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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
To: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org,
	chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org, neilb@suse.de,
	kolga@netapp.com, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
	paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	zohar@linux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com,
	dhowells@redhat.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, eparis@parisplace.org,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, mic@digikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 16/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 18:33:09 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231120173318.1132868-17-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231120173318.1132868-1-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>

From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_set_acl hook.

At inode_set_acl hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_set_acl, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC based on the modified
POSIX ACL and other file metadata.

Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful POSIX ACL
change.

The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 fs/posix_acl.c                |  1 +
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/security.h      |  7 +++++++
 security/security.c           | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/posix_acl.c b/fs/posix_acl.c
index a05fe94970ce..58e3c1e2fbbc 100644
--- a/fs/posix_acl.c
+++ b/fs/posix_acl.c
@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ int vfs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 		error = -EIO;
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
+		security_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 		evm_inode_post_set_acl(dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 	}
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 4b195996f848..5133dd88b5fb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_removexattr, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_set_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_set_acl, struct dentry *dentry,
+	 const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_get_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_remove_acl, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d77b717b5a45..948aaddf0edd 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
 			   struct posix_acl *kacl);
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl);
 int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			   struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name);
 int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
@@ -913,6 +915,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry,
+					       const char *acl_name,
+					       struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 					 struct dentry *dentry,
 					 const char *acl_name)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index a1bdf4859448..5d25bbd18d66 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2350,6 +2350,23 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_inode_post_set_acl() - Update inode security from posix acls set
+ * @dentry: file
+ * @acl_name: acl name
+ * @kacl: acl struct
+ *
+ * Update inode security data after successfully setting posix acls on @dentry.
+ * The posix acls in @kacl are identified by @acl_name.
+ */
+void security_inode_post_set_acl(struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
+				 struct posix_acl *kacl)
+{
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
+		return;
+	call_void_hook(inode_post_set_acl, dentry, acl_name, kacl);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-20 17:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-20 17:32 [PATCH v6 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 02/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 03/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 04/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 05/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:32 ` [PATCH v6 06/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 07/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 09/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 10/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 11/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 12/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 13/25] security: Introduce file_release hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 14/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 18/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 19/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-11-21  8:02   ` Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 20/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 21/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 22/25] ima: Remove dependency on 'integrity' LSM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 23/25] evm: " Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 24/25] integrity: Remove LSM Roberto Sassu
2023-11-20 17:33 ` [PATCH v6 25/25] security: Enforce ordering of 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs Roberto Sassu
2023-11-21  0:50   ` Casey Schaufler
2023-11-21  7:57     ` Roberto Sassu

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