All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
	"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
	"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Konstantin Meskhidze" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
	"Matt Bobrowski" <repnop@google.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 13:39:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240325134004.4074874-2-gnoack@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240325134004.4074874-1-gnoack@google.com>

If security_file_ioctl or security_file_ioctl_compat return
ENOFILEOPS, the IOCTL logic in fs/ioctl.c will permit the given IOCTL
command, but only as long as the IOCTL command is implemented directly
in fs/ioctl.c and does not use the f_ops->unhandled_ioctl or
f_ops->compat_ioctl operations, which are defined by the given file.

The possible return values for security_file_ioctl and
security_file_ioctl_compat are now:

 * 0 - to permit the IOCTL
 * ENOFILEOPS - to permit the IOCTL, but forbid it if it needs to fall
   back to the file implementation.
 * any other error - to forbid the IOCTL and return that error

This is an alternative to the previously discussed approaches [1] and [2],
and implements the proposal from [3].

Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240309075320.160128-2-gnoack@google.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322151002.3653639-2-gnoack@google.com/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32b1164e-9d5f-40c0-9a4e-001b2c9b822f@app.fastmail.com/ [3]
Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
---
 fs/ioctl.c               | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/security.h |  6 ++++++
 security/security.c      | 10 ++++++++--
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ioctl.c b/fs/ioctl.c
index 76cf22ac97d7..8244354ad04d 100644
--- a/fs/ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/ioctl.c
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static int do_vfs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int fd,
 
 	case FIONREAD:
 		if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-			return vfs_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg);
+			return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
 
 		return put_user(i_size_read(inode) - filp->f_pos,
 				(int __user *)argp);
@@ -858,17 +858,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd, unsigned long, arg)
 {
 	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
 	int error;
+	bool use_file_ops = true;
 
 	if (!f.file)
 		return -EBADF;
 
 	error = security_file_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
-	if (error)
+	if (error == -ENOFILEOPS)
+		use_file_ops = false;
+	else if (error)
 		goto out;
 
 	error = do_vfs_ioctl(f.file, fd, cmd, arg);
-	if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
-		error = vfs_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
+	if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD) {
+		if (use_file_ops)
+			error = vfs_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
+		else
+			error = -EACCES;
+	}
 
 out:
 	fdput(f);
@@ -916,12 +923,15 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd,
 {
 	struct fd f = fdget(fd);
 	int error;
+	bool use_file_ops = true;
 
 	if (!f.file)
 		return -EBADF;
 
 	error = security_file_ioctl_compat(f.file, cmd, arg);
-	if (error)
+	if (error == -ENOFILEOPS)
+		use_file_ops = false;
+	else if (error)
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -967,6 +977,11 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, unsigned int, fd, unsigned int, cmd,
 		if (error != -ENOIOCTLCMD)
 			break;
 
+		if (!use_file_ops) {
+			error = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		if (f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl)
 			error = f.file->f_op->compat_ioctl(f.file, cmd, arg);
 		if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index d0eb20f90b26..b769dc888d07 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -248,6 +248,12 @@ static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = {
 	__kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify)
 };
 
+/*
+ * Returned by security_file_ioctl and security_file_ioctl_compat to indicate
+ * that the IOCTL request may not be dispatched to the file's f_ops IOCTL impl.
+ */
+#define ENOFILEOPS 532
+
 static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 {
 	if ((unsigned)id >= LOADING_MAX_ID)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7035ee35a393..000c54a1e541 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2719,7 +2719,10 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file)
  * value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used
  * by the security module.
  *
- * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.  Returns -ENOFILEOPS if
+ *         permission is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by
+ *         f_ops->unlocked_ioctl().  Returns another negative error code is
+ *         permission is denied.
  */
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -2736,7 +2739,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
  * Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit
  * processes running on 64-bit kernels.
  *
- * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. Returns -ENOFILEOPS if permission
+ *         is granted for IOCTL commands that do not get handled by
+ *         f_ops->compat_ioctl().  Returns another negative error code is
+ *         permission is denied.
  */
 int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			       unsigned long arg)
-- 
2.44.0.396.g6e790dbe36-goog


  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-25 13:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-25 13:39 [PATCH v12 0/9] Landlock: IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2024-03-25 14:28   ` [PATCH v12 1/9] security: Introduce ENOFILEOPS return value for IOCTL hooks Günther Noack
2024-03-25 15:19   ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26  8:32     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26  9:33       ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26 10:10         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26 11:58           ` Arnd Bergmann
2024-03-26 13:09             ` Günther Noack
2024-03-26 14:28               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-03-26 18:52   ` Paul Moore
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 2/9] landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 3/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:39 ` [PATCH v12 4/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 5/9] selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH) Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 6/9] selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 7/9] selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 8/9] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV Günther Noack
2024-03-25 13:40 ` [PATCH v12 9/9] landlock: Document IOCTL support Günther Noack

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240325134004.4074874-2-gnoack@google.com \
    --to=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=allenwebb@google.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=dtor@google.com \
    --cc=jeffxu@google.com \
    --cc=jorgelo@chromium.org \
    --cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=repnop@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.