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From: mhkelley58@gmail.com
To: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, kys@microsoft.com,
	haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, davem@davemloft.net,
	edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
	kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Cc: sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, elena.reshetova@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Track decrypted status in vmbus_gpadl
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240311161558.1310-1-mhklinux@outlook.com>

From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause
set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an
error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to
take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared)
memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security
issues.

In order to make sure callers of vmbus_establish_gpadl() and
vmbus_teardown_gpadl() don't return decrypted/shared pages to
allocators, add a field in struct vmbus_gpadl to keep track of the
decryption status of the buffers. This will allow the callers to
know if they should free or leak the pages.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
---
 drivers/hv/channel.c   | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 include/linux/hyperv.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c
index 56f7e06c673e..bb5abdcda18f 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/channel.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c
@@ -472,9 +472,18 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 		(atomic_inc_return(&vmbus_connection.next_gpadl_handle) - 1);
 
 	ret = create_gpadl_header(type, kbuffer, size, send_offset, &msginfo);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		gpadl->decrypted = false;
 		return ret;
+	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Set the "decrypted" flag to true for the set_memory_decrypted()
+	 * success case. In the failure case, the encryption state of the
+	 * memory is unknown. Leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the
+	 * memory will be leaked instead of going back on the free list.
+	 */
+	gpadl->decrypted = true;
 	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
 				   PFN_UP(size));
 	if (ret) {
@@ -563,9 +572,15 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 
 	kfree(msginfo);
 
-	if (ret)
-		set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
-				     PFN_UP(size));
+	if (ret) {
+		/*
+		 * If set_memory_encrypted() fails, the decrypted flag is
+		 * left as true so the memory is leaked instead of being
+		 * put back on the free list.
+		 */
+		if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size)))
+			gpadl->decrypted = false;
+	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -886,6 +901,8 @@ int vmbus_teardown_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, struct vmbus_gpadl *gpad
 	if (ret)
 		pr_warn("Fail to set mem host visibility in GPADL teardown %d.\n", ret);
 
+	gpadl->decrypted = ret;
+
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmbus_teardown_gpadl);
diff --git a/include/linux/hyperv.h b/include/linux/hyperv.h
index 2b00faf98017..5bac136c268c 100644
--- a/include/linux/hyperv.h
+++ b/include/linux/hyperv.h
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ struct vmbus_gpadl {
 	u32 gpadl_handle;
 	u32 size;
 	void *buffer;
+	bool decrypted;
 };
 
 struct vmbus_channel {
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-03-11 16:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-11 16:15 [PATCH 0/5] Handle set_memory_XXcrypted() errors in Hyper-V mhkelley58
2024-03-11 16:15 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if set_memory_encrypted() fails mhkelley58
2024-03-12  2:56   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:15 ` mhkelley58 [this message]
2024-03-12  5:02   ` [PATCH v2 2/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Track decrypted status in vmbus_gpadl Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12  5:45     ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12  6:07     ` Michael Kelley
2024-03-12 15:22       ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-14 13:56         ` Michael Kelley
2024-03-11 16:15 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] hv_netvsc: Don't free decrypted memory mhkelley58
2024-03-12  5:03   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:15 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] uio_hv_generic: " mhkelley58
2024-03-12  5:04   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-11 16:15 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't free ring buffers that couldn't be re-encrypted mhkelley58
2024-03-12 15:16   ` Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
2024-03-12 14:52 ` [PATCH 0/5] Handle set_memory_XXcrypted() errors in Hyper-V Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-04-10 21:34 ` Wei Liu
2024-04-11 21:07   ` Edgecombe, Rick P

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