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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
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	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:11:15 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240126041126.1927228-16-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240126041126.1927228-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>

Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator, if they
have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case add
them to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed
or touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.

Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c    | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index d3ccb7a0c7e9..435ba9bc4510 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
 int psmash(u64 pfn);
 int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int asid, bool immutable);
 int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int as
 	return -ENODEV;
 }
 static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 1a13eff78c9d..649ac1bb6b0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
 static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init;
 static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init;
 
+static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+
+static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
 
@@ -505,3 +510,32 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
 	return rmpupdate(pfn, &state);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
+
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+	pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages);
+
+	spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+	while (npages--) {
+		/*
+		 * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked
+		 * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently
+		 * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list.
+		 */
+		if (likely(!PageCompound(page)) ||
+		    (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages))
+			/*
+			 * Skip inserting tail pages of compound page as
+			 * page->buddy_list of tail pages is not usable.
+			 */
+			list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
+		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+		snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
+		pfn++;
+		page++;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-26  4:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-26  4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV-SNP " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54         ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 11:42           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 15:45             ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 11:59                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26                   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Adjust the directmap to avoid inadvertent " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] crypto: ccp: Provide an " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-29 14:26   ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Introduce an SNP " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-02-07 17:13   ` [tip: x86/sev] iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry() tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov

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