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From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Alexander Graf" <graf@amazon.com>,
	"Chao Peng" <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Forrest Yuan Yu" <yuanyu@google.com>,
	"James Gowans" <jgowans@amazon.com>,
	"James Morris" <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"John Andersen" <john.s.andersen@intel.com>,
	"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
	"Marian Rotariu" <marian.c.rotariu@gmail.com>,
	"Mihai Donțu" <mdontu@bitdefender.com>,
	"Nicușor Cîțu" <nicu.citu@icloud.com>,
	"Thara Gopinath" <tgopinath@microsoft.com>,
	"Trilok Soni" <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wei.liu@kernel.org>, "Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Yu Zhang" <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	"Zahra Tarkhani" <ztarkhani@microsoft.com>,
	"Ștefan Șicleru" <ssicleru@bitdefender.com>,
	dev@lists.cloudhypervisor.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
	xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 08/19] KVM: x86: Extend kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes() with a mask
Date: Sun, 12 Nov 2023 21:23:15 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231113022326.24388-9-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231113022326.24388-1-mic@digikod.net>

Enable to only update a subset of attributes.

This is needed to be able to use the XArray for different use cases and
make sure they don't interfere (see a following commit).

Cc: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---

Changes since v1:
* New patch
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c   |  2 +-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h |  2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c      | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 4d378d308762..d7010e09440d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -7283,7 +7283,7 @@ static bool hugepage_has_attrs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 
 	for (gfn = start; gfn < end; gfn += KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1)) {
 		if (hugepage_test_mixed(slot, gfn, level - 1) ||
-		    attrs != kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn))
+		    !(attrs & kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn)))
 			return false;
 	}
 	return true;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 85b8648fd892..de68390ab0f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2397,7 +2397,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 					 struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
 int kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
-			      unsigned long attributes);
+			      unsigned long attributes, unsigned long mask);
 
 static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 {
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 0096ccfbb609..e2c178db17d5 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_clear_dirty_log(struct kvm *kvm,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
 /*
  * Returns true if _all_ gfns in the range [@start, @end) have attributes
- * matching @attrs.
+ * matching the @attrs bitmask.
  */
 bool kvm_range_has_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
 				     unsigned long attrs)
@@ -2459,7 +2459,8 @@ bool kvm_range_has_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
 			entry = xas_next(&xas);
 		} while (xas_retry(&xas, entry));
 
-		if (xas.xa_index != index || xa_to_value(entry) != attrs) {
+		if (xas.xa_index != index ||
+		    (xa_to_value(entry) & attrs) != attrs) {
 			has_attrs = false;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2553,7 +2554,7 @@ static bool kvm_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 /* Set @attributes for the gfn range [@start, @end). */
 int kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
-				     unsigned long attributes)
+			      unsigned long attributes, unsigned long mask)
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_notifier_range pre_set_range = {
 		.start = start,
@@ -2572,11 +2573,8 @@ int kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
 		.may_block = true,
 	};
 	unsigned long i;
-	void *entry;
 	int r = 0;
 
-	entry = attributes ? xa_mk_value(attributes) : NULL;
-
 	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
 
 	/* Nothing to do if the entire range as the desired attributes. */
@@ -2596,6 +2594,16 @@ int kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start, gfn_t end,
 	kvm_handle_gfn_range(kvm, &pre_set_range);
 
 	for (i = start; i < end; i++) {
+		unsigned long value = 0;
+		void *entry;
+
+		entry = xa_load(&kvm->mem_attr_array, i);
+		if (xa_is_value(entry))
+			value = xa_to_value(entry) & ~mask;
+
+		value |= attributes & mask;
+		entry = value ? xa_mk_value(value) : NULL;
+
 		r = xa_err(xa_store(&kvm->mem_attr_array, i, entry,
 				    GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT));
 		KVM_BUG_ON(r, kvm);
@@ -2609,12 +2617,14 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 					   struct kvm_memory_attributes *attrs)
 {
 	int r;
+	unsigned long attrs_mask;
 	gfn_t start, end;
 
 	/* flags is currently not used. */
 	if (attrs->flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (attrs->attributes & ~kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm))
+	attrs_mask = kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm);
+	if (attrs->attributes & ~attrs_mask)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (attrs->size == 0 || attrs->address + attrs->size < attrs->address)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2632,7 +2642,8 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_mem_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(attrs->attributes) != sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
-	r = kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(kvm, start, end, attrs->attributes);
+	r = kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(kvm, start, end, attrs->attributes,
+				      attrs_mask);
 	mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_arch_lock);
 	return r;
 }
-- 
2.42.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-13  2:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-13  2:23 [RFC PATCH v2 00/19] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/19] virt: Introduce Hypervisor Enforced Kernel Integrity (Heki) Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/19] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to lock control registers Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/19] KVM: x86: Add notifications for Heki policy configuration and violation Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/19] heki: Lock guest control registers at the end of guest kernel init Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/19] KVM: VMX: Add MBEC support Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/19] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops.fault_gva() Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/19] KVM: x86: Make memory attribute helpers more generic Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/19] KVM: x86: Extend kvm_range_has_memory_attributes() with match_all Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/19] KVM: x86: Implement per-guest-page permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/19] KVM: x86: Add new hypercall to set EPT permissions Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  4:45   ` kernel test robot
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/19] x86: Implement the Memory Table feature to store arbitrary per-page data Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-22  7:19   ` kernel test robot
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/19] heki: Implement a kernel page table walker Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/19] heki: x86: Initialize permissions counters for pages mapped into KVA Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/19] heki: x86: Initialize permissions counters for pages in vmap()/vunmap() Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters when guest page permissions change Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters during text patching Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  8:19   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 16:48     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-27 20:08       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-29 21:07         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-30 11:33           ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-12-06 16:37             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-12-06 18:51               ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-12-08 18:41                 ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-12-01  0:45           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-12-06 16:41             ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] heki: x86: Protect guest kernel memory using the KVM hypervisor Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  8:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 17:05     ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-27 20:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-29 19:47         ` Madhavan T. Venkataraman
2023-11-13  2:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/19] virt: Add Heki KUnit tests Mickaël Salaün
2023-11-13  5:18 [RFC PATCH v2 14/19] heki: x86: Initialize permissions counters for pages mapped into KVA kernel test robot
2023-11-14  1:22 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-13  7:42 [RFC PATCH v2 10/19] KVM: x86: Implement per-guest-page permissions kernel test robot
2023-11-14  1:27 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-13  8:14 [RFC PATCH v2 18/19] heki: x86: Protect guest kernel memory using the KVM hypervisor kernel test robot
2023-11-14  1:30 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-13 12:37 [RFC PATCH v2 10/19] KVM: x86: Implement per-guest-page permissions kernel test robot
2023-11-14  1:29 ` kernel test robot

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