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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
	<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
	<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
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	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
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	<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:11:07 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240126041126.1927228-8-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240126041126.1927228-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

This information will be useful for debugging things like page faults
due to RMP access violations and RMPUPDATE failures.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: move helper to standalone patch, rework dump logic as suggested by
      Boris ]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h |  2 +
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c    | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 01ce61b283a3..2c53e3de0b71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -247,9 +247,11 @@ static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; }
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
 bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void);
 int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level);
+void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 7669b2ff0ec7..c74266e039b2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -35,16 +35,21 @@
  * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor.
  */
 struct rmpentry {
-	u64	assigned	: 1,
-		pagesize	: 1,
-		immutable	: 1,
-		rsvd1		: 9,
-		gpa		: 39,
-		asid		: 10,
-		vmsa		: 1,
-		validated	: 1,
-		rsvd2		: 1;
-	u64 rsvd3;
+	union {
+		struct {
+			u64 assigned	: 1,
+			    pagesize	: 1,
+			    immutable	: 1,
+			    rsvd1	: 9,
+			    gpa		: 39,
+			    asid	: 10,
+			    vmsa	: 1,
+			    validated	: 1,
+			    rsvd2	: 1;
+		};
+		u64 lo;
+	};
+	u64 hi;
 } __packed;
 
 /*
@@ -263,3 +268,77 @@ int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level)
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_lookup_rmpentry);
+
+/*
+ * Dump the raw RMP entry for a particular PFN. These bits are documented in the
+ * PPR for a particular CPU model and provide useful information about how a
+ * particular PFN is being utilized by the kernel/firmware at the time certain
+ * unexpected events occur, such as RMP faults.
+ */
+static void dump_rmpentry(u64 pfn)
+{
+	u64 pfn_i, pfn_end;
+	struct rmpentry *e;
+	int level;
+
+	e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &level);
+	if (IS_ERR(e)) {
+		pr_err("Failed to read RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx, error %ld\n",
+		       pfn, PTR_ERR(e));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (e->assigned) {
+		pr_info("PFN 0x%llx, RMP entry: [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+			pfn, e->lo, e->hi);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the RMP entry for a particular PFN is not in an assigned state,
+	 * then it is sometimes useful to get an idea of whether or not any RMP
+	 * entries for other PFNs within the same 2MB region are assigned, since
+	 * those too can affect the ability to access a particular PFN in
+	 * certain situations, such as when the PFN is being accessed via a 2MB
+	 * mapping in the host page table.
+	 */
+	pfn_i = ALIGN_DOWN(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD);
+	pfn_end = pfn_i + PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+	pr_info("PFN 0x%llx unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x%llx - 0x%llx]\n",
+		pfn, pfn_i, pfn_end);
+
+	while (pfn_i < pfn_end) {
+		e = __snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn_i, &level);
+		if (IS_ERR(e)) {
+			pr_err("Error %ld reading RMP entry for PFN 0x%llx\n",
+			       PTR_ERR(e), pfn_i);
+			pfn_i++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (e->lo || e->hi)
+			pr_info("PFN: 0x%llx, [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n", pfn_i, e->lo, e->hi);
+		pfn_i++;
+	}
+}
+
+void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long hva)
+{
+	unsigned long paddr;
+	unsigned int level;
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
+	pgd += pgd_index(hva);
+	pte = lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd, hva, &level);
+
+	if (!pte) {
+		pr_err("Can't dump RMP entry for HVA %lx: no PTE/PFN found\n", hva);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	paddr = PFN_PHYS(pte_pfn(*pte)) | (hva & ~page_level_mask(level));
+	dump_rmpentry(PHYS_PFN(paddr));
+}
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-26  4:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-26  4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV-SNP " tip-bot2 for Kim Phillips
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP host " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54         ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 11:42           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 15:45             ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 11:59                 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26                   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Adjust the directmap to avoid inadvertent " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] crypto: ccp: Provide an " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-29 14:26   ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Introduce an SNP " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:26   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-02-07 17:13   ` [tip: x86/sev] iommu/amd: Fix failure return from snp_lookup_rmpentry() tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Ashish Kalra
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Michael Roth
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Tom Lendacky
2024-01-26  4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18   ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:25   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Brijesh Singh
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov

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