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From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	brauner@kernel.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 08/30] bpf: consistently use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 18:21:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240124022127.2379740-9-andrii@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240124022127.2379740-1-andrii@kernel.org>

Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable()
in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make
decisions about privileges.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/bpf.h    | 16 ++++++++--------
 include/linux/filter.h |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/arraymap.c  |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/core.c      |  2 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c  | 13 ++++++-------
 net/core/filter.c      |  4 ++--
 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 87694115fac0..1b556c74f43f 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -2232,24 +2232,24 @@ extern int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
 
 bool bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap);
 
-static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(void)
+static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(const struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return perfmon_capable();
+	return bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
 }
 
-static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void)
+static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(const struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return perfmon_capable();
+	return bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
 }
 
-static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(void)
+static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(const struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return cpu_mitigations_off() || perfmon_capable();
+	return cpu_mitigations_off() || bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
 }
 
-static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(void)
+static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(const struct bpf_token *token)
 {
-	return cpu_mitigations_off() || perfmon_capable();
+	return cpu_mitigations_off() || bpf_token_capable(token, CAP_PERFMON);
 }
 
 int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 35f067fd3840..fee070b9826e 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -1140,7 +1140,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_jit_blinding_enabled(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 		return false;
 	if (!bpf_jit_harden)
 		return false;
-	if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_capable())
+	if (bpf_jit_harden == 1 && bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
index 0bdbbbeab155..13358675ff2e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static struct bpf_map *array_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	bool percpu = attr->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY;
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
 	u32 elem_size, index_mask, max_entries;
-	bool bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
+	bool bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(NULL);
 	u64 array_size, mask64;
 	struct bpf_array *array;
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 00dccba29769..71c459a51d9e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static bool bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(const struct bpf_prog *fp)
 void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 	if (!bpf_prog_kallsyms_candidate(fp) ||
-	    !bpf_capable())
+	    !bpf_token_capable(fp->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
 		return;
 
 	bpf_prog_ksym_set_addr(fp);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9e9cc132dd02..73ae8b45b641 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -20816,7 +20816,12 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
 	env->prog = *prog;
 	env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[env->prog->type];
 	env->fd_array = make_bpfptr(attr->fd_array, uattr.is_kernel);
-	is_priv = bpf_capable();
+
+	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks(env->prog->aux->token);
+	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack(env->prog->aux->token);
+	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1(env->prog->aux->token);
+	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4(env->prog->aux->token);
+	env->bpf_capable = is_priv = bpf_token_capable(env->prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF);
 
 	bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
 
@@ -20848,12 +20853,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
 	if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
 		env->strict_alignment = false;
 
-	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
-	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
-	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
-	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
-	env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();
-
 	if (is_priv)
 		env->test_state_freq = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ;
 	env->test_reg_invariants = attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS;
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 521bcd0f5e4d..40121475e8d1 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -8580,7 +8580,7 @@ static bool cg_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 		return false;
 	case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data):
 	case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, data_end):
-		if (!bpf_capable())
+		if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
 			return false;
 		break;
 	}
@@ -8592,7 +8592,7 @@ static bool cg_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size,
 		case bpf_ctx_range_till(struct __sk_buff, cb[0], cb[4]):
 			break;
 		case bpf_ctx_range(struct __sk_buff, tstamp):
-			if (!bpf_capable())
+			if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_BPF))
 				return false;
 			break;
 		default:
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-24  2:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-24  2:20 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/30] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:20 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 01/30] bpf: align CAP_NET_ADMIN checks with bpf_capable() approach Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:20 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 02/30] bpf: add BPF token delegation mount options to BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 03/30] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 04/30] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 05/30] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 06/30] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 07/30] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` Andrii Nakryiko [this message]
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 09/30] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free LSM hooks Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 10/30] bpf,lsm: refactor bpf_map_alloc/bpf_map_free " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 11/30] bpf,lsm: add BPF token " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 12/30] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 13/30] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 14/30] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 15/30] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 16/30] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled tests Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 17/30] bpf,selinux: allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 18/30] bpf: fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 19/30] bpf: support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 20/30] selftests/bpf: utilize string values for delegate_xxx " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 21/30] libbpf: split feature detectors definitions from cached results Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 22/30] libbpf: further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 23/30] libbpf: move feature detection code into its own file Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 24/30] libbpf: wire up token_fd into feature probing logic Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 25/30] libbpf: wire up BPF token support at BPF object level Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 26/30] selftests/bpf: add BPF object loading tests with explicit token passing Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 27/30] selftests/bpf: add tests for BPF object load with implicit token Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 28/30] libbpf: support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 29/30] selftests/bpf: add tests for " Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-24  2:21 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 30/30] selftests/bpf: incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests Andrii Nakryiko
2024-01-25  0:10 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/30] BPF token patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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