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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>,
	Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	 Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>,
	 Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	 David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 18:41:37 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240228024147.41573-7-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240228024147.41573-1-seanjc@google.com>

WARN if bits 63:32 are non-zero when handling an intercepted legacy #PF,
as the error code for #PF is limited to 32 bits (and in practice, 16 bits
on Intel CPUS).  This behavior is architectural, is part of KVM's ABI
(see kvm_vcpu_events.error_code), and is explicitly documented as being
preserved for intecerpted #PF in both the APM:

  The error code saved in EXITINFO1 is the same as would be pushed onto
  the stack by a non-intercepted #PF exception in protected mode.

and even more explicitly in the SDM as VMCS.VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE is a
32-bit field.

Simply drop the upper bits of hardware provides garbage, as spurious
information should do no harm (though in all likelihood hardware is buggy
and the kernel is doomed).

Handling all upper 32 bits in the #PF path will allow moving the sanity
check on synthetic checks from kvm_mmu_page_fault() to npf_interception(),
which in turn will allow deriving PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS from AMD's
PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK without running afoul of the sanity check.

Note, this also why Intel uses bit 15 for SGX (highest bit on Intel CPUs)
and AMD uses bit 31 for RMP (highest bit on AMD CPUs); using the highest
bit minimizes the probability of a collision with the "other" vendor,
without needing to plumb more bits through microcode.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 7807bdcd87e8..5d892bd59c97 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4553,6 +4553,13 @@ int kvm_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 error_code,
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(fault_address >> 32))
 		return -EFAULT;
 #endif
+	/*
+	 * Legacy #PF exception only have a 32-bit error code.  Simply drop the
+	 * upper bits as KVM doesn't use them for #PF (because they are never
+	 * set), and to ensure there are no collisions with KVM-defined bits.
+	 */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code >> 32))
+		error_code = lower_32_bits(error_code);
 
 	vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = true;
 	if (!flags) {
-- 
2.44.0.278.ge034bb2e1d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-28  2:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-28  2:41 [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 01/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Exit to userspace with -EFAULT if private fault hits emulation Sean Christopherson
2024-03-01  8:48   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-03-07 12:52   ` Gupta, Pankaj
2024-03-12  2:59     ` Binbin Wu
2024-04-04 16:38       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-08  4:22   ` Yan Zhao
2024-04-04 16:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 02/16] KVM: x86: Remove separate "bit" defines for page fault error code masks Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 12:44   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 18:40     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 20:56       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-02-29 13:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-29 15:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 03/16] KVM: x86: Define more SEV+ page fault error bits/flags for #NPF Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  4:43   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:16     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 04/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Pass full 64-bit error code when handling page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  7:30   ` Dongli Zhang
2024-02-28 16:22     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 13:32       ` Dongli Zhang
2024-03-05  3:55   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 05/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Use synthetic page fault error code to indicate private faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 11:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 15:17     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  9:43   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-06 14:45     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  9:05       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-07 14:36         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:34   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-02-29 22:11   ` [PATCH 06/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN if upper 32 bits of legacy #PF error code are non-zero Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:07     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-12  5:44       ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 07/16] KVM: x86: Move synthetic PFERR_* sanity checks to SVM's #NPF handler Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:19   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 22:52     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:14       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-12  9:44   ` Binbin Wu
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 08/16] KVM: x86/mmu: WARN and skip MMIO cache on private, reserved page faults Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 22:26   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-29 23:06     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-29 23:21       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-04 15:51         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 21:32           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 09/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move private vs. shared check above slot validity checks Sean Christopherson
2024-03-05 23:06   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  0:38     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06  1:22       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06  2:02         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:06           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:49             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:28               ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-08  4:54   ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-08 23:28     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11  4:43       ` Xu Yilun
2024-03-12  0:08         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 10/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Don't force emulation of L2 accesses to non-APIC internal slots Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:03   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 11/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly disallow private accesses to emulated MMIO Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:35   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 22:43     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 22:49       ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-06 23:01         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-06 23:20           ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07 17:10         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-03-08  0:09           ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 12/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Move slot checks from __kvm_faultin_pfn() to kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:11   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 13/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle no-slot faults at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn() Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:48   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  0:53     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 14/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Set kvm_page_fault.hva to KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD for "no slot" faults Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:50   ` Huang, Kai
2024-03-07  1:01     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 15/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Initialize kvm_page_fault's pfn and hva to error values Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-02-28  2:41 ` [PATCH 16/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Sanity check that __kvm_faultin_pfn() doesn't create noslot pfns Sean Christopherson
2024-03-07  0:46   ` Huang, Kai
2024-04-17 12:48 ` [PATCH 00/16] KVM: x86/mmu: Page fault and MMIO cleanups Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-18 15:40   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-19  6:47   ` Xiaoyao Li

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