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From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v8 22/38] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 12:25:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-22-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>

As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
shadow stack page.

Implement this for arm64.  Two flags are provided, allowing applications
to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the
top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that.
We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a
NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 95f5cf599bc6..f34821d98d85 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -115,6 +115,67 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return addr;
 }
 
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+	unsigned long alloc_size;
+	unsigned long __user *cap_ptr;
+	unsigned long cap_val;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int cap_offset;
+
+	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (size == 8 || size % 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+	 * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+	 * error code and block it.
+	 */
+	alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+	if (alloc_size < size)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size, 0, false);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it
+	 * can be switched to.
+	 */
+	if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) {
+		/* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */
+		if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)
+			cap_offset = 2;
+		else
+			cap_offset = 1;
+
+		cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size -
+						   (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+		cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr);
+
+		put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			vm_munmap(addr, size);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/* Ensure the new cap is viaible for GCS */
+		gcsb_dsync();
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
 /*
  * Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the
  * hardware.

-- 
2.30.2


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v8 22/38] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 12:25:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-22-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>

As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
shadow stack page.

Implement this for arm64.  Two flags are provided, allowing applications
to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the
top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that.
We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a
NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 95f5cf599bc6..f34821d98d85 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -115,6 +115,67 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return addr;
 }
 
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+	unsigned long alloc_size;
+	unsigned long __user *cap_ptr;
+	unsigned long cap_val;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int cap_offset;
+
+	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (size == 8 || size % 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+	 * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+	 * error code and block it.
+	 */
+	alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+	if (alloc_size < size)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size, 0, false);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it
+	 * can be switched to.
+	 */
+	if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) {
+		/* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */
+		if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)
+			cap_offset = 2;
+		else
+			cap_offset = 1;
+
+		cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size -
+						   (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+		cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr);
+
+		put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			vm_munmap(addr, size);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/* Ensure the new cap is viaible for GCS */
+		gcsb_dsync();
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
 /*
  * Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the
  * hardware.

-- 
2.30.2


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	 Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	 Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,  Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	 "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	 Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	 Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	 kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	 linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v8 22/38] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack()
Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 12:25:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-22-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240203-arm64-gcs-v8-0-c9fec77673ef@kernel.org>

As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
security requirements for guarded control stacks since they lead to
windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which
are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall
map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a
shadow stack page.

Implement this for arm64.  Two flags are provided, allowing applications
to request that the stack be initialised with a valid cap token at the
top of the stack and optionally also an end of stack marker above that.
We support requesting an end of stack marker alone but since this is a
NULL pointer it is indistinguishable from not initialising anything by
itself.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
---
 arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
index 95f5cf599bc6..f34821d98d85 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/gcs.c
@@ -115,6 +115,67 @@ unsigned long gcs_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return addr;
 }
 
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+	unsigned long alloc_size;
+	unsigned long __user *cap_ptr;
+	unsigned long cap_val;
+	int ret = 0;
+	int cap_offset;
+
+	if (!system_supports_gcs())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags & ~(SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN | SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (addr && (addr % PAGE_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (size == 8 || size % 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+	 * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+	 * error code and block it.
+	 */
+	alloc_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+	if (alloc_size < size)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	addr = alloc_gcs(addr, alloc_size, 0, false);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return addr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Put a cap token at the end of the allocated region so it
+	 * can be switched to.
+	 */
+	if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) {
+		/* Leave an extra empty frame as a top of stack marker? */
+		if (flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_MARKER)
+			cap_offset = 2;
+		else
+			cap_offset = 1;
+
+		cap_ptr = (unsigned long __user *)(addr + size -
+						   (cap_offset * sizeof(unsigned long)));
+		cap_val = GCS_CAP(cap_ptr);
+
+		put_user_gcs(cap_val, cap_ptr, &ret);
+		if (ret != 0) {
+			vm_munmap(addr, size);
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		/* Ensure the new cap is viaible for GCS */
+		gcsb_dsync();
+	}
+
+	return addr;
+}
+
 /*
  * Apply the GCS mode configured for the specified task to the
  * hardware.

-- 
2.30.2


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-03 12:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 270+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-03 12:25 [PATCH v8 00/38] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 01/38] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 02/38] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 03/38] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 04/38] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 05/38] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 06/38] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 07/38] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 08/38] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 09/38] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 10/38] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 11/38] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 12/38] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 13/38] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05  9:46   ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05  9:46     ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05  9:46     ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05 12:35     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05 12:35       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05 12:35       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05 15:34       ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05 15:34         ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05 15:34         ` Marc Zyngier
2024-02-05 16:58         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05 16:58           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-05 16:58           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 14/38] arm64/gcs: Allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 15/38] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 16/38] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 17/38] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 18/38] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 19/38] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 20/38] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20  2:02   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:02     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:02     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-21 18:16     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 18:16       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 18:16       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 21/38] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` Mark Brown [this message]
2024-02-03 12:25   ` [PATCH v8 22/38] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 23/38] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20  2:03   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:03     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:03     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 24/38] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 25/38] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 26/38] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 27/38] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 28/38] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 29/38] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 30/38] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 31/38] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 32/38] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25 ` [PATCH v8 33/38] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:25   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20  2:15   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:15     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:15     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-21 19:20     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 19:20       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 19:20       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 19:11     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 19:11       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 19:11       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-23  2:24       ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-23  2:24         ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-23  2:24         ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-27 16:14         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-27 16:14           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-27 16:14           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-27 19:08           ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-27 19:08             ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-27 19:08             ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-29 21:45         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-29 21:45           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-29 21:45           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-29 22:13           ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-29 22:13             ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-29 22:13             ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-03 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 34/38] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 35/38] selftests/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20  2:17   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:17     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:17     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-03 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 36/38] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 37/38] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26 ` [PATCH v8 38/38] kselftest: Provide shadow stack enable helpers for arm64 Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-03 12:26   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20  2:00 ` [PATCH v8 00/38] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:00   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20  2:00   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2024-02-20 16:36 ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-20 16:36   ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-20 16:36   ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-20 18:41   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 18:41     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 18:41     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 18:57     ` [musl] " Rich Felker
2024-02-20 18:57       ` Rich Felker
2024-02-20 18:57       ` Rich Felker
2024-02-20 23:30       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 23:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 23:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 23:54         ` dalias
2024-02-20 23:54           ` dalias
2024-02-20 23:54           ` dalias
2024-02-21  0:35           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  0:35             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  0:35             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  0:44             ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  0:44               ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  0:44               ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  1:27             ` dalias
2024-02-21  1:27               ` dalias
2024-02-21  1:27               ` dalias
2024-02-21  2:11               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  2:11                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  2:11                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  4:18                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  4:18                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  4:18                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 13:53               ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 13:53                 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 13:53                 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 14:58                 ` dalias
2024-02-21 14:58                   ` dalias
2024-02-21 14:58                   ` dalias
2024-02-21 17:36                   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 17:36                     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 17:36                     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 17:57                     ` dalias
2024-02-21 17:57                       ` dalias
2024-02-21 17:57                       ` dalias
2024-02-21 18:12                       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 18:12                         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 18:12                         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 18:30                         ` dalias
2024-02-21 18:30                           ` dalias
2024-02-21 18:30                           ` dalias
2024-02-21 18:53                           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 18:53                             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 18:53                             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 19:06                             ` dalias
2024-02-21 19:06                               ` dalias
2024-02-21 19:06                               ` dalias
2024-02-21 19:22                               ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 19:22                                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 19:22                                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21 20:18                                 ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:18                                   ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:18                                   ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:25                                   ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:25                                     ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:25                                     ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 21:12                                     ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 21:12                                       ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 21:12                                       ` H.J. Lu
2024-02-21 20:18                                 ` dalias
2024-02-21 20:18                                   ` dalias
2024-02-21 20:18                                   ` dalias
2024-02-22 13:57                                 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 13:57                                   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 13:57                                   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 18:32                       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 18:32                         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 18:32                         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21 19:10                         ` dalias
2024-02-21 19:10                           ` dalias
2024-02-21 19:10                           ` dalias
2024-03-02 14:57                     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2024-03-02 14:57                       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2024-03-02 14:57                       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2024-03-02 15:05                       ` H.J. Lu
2024-03-02 15:05                         ` H.J. Lu
2024-03-02 15:05                         ` H.J. Lu
2024-03-14 14:03                       ` Mark Brown
2024-03-14 14:03                         ` Mark Brown
2024-03-14 14:03                         ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20 23:59         ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-20 23:59           ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-20 23:59           ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-02-21  0:40           ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  0:40             ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  0:40             ` Mark Brown
2024-02-21  4:30           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  4:30             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-21  4:30             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 20:14     ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20 20:14       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20 20:14       ` Mark Brown
2024-02-20 23:30       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 23:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-02-20 23:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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