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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 03/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 17:27:41 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231110222751.219836-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231110222751.219836-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3762f41bb092..1b983e336611 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2066,6 +2066,18 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
 
 	  See also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-efi-runtime-map.
 
+config SECURE_LAUNCH
+	bool "Secure Launch support"
+	default n
+	depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
+	help
+	   The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
+	   directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
+	   establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
+	   where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
+	   continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
+	   information and init images.
+
 source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
 
 config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
-- 
2.39.3


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 03/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 17:27:41 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231110222751.219836-4-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231110222751.219836-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.

Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 3762f41bb092..1b983e336611 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2066,6 +2066,18 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
 
 	  See also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-efi-runtime-map.
 
+config SECURE_LAUNCH
+	bool "Secure Launch support"
+	default n
+	depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
+	help
+	   The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
+	   directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
+	   establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
+	   where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
+	   continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
+	   information and init images.
+
 source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
 
 config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
-- 
2.39.3


_______________________________________________
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kexec@lists.infradead.org
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-10 22:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-10 22:27 [PATCH v7 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 01/13] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 02/13] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-12 18:07   ` Alyssa Ross
2023-11-12 18:07     ` Alyssa Ross
2023-11-16 17:55     ` ross.philipson
2023-11-16 17:55       ` ross.philipson
2024-01-31 19:40     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-01-31 19:40       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-11-10 22:27 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-11-10 22:27   ` [PATCH v7 03/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 04/13] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 05/13] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 06/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-11 17:44   ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-11 17:44     ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-11 18:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-11 18:19       ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-11 20:36       ` James Bottomley
2023-11-11 20:36         ` James Bottomley
2023-11-13 23:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-13 23:21           ` Andrew Cooper
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-11 10:41   ` kernel test robot
2023-11-11 10:41     ` kernel test robot
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 10/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 23:41   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-10 23:41     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  0:50     ` ross.philipson
2023-11-16  0:50       ` ross.philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 11/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 12/13] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27 ` [PATCH v7 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2023-11-10 22:27   ` Ross Philipson

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