[PATCH v39 04/42] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs

[Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>]

Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.

This requires adding the LSM of interest as a parameter
to three of the audit hooks.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
To: audit@vger.kernel.org
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy |  8 +++-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h        |  7 +--
 include/linux/security.h             | 26 +++++++---
 security/apparmor/audit.c            | 15 ++++--
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |  7 +--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c  | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/security.c                  | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 security/selinux/include/audit.h     | 10 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c       | 15 ++++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c           | 12 ++++-
 10 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index c2385183826c..a59291b97c24 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
 				[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
 				[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
-				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
 			option:	[digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
 				[appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
 				[appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ Description:
 
 			measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
+		It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+		module a rule applies to using lsm=.  If the security
+		module specified is not active on the system the rule
+		will be rejected.  If lsm= is not specified the first
+		security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
 		Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
 
 			measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index c925a0d26edf..2159013890aa 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -392,10 +392,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-	 void **lsmrule)
+	 void **lsmrule, int lsmid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+	 int lsmid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d4103b6cd3fc..2320ed78c4de 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
 extern int security_init(void);
 extern int early_security_init(void);
 extern u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name);
+extern u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name);
+extern const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id);
 
 /* Security operations */
 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr);
@@ -536,6 +538,16 @@ static inline u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name)
 	return LSM_ATTR_UNDEF;
 }
 
+static inline u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name)
+{
+	return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+}
+
+static inline const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
 {
 }
@@ -2030,25 +2042,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			 int lsmid);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+			  int lsmid);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid);
 
 #else
 
 static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-					   void **lsmrule)
+				       void **lsmrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void *lsmrule)
+					void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
 { }
 
 #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 45beb1c5f747..0a9f0019355a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -206,10 +206,12 @@ struct aa_audit_rule {
 	struct aa_label *label;
 };
 
-void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
+		return;
 	if (rule) {
 		if (!IS_ERR(rule->label))
 			aa_put_label(rule->label);
@@ -217,10 +219,13 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 	}
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+		       int lsmid)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
+		return 0;
 	switch (field) {
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
@@ -240,7 +245,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 				     GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
-		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
+		aa_audit_rule_free(rule, LSM_ID_APPARMOR);
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -264,12 +269,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	int found = 0;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
+		return 0;
 	label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
 
 	if (!label)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index acbb03b9bd25..a75c45dd059f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -199,9 +199,10 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 	return error;
 }
 
-void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
+void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid);
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+		       int lsmid);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid);
 
 #endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index f69062617754..a563e0478cc6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
 		void *rule;	/* LSM file metadata specific */
 		char *args_p;	/* audit value */
 		int type;	/* audit type */
+		int lsm_id;	/* which LSM rule applies to */
+		bool lsm_specific;	/* true if lsm is specified */
 	} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
 	char *fsname;
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
@@ -309,6 +311,25 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
+static int default_rules_lsm __ro_after_init = LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+	int newdrl;
+
+	newdrl = lsm_name_to_id(str);
+	if (newdrl >= 0) {
+		default_rules_lsm = newdrl;
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	pr_err("default ima rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, value unchanged.",
+		str);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
 static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -380,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 		kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 }
@@ -425,7 +447,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -451,7 +474,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * be owned by nentry.
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 	kfree(entry);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -650,14 +674,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
 			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
-						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
 			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
-						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 			break;
 		default:
 			break;
@@ -680,7 +706,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 out:
 	if (rule_reinitialized) {
 		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
-			ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+			ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
+					     lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
 		kfree(lsm_rule);
 	}
 	return result;
@@ -1073,7 +1100,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
 	Opt_digest_type,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
 	Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
-	Opt_label, Opt_err
+	Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
 };
 
 static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1121,6 +1148,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
 	{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
 	{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
+	{Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
 	{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
@@ -1140,7 +1168,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
 				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].lsm_id);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1878,6 +1907,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 						 &(template_desc->num_fields));
 			entry->template = template_desc;
 			break;
+		case Opt_lsm: {
+			int i;
+
+			result = lsm_name_to_id(args[0].from);
+			if (result < 0) {
+				for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+					entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+				entry->lsm[i].lsm_id = result;
+				entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = true;
+			}
+			result = 0;
+			break;
+			}
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
 			result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1923,6 +1969,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
 	int audit_info = 0;
+	int i;
 
 	p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
 	len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1940,6 +1987,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+		entry->lsm[i].lsm_id = default_rules_lsm;
+		entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = false;
+	}
+
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
 		ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2251,6 +2303,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 					   entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 				break;
 			}
+			if (entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific)
+				seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
+				    lsm_id_to_name(entry->lsm[i].lsm_id));
 			seq_puts(m, " ");
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0a51e3d23570..cdf9ee12b064 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -271,6 +271,46 @@ static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
 u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init;
 const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT];
 
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_id - get the LSM ID for a registered LSM
+ * @name: the name of the LSM
+ *
+ * Returns the LSM ID associated with the named LSM or
+ * LSM_ID_UNDEF if the name isn't recongnized.
+ */
+u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSM_CONFIG_COUNT; i++) {
+		if (!lsm_idlist[i]->name)
+			return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+		if (!strcmp(name, lsm_idlist[i]->name))
+			return lsm_idlist[i]->id;
+	}
+	return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
+}
+
+/**
+ * lsm_id_to_name - get the LSM name for a registered LSM ID
+ * @id: the ID of the LSM
+ *
+ * Returns the LSM name associated with the LSM ID or
+ * NULL if the ID isn't recongnized.
+ */
+const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < LSM_CONFIG_COUNT; i++) {
+		if (!lsm_idlist[i]->name)
+			return NULL;
+		if (id == lsm_idlist[i]->id)
+			return lsm_idlist[i]->name;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
 {
@@ -5336,7 +5376,8 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule,
+			     LSM_ID_UNDEF);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5362,7 +5403,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
  */
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 {
-	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule, LSM_ID_UNDEF);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5380,7 +5421,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
  */
 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+			     LSM_ID_UNDEF);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
@@ -5389,19 +5431,23 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
  * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
  * the audit subsystem.
  */
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			 int lsmid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule,
+			     lsmid);
 }
 
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
 {
-	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+	call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule, lsmid);
 }
 
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+			  int lsmid)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+			     lsmid);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index d5495134a5b9..59468baf0c91 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -21,21 +21,24 @@
  *	@op: the operator the rule uses
  *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
  *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *	@lsmid: the relevant LSM
  *
  *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
  *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
+			    int lsmid);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
  *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *	@lsmid: which LSM this rule relates to
  *
  *	This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
  *	If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
  */
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule, int lsmid);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
@@ -43,11 +46,12 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  *	@field: the field this rule refers to
  *	@op: the operator the rule uses
  *	@rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ *	@lsmid: the relevant LSM
  *
  *	Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
  *	-errno on failure.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, int lsmid);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 1eeffc66ea7d..a9fe8d85acae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3487,17 +3487,20 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
 	struct context au_ctxt;
 };
 
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
+		return;
 	if (rule) {
 		context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
 		kfree(rule);
 	}
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+			    int lsmid)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3511,6 +3514,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	*rule = NULL;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
+		return 0;
 	if (!selinux_initialized())
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -3592,7 +3597,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 err:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+	selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule, LSM_ID_SELINUX);
 	*rule = NULL;
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -3622,7 +3627,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3631,6 +3636,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	int match = 0;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
+		return 0;
 	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index cd44f7f3f393..4342947f51d8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4672,16 +4672,20 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
  * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
  * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
  *
  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
  * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+				 int lsmid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
 	*rule = NULL;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SMACK)
+		return 0;
 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -4726,15 +4730,19 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
  * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
  * @op: required testing operator
  * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
+ * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
  *
  * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
  * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+				  int lsmid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
 
+	if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SMACK)
+		return 0;
 	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
 		return -ENOENT;
-- 
2.41.0