCH 03/10] kvmclock: Use free_decrypted_pages() Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-18  5:20   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2023-10-18 15:57     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-17 20:24 ` [PATCH 04/10] swiotlb: " Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-18  4:43   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-10-18 15:55     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-31 10:43   ` Petr Tesařík
2023-10-31 15:54     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-31 17:13       ` Petr Tesařík
2023-10-31 17:29         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-01  6:27           ` Petr Tesařík
2023-11-01 14:40             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-17 20:25 ` [PATCH 05/10] ptp: " Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-17 20:25 ` [PATCH 06/10] dma: " Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-18  6:24   ` Christoph Hellwig
2023-10-18 17:09     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-18 17:42   ` Robin Murphy
2023-10-23 16:46     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-23 17:22       ` Robin Murphy
2023-10-23 17:27         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-10-17 20:25 ` [RFC 07/10] hv: " Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-17 20:25 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2023-10-17 20:25 ` [RFC 09/10] hv_nstvsc: Don't free decrypted memory Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-17 20:25 ` [RFC 10/10] uio_hv_generic: " Rick Edgecombe
2023-10-19 17:05 ` [PATCH 00/10] Handle set_memory_XXcrypted() errors Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-10-19 19:13   ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-23 16:47     ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-10-23 16:57       ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-23 17:01       ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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