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From: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
	mhocko@suse.com, ying.huang@intel.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, ligang.bdlg@bytedance.com,
	Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 4/7] mm, security: Add lsm hook for memory policy adjustment
Date: Fri,  1 Dec 2023 09:46:33 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231201094636.19770-5-laoar.shao@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231201094636.19770-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com>

In a containerized environment, independent memory binding by a user can
lead to unexpected system issues or disrupt tasks being run by other users
on the same server. If a user genuinely requires memory binding, we will
allocate dedicated servers to them by leveraging kubelet deployment.

At present, users have the capability to bind their memory to a specific
node without explicit agreement or authorization from us. Consequently, a
new LSM hook is introduced to mitigate this. This implementation allows us
to exercise fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments within our
container environment

Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  3 +++
 include/linux/security.h      |  9 +++++++++
 mm/mempolicy.c                |  8 ++++++++
 security/security.c           | 13 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index ff217a5ce552..558012719f98 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -419,3 +419,6 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, set_mempolicy, unsigned long mode, unsigned short mode_flags,
+	 nodemask_t *nmask, unsigned int flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1d1df326c881..cc4a19a0888c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -484,6 +484,8 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
+int security_set_mempolicy(unsigned long mode, unsigned short mode_flags,
+			   nodemask_t *nmask, unsigned int flags);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
@@ -1395,6 +1397,13 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static inline int
+security_set_mempolicy(unsigned long mode, unsigned short mode_flags,
+		       nodemask_t *nmask, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) && defined(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE)
diff --git a/mm/mempolicy.c b/mm/mempolicy.c
index 1eafe81d782e..9a260dd24a4b 100644
--- a/mm/mempolicy.c
+++ b/mm/mempolicy.c
@@ -1495,6 +1495,10 @@ static long kernel_mbind(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	err = security_set_mempolicy(lmode, mode_flags, &nodes, flags);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	return do_mbind(start, len, lmode, mode_flags, &nodes, flags);
 }
 
@@ -1589,6 +1593,10 @@ static long kernel_set_mempolicy(int mode, const unsigned long __user *nmask,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	err = security_set_mempolicy(lmode, mode_flags, &nodes, 0);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	return do_set_mempolicy(lmode, mode_flags, &nodes);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dcb3e7014f9b..685ad7993753 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5337,3 +5337,16 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
 	return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+/**
+ * security_set_mempolicy() - Check if memory policy can be adjusted
+ * @mode: The memory policy mode to be set
+ * @mode_flags: optional mode flags
+ * @nmask: modemask to which the mode applies
+ * @flags: mode flags for mbind(2) only
+ */
+int security_set_mempolicy(unsigned long mode, unsigned short mode_flags,
+			   nodemask_t *nmask, unsigned int flags)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(set_mempolicy, 0, mode, mode_flags, nmask, flags);
+}
-- 
2.30.1 (Apple Git-130)


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-12-01  9:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-01  9:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] mm, security, bpf: Fine-grained control over memory policy adjustments with lsm bpf Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] mm, doc: Add doc for MPOL_F_NUMA_BALANCING Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] mm: mempolicy: Revise comment regarding mempolicy mode flags Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mm, security: Fix missed security_task_movememory() Yafang Shao
2023-12-01 20:50   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2023-12-03  2:57     ` Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` Yafang Shao [this message]
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] security: selinux: Implement set_mempolicy hook Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] selftests/bpf: Add selftests for set_mempolicy with a lsm prog Yafang Shao
2023-12-01  9:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] NOT kernel/man2/mbind.2: Add mode flag MPOL_F_NUMA_BALANCING Yafang Shao

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